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This dissertation is a history of construction work and the construction industry in twentieth-century 
Palestine/Israel, from British rule after World War I, through the first twenty-five years of Israeli statehood 
and Palestinians’ ongoing Nakba (catastrophe). It is primarily a study of the relationship between the 
history of construction work and the construction industry in the literal sense, and between social and 
cultural processes frequently understood through construction as metaphor: nation- and state-building, 
and the construction of social difference. The dissertation examines these histories of construction in 
Israel/Palestine through multiple lenses, combining histories of labor, the body and the senses, race, 
political economy, and material culture. It analyzes the shifts from Zionist-Palestinian competition over 
work, resources and production under the British Mandate; through the transformation of the construction 
industry’s workforce into one based on marginalized and racialized Mizrahi Jews (Jews from Muslim 
lands), and Palestinian citizens in Israel in the decades following Israel’s establishment and the Nakba in 
1948. I trace these shifts and their implications using sources from archives in Israel/Palestine, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States, newspapers, literature, film, workers’ songs, trade publications, and oral 
history interviews. The dissertation argues that political economy, ecology, and culture alike made cement 
factories, quarries, construction sites, and workers’ bodies into sites of Zionist and Palestinian nation-
building, conflict, domination, and resistance. Meanwhile, workers’ and their communities’ use and 
understanding of these sites often defied and challenged an increasingly racialized and nationalist social 
order. Construction work and the construction industry thus played a pivotal role in the formation of 
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“We are now faced with the fact that tomorrow is today. We are confronted with the 
fierce urgency of now. In this unfolding conundrum of life and history there is such a 
thing as being too late. Procrastination is still the thief of time. Life often leaves us 
standing bare, naked, and dejected with a lost opportunity. The ‘tide in the affairs of men’ 
does not remain at the flood; it ebbs. We may cry out desperately for time to pause in her 
passage, but time is deaf to every plea and rushes on. Over the bleached bones and 
jumbled residue of numerous civilizations are written the pathetic words: ‘Too late.’” 
 
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., “Beyond Vietnam: A 
Time to Break the Silence,” Riverside Church, New 




This dissertation, like most projects of its kind, bears the name of a single author, but is in 
reality the product of the labor of countless others: mentors, teachers, administrators, 
archivists, librarians, interviewees, anonymous readers, colleagues, and of course, friends 
and family. Nor are these categories fixed. Individuals who have been part of this project 
in various ways have moved between them, often inhabiting multiple categories at once. 
Acknowledging the debts I owe to all of them and their respective contributions to the 
project in full is impossible. Accordingly, what follows is only a rough approximation of 
those debts and contributions, a way of expressing my gratitude and of making hidden 
work visible. There are, no doubt, those whose labor I have failed to include or capture to 
its full extent. They have both my gratitude and my apologies. Other, more specific debts 
are mentioned throughout the dissertation as well. 
First, I would like to thank my advisor, Eve Troutt Powell, for her immense intellectual 
generosity, unwavering support, for teaching me to trust in my voice, and for her 
friendship, which has meant the world to Tal and me. I also want to thank my committee 
members: Kathy Brown – for pushing me in new directions of thinking about the body, 
race and gender, and for wading into some pretty obscure paths with me on the way 
there; Heather Sharkey – for her endless creativity, meticulous reading and willingness to 
always step up in a pinch; Sherene Seikaly – for practicing the generosity she preaches 
without fail, forever prepared to read something, meet up, Zoom or Skype, and always 
with the best suggestions of how to make something – anything – work; and On Barak, 
for being there as a mentor and a friend from the very beginning of this journey, when I 
was only just considering Grad School, and not missing a beat since. All of you have 
given me a sense and a model for the kind of historian I want to be. 
Over the past six years, the University of Pennsylvania and the city of Philadelphia have 
proven to be the best possible setting for undertaking the joint challenges of (temporary 
and privileged) immigration and graduate studies. At Penn, I owe special thanks to the 
people of the Department of History. To Joan Plonski, Octavia Carr, Yvie Fabella, Taylor 
Baciocco, and Bekah Rosenberg for creating what was for me a safe space at the end of 
the corridor, for countless conversations, and the countless times they made the 
experience of graduate school a little less painful. Morning chats and evening check-ins 
with Daryl Richardson in College Hall often offered a few moments of much-needed 
levity on otherwise difficult days, and always did so on good ones. I owe gratitude to 
many faculty and staff members at Penn in the Department of History and beyond, from 
whom I have learned a great deal in various capacities, including Oscar Aguirre-
Mandujano, Roger M.A. Allen, Abeer Aloush, Francesca Ammon, Anne Berg, Dan Ben 
Amos, Lee Cassanelli, Brent Cebul, Tom Childers, Huda Fakhreddine, Ann Farnsworth-
Alvear, Marc Flandreau, Peter Holquist, Nili Gold, Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet, Kathy Peiss, 
Tom Safley, Anna Viden, Bob Vitalis, Steve Weizman, and Beth Wenger. I spent (much) 
more time than most in the offices of Penn’s School of Arts Sciences’ Graduate Division. 
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There I am especially thankful for the help, patience, thoughtfulness, and kindness of 
Melissa Moore, Pat Rea, Anna Smith, and Tracey Turner. 
I am particularly grateful to Ben Nathans, who was Graduate Chair of the History 
Department when I first came to Penn, and who even before then, and certainly since, did 
everything in his power to make our landing and time in the US and at Penn, a little less 
rocky. I owe a similar debt to Mehmet Darakçıoğlu –  since moved on to NYU – who 
welcomed me to Penn with open arms and an always open office door, to share a tea, and 
to talk about Middle Eastern histories and presents and geek out about India Pale Ales, 
among other things. 
The research and writing of this dissertation were made possible with the support of 
several fellowships: the Social Sciences Research Council’s Mellon International 
Dissertation Research Fellowship, the Woodrow Wilson National Fellowship 
Foundation’s Charlotte W. Newcombe Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship, the Andrea 
Mitchell Center for the Study of Democracy’s Graduate Fellowship, the University of 
Pennsylvania Middle East Center’s Janet Lee Stevens Award for Arabic and Islamic 
Studies, the UPenn Department of History Dissertation Proposal Workshop Research 
Award, and the UPenn Jewish Studies Program’s Goldfein Research Award. 
The librarians and staff at Penn’s Van Pelt Library and the library at the Herbert D. Katz 
Center for Advanced Judaic Studies were endlessly helpful, even as the CoVid-19 
pandemic restricted physical access to the library’s collections. So too were the archivists 
and librarians at the UK National Archives in Kew, the British Library, the Central 
Zionist Archives in Jerusalem, the Israel State Archives, the New York Public Library’s 
Manuscripts and Archives Division, the Lavon Institute in Tel Aviv, the Haifa Municipal 
Archives, the National Library of Israel, the National Archives at College Park, 
Maryland, the Middle East Centre Archive at St. Antony’s College, Oxford, and David 
Ferentz and his self-curated collection of Nesher Cement Company records. 
While working on this dissertation, I was able to present portions of my research and 
receive valuable feedback, for which I am grateful, at multiple conferences and 
workshops: the 2016, 2018, and 2019 Middle East Studies Association Annual Meetings; 
the ERC Project “JudgingHistories” 3rd International Workshop “Palestine in World War 
II,” at the Hebrew University; “South-South II: Materiality and Embodiment in Greater 
Asia and Africa,” at Columbia University; the 2018 and 2019 New Directions in 
Palestinian Studies (NDPS) workshops at Brown University; the 2018 Political Economy 
Summer Institute at George Mason University; the George Washington University 
Institute for Middle East Studies’ 2019 Annual Conference; and the Martin Buber Society 
of Fellows, “Lived, Contested, and Adapted Modernities, Re-evaluating Bauhaus 100 
Years After” conference, at the Hebrew University. 
Many faculty members beyond Penn have lent their support to this project in myriad 
ways. Beshara Doumani and Alex Winder gave me the opportunity to present at the 
inimitable NDPS two years in a row, and, along with Salim Tamari, to publish some of 
this project’s findings in the pages of the Jerusalem Quarterly. They thus ushered me into 
the field of Palestinian Studies, fostering many of the relationships which have shaped 
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and a mild obsession. Once I had finally found his office at NYU’s Hagop Kevorkian 
Center the first time around, Zach Lockman welcomed me to it several times, always 
listening and reading drafts carefully and thoughtfully, providing valuable feedback on 
ideas that were sometimes half-baked, and suggesting exactly the right book to read or 
the right person to speak to about something.  
While working on this project, I have also benefitted from the generosity of Samer 
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all of them, they have kept me sane.  
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FOUNDATIONS OF INEQUALITY: CONSTRUCTION, POLITICAL ECONOMY, RACE, AND THE 
BODY IN PALESTINE/ISRAEL, 1918-1973 
Nimrod Ben-Zeev 
Eve Troutt Powell 
This dissertation is a history of construction work and the construction industry in 
twentieth-century Palestine/Israel, from British rule after World War I, through the first 
twenty-five years of Israeli statehood and Palestinians’ ongoing Nakba (catastrophe). It is 
primarily a study of the relationship between the history of construction work and the 
construction industry in the literal sense, and between social and cultural processes 
frequently understood through construction as metaphor: nation- and state-building, and 
the construction of social difference. The dissertation examines these histories of 
construction in Israel/Palestine through multiple lenses, combining histories of labor, the 
body and the senses, race, political economy, and material culture. It analyzes the shifts 
from Zionist-Palestinian competition over work, resources and production under the 
British Mandate; through the transformation of the construction industry’s workforce into 
one based on marginalized and racialized Mizrahi Jews (Jews from Muslim lands), and 
Palestinian citizens in Israel in the decades following Israel’s establishment and the 
Nakba in 1948. I trace these shifts and their implications using sources from archives in 
Israel/Palestine, the United Kingdom, and the United States, newspapers, literature, film, 
workers’ songs, trade publications, and oral history interviews. The dissertation argues 
that political economy, ecology, and culture alike made cement factories, quarries, 
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construction sites, and workers’ bodies into sites of Zionist and Palestinian nation-
building, conflict, domination, and resistance. Meanwhile, workers’ and their 
communities’ use and understanding of these sites often defied and challenged an 
increasingly racialized and nationalist social order. Construction work and the 
construction industry thus played a pivotal role in the formation of racialized social 
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“We do not come to Palestine as to a colony to benefit here 
by the labour of others. We have no intention of forming a 
skilled labour aristocracy by the side of native labourers to 
be looked upon as the ‘hewers of wood and drawers of 
water.’” 
General Federation of Jewish Labour in 
Palestine Memorandum to the British High 
Commissioner, February 17, 1929 
   
“They told me I’m lucky to even find a job. During the 
economic crisis, the Arab workers were the first to be 
thrown out. I’m lucky…. How did they call it in bible class? 
‘Treasure cities,’ right? Treasure cities in Egypt. Gibeonites. 
Hewers of wood. That’s also from the bible. I have enough 
examples.” 
Ahmad Yusuf Masarweh, “I am Ahmad,” 
1966 
 
“[W]ho erected the buildings, paved the roads, dug and 
planted the earth of Israel, other than the Arabs who 
remained there?” 






This dissertation is a history of construction work and the construction industry in 
twentieth-century Palestine/Israel, from British rule after World War I, through the first 
twenty-five years of Israeli statehood and Palestinians’ ongoing Nakba (catastrophe). 
Defining it as such, however, may set expectations it will not be able to meet. That is to 
say, it is primarily a study of the relationship between the history of construction work 
and the construction industry in the literal sense, and between social and cultural 
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processes frequently understood through construction as metaphor: nation- and state-
building, and the construction of social difference.  
The dissertation examines these histories of construction in Israel/Palestine 
through multiple lenses, combining histories of labor, the body and the senses, race, 
political economy, and material culture. It analyzes the shifts from Zionist-Palestinian 
competition over work, resources and production under the British Mandate; through the 
transformation of the construction industry’s workforce into one based on marginalized 
and racialized Mizrahi Jews (Jews from Muslim lands, pl. Mizrahim), and Palestinian 
citizens in Israel in the decades following Israel’s establishment and the Nakba in 1948.  
I trace these shifts and their implications using sources from archives in 
Israel/Palestine, the United Kingdom, and the United States, newspapers, literature, film, 
workers’ songs, trade publications, and oral history interviews. The dissertation argues 
that political economy, ecology, and culture alike made cement factories, quarries, 
construction sites, and workers’ bodies into sites of Zionist and Palestinian nation-
building, conflict, domination, and resistance. Meanwhile, workers’ and their 
communities’ use and understanding of these sites often defied and challenged an 
increasingly racialized and nationalist social order. Construction work and the 
construction industry thus played a pivotal role in the formation of racialized social 
hierarchies within Palestine/Israel.1 
 
 
1 Whenever discussing the period after the Palestinian Nakba and Israel’s independence in 1948, I refer to 
the territory historically identified as Palestine (or Eretz Yisrael in Hebrew) as “Israel/Palestine” and 
“Palestine/Israel” interchangeably, to recognize both identifications of the land without granting preference 




Construction became a contested sphere in Palestine during the first half of the twentieth 
century because of its cultural and material importance for Zionists and Palestinians 
alike. In Zionist thought, construction’s importance was manifested in two nationalist 
myths – “Hebrew labor” (‘avoda ‘ivrit) and “building the land” (binyan ha-aretz). 
“Hebrew labor,” the principle according to which Jews in Palestine were meant to engage 
in all forms of labor, particularly manual productive labor, was considered a crucial 
component in the creation of a “new Jew”, able-bodied, masculine and wholly antithetical 
to the frail “diaspora Jew”. As competition with Palestinian Arab workers over 
employment became a major concern for the second wave of Zionist settlers in Palestine 
during the late Ottoman period, Hebrew labor evolved, fostering a call for the “conquest 
of labor” (kibush ha-‘avoda). It thus gained a more concrete economic role as well. In 
pushing for the exclusive employment of Jews by Jewish employers, the proponents of 
labor Zionism, a strand of Zionist thought which merged socialist ideals with Eastern 
European nationalism aimed to buttress the creation of a separate, independent Jewish 
economy, and the foundations of a state. “Building the land”, was equally important: to 
transform an allegedly barren Palestine into a Jewish homeland, it would have to be built 
anew. This aspect of the Zionist project required not only Hebrew construction workers, 
but a Hebrew industrial apparatus and the capital to establish and support it.2 
 
2 See: Anita Shapira, Ha-Ma’avak ha Nikhzav: ‘Avoda ‘Ivrit, 1929–1939 [Futile Struggle: The Jewish 
Labor Controversy, 1929–1939] (Tel Aviv: ha-Kibbutz ha-Meukhad, 1977); Gershon Shafir, Land, Labor, 
and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1882–1914 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1996 [1989]); Zachary Lockman, Comrades and Enemies: Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine, 1906–




Whereas most Zionist settlers and ideologues approached construction work as a 
novel realm to be “conquered,” in Palestine there was already an established building 
trade. Palestinian master builders (mu‘allim al-bina’), known for their distinctive styles, 
operated throughout the land, the products of their expertise populating Palestine’s 
coastal towns and the hilly areas of its interior. Rural lime kilns and stone quarries 
produced the mortar, plaster, and a variety of building stones – finely distinguished by 
kind and by finish – which builders then used. Construction was also deeply embedded in 
Palestinian culture and social life. In villages, the building of the family home was a 
collective effort and celebration, a “chief festive [event] (faraḥ).” The home itself was an 
object of desire (ghayat al-mana), a provider of security and stability, and a signifier of 
social respectability and economic standing.3 
Prior to the wide-scale adoption of Portland cement and concrete during the 
1920s, rural limekilns (Arabic: al-latun) were the primary producers of mortar and plaster 
for Palestine’s stone-built architecture. Several forms of kilns were in use in the first half 
of the twentieth century. The earliest and most basic were stone-built structures fueled by 
brushwood. Diesel, crude oil, and coal-fueled kilns capable of industrial-levels of output 
and intended for commercial production, first came into use in the mid-to-late 1920s, 
ushered in by Palestinian capitalists such as the Haifa-based Tahir Qaraman. While 
 
Jewish and Arab Workers in Mandatory Palestine (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000); 
Michael Gluzman, ha-Guf ha-Tsiyoni: Leumiut, Migdar, u-Miniut ba-Sifrut ha-‘Ivrit ha-Hadashah [The 
Zionist Body: Nationalism, Gender and Sexuality in Modern Hebrew Literature] (Tel Aviv: ha-Kibbutz ha-
Meuhad, 2007). 
3 Tawfiq Canaan, The Palestinian Arab House, its Architecture and its Folklore (Jerusalem: Syrian 
Orphanage Press, 1933), 82. On the institution of the mu‘allim al-bina’, see: Susan Slyomovics, The Object 




Portland cement (Arabic: asmant or shimento, Hebrew: meleṭ) did eventually become the 
dominant mortar and concrete increasingly displaced stone, various forms of kilns, big 
and small, continued to operate throughout the period of British rule and beyond 1948.4 
Alongside these established institutions, other ways of thinking about construction 
also emerged. Beginning in the late 1920s, Palestinian champions of “prosperity” 
(‘umran), “progress” (taqaddum, or ruqiy), and “development” (taṭawwur) – Palestine’s 
“men of capital” – started viewing construction as an integral component of a larger 
developmental project necessary for Palestine’s future.5 More specifically, they 
envisioned an independent, national, and modern construction industry, radically 
different than the land’s existing building trade. 
Contestation over labor between Palestinian Arabs and Zionist Jews, and, as 
Chapter 1 shows, Zionist attempts to reshape Palestine’s construction industry, dated to 
the final decades of Ottoman rule. But it was only after Palestine came under British rule 
following World War I, that construction fully emerged as a locust of competing 
Palestinian and Zionist ambitions. This emergence was partially the result of 
developments in the construction industry itself, which I will describe below. However, it 
was also rooted in some of the broader changes that British rule, and specifically the 
British Mandate over Palestine introduced. 
 
4 Jerusalem District Health Office, ‘Lime Kilns’ (8 May 1946), Israel State Archive (ISA), Mandatory 
Organizations-Mandate Health-0010dze; Omar Ahmad Hassan, “Min al-Hiraf al-Sha‘biyya - Sina‘at al-
Shid” [From the Popular [or Folk] Crafts – The Lime Industry], al-Turath wa-l-Mujtama‘ 17 (1985): 103-
21. A 1937 article from the Hebrew daily Davar describes an array of Palestinian Arab-owned kilns in the 
Migdal Tzedek quarry, which employed some Jewish as well as Palestinian Arab laborers and supplied 
large contracting firms. D. Zaslavsky, “Migdal Tzedek,” Davar, April 6, 1937, 3. 
5 Sherene Seikaly, Men of Capital: Scarcity and Economy in Mandate Palestine (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2016). 
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Palestine Under the Mandate 
British forces occupied Palestine in late 1917, following roughly 400 years of Ottoman 
rule in the land. The Mandate for Palestine, formed as part of the League of Nations’ 
post-World War I system of mandates, was allocated to Britain at the April 1920 San 
Remo conference and officially commenced in 1923. Although it shared considerable 
similarities with other such mandates, particularly former Ottoman territories in the 
Middle East classified as “Class A” mandate states, the Mandate for Palestine was unique 
in important ways.  
Like the other mandates, the Mandate for Palestine’s formal goal was to prepare 
local populations, eventually, for self-rule. The anticipated path to such self-rule was 
determined in accordance with then dominant civilizational and racial hierarchies which 
constituted the “global color line.” The Class A mandates were viewed as relatively close 
to meeting the conditions for independence. Class B and C mandates, primarily former 
German imperial territories in Africa and in the Pacific, respectively, were considered 
less prepared – either due to the perceived inferiority of their populations, their 
“sparseness,” their “remoteness,” or all of the above. Their periods of tutelage, 
accordingly, were to be longer.6 
What set the British Mandate for Palestine apart from all its contemporaries, 
however, was that it incorporated a pre-existing document, the 1917 Balfour Declaration, 
into its preamble and thus its legal structure. The inclusion of the Balfour declaration 
 
6 Susan Pedersen, The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), esp. Chapter 2. 
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meant that while the mandatory would safeguard the “civil and religious rights” of local 
Muslim and Christian populations, “political rights” – foremost of which was the future 
establishment of a “national home” – were reserved for the “Jewish people.” These rights 
referred not to a local Jewish population, but to the “Jewish people” as a whole. The 
mandate thus endorsed Zionism’s project of settlement and colonization. Muslim and 
Christian Palestinians, rather than being regarded as a national community or 
communities, were defined as “existing non-Jewish communities.”7  
Although British administration of the Palestine Mandate was often inconsistent, 
for most of its existence it remained bound to this commitment to establishing a Jewish 
national home, ambiguous a term as that may have been. This granted the Jewish 
population in Palestine, and primarily the organized Zionist European settler community 
known as the New Yishuv (ha-Yishuv ha-Hadash, roughly translated as “the new 
community” or “settlement”) distinct advantages over the local Christian and Muslim 
population. It also placed the latter in a legal bind throughout their interactions with the 
Mandate’s administration. Furthermore, the Mandate’s structure, alongside British 
imperial racial thought, meant that while European Jews were considered capable of 
marching Palestine forward toward the Mandate’s economic and political goals, 
Palestinian Arabs were by and large not.8 
 
7 Susan Pedersen, “Settler Colonialism at the Bar of the League of Nations,” in Settler Colonialism in the 
Twentieth Century: Projects, Practices, Legacies, eds. Caroline Elkins and Susan Pedersen, (London: 
Routledge, 2005), 124-129, cited in Seikaly, Men of Capital, 5; Rashid Khalidi, The Iron Cage: The Story 
of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2006), 32-3. 
8 Khalidi, The Iron Cage; Seikaly, Men of Capital.; Jacob Norris, Land of Progress Palestine in the Age of 
Colonial Development, 1905-1948 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
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The period of British rule over Palestine was a period of immense political, social, 
economic, and technological changes. While these changes certainly did not come out of 
nowhere – many of them had their roots in the final decades of Ottoman rule – the pace 
of change during the British Mandate was often furious. Dramatic shifts were driven by 
the incorporation of Palestine into the British empire’s rapidly changing imperial 
formation, unprecedented waves of internal and external migration, large capital flows 
into the territory and world historical events.9 
The flows of people and capital into Palestine, growing urbanization, and private, 
public, and government infrastructure and industrial projects meant that throughout the 
Mandate, construction constituted an uncharacteristically significant part of Palestine’s 
industry and economy. As construction work expanded, the industry itself also changed 
rapidly. Competition over labor between Jewish immigrants and Palestinians, a growing 
number of whom were forced into the urban workforce after Zionist land purchases 
pushed them off their tenant farms, increased.10 Zionist Hebrew and Palestinian Arabic 
newspapers closely followed the pace, or movement, of construction (Arabic: harakat al-
 
9 For works that describe various aspects of these changes from the late-Ottoman period onward, see, for 
example: Alexander Schӧlch, Palestine in Transformation, 1856-1882: Studies in Social, Economic and 
Political Development, reprint edition (Washington, D.C: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2006 [1993]); May 
Seikaly, Haifa: Transformation of an Arab Society (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995); Mark LeVine, 
Overthrowing Geography: Jaffa, Tel Aviv, and the Struggle for Palestine, 1880-1948 (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2005); Abigail Jacobson, From Empire to Empire: Jerusalem Between Ottoman and 
British Rule (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2011); Norris, Land of Progress; Seikaly, Men of 
Capital; Fredrik Meiton, Electrical Palestine: Capital and Technology from Empire to Nation (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2019). 
10 On construction’s significance in Palestine’s economy, see: Jacob Metzer, The Divided Economy of 
Mandatory Palestine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 25-26; Bernstein, Constructing 
Boundaries, 85-86. On Palestinian labor migration into Palestine’s urban centers as a result of displacement 
during the Mandate, see: Mahmoud Yazbak, “From Poverty to Revolt: Economic Factors in the Outbreak 
of the 1936 Rebellion in Palestine,” Middle Eastern Studies 36, no. 3 (July 2000): 93–113; Charles 
Anderson, “From Petition to Confrontation: The Palestinian National Movement and the Rise of Mass 
Politics, 1929–1939” (PhD diss., New York University, 2013), 532-549.  
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bina’; Hebrew: tnu‘at ha-binyan) – frequently dividing it neatly into “Jewish” and 
“Arab” building activities.11 
Palestine’s building materials industry also witnessed upheavals. Portland cement, 
a hydraulic cement patented in England in the early nineteenth century and produced by 
the fusing of limestone and aluminosilicates, was first imported into Palestine in the 
1890s. Cement introduced unprecedented advantages to the building sector, allowing to 
erect buildings that were cheap and considered durable, at a rapid pace. As architectural 
critic, Or Alexandrovich, has argued, the significance of construction materials is never 
intrinsic to physical properties alone; rather, it is derived from how they have been 
employed historically and from the contexts that undergird their use – what 
Alexandrovich calls a “politics of building materials.”12 Amidst several initiatives and 
calls for broader use of cement in the land during the initial decades of the twentieth 
century, it was such a politics that defined the attempts of some Zionist entrepreneurs to 
seek in cement and concrete a replacement for Palestinian stone and quicklime mortars, 
one that would grant a decisive advantage to Jewish laborers.13  
In the first years after World War I, the volume of imported cement steadily 
increased. Then in 1923 the Russian-born Jewish industrialist Michael Pollak (1864-
1954) established the Nesher Portland Cement Company. The company selected a plot of 
land outside the city of Haifa, which would soon become Palestine’s main port and a key 
 
11 See Chapter 1 below. 
12 Or Alexandrovich, “Kurkar, Melet, ‘Aravim, Yehudim: Eikh Bonim ‘Ir ‘Ivrit” [Gravel, Cement, Arabs, 
Jews: How to Build a Hebrew City], Te’orya u-Vikoret: Bamah Yisra’elit 36 (Spring 2010), 62. 
13 ‘Concrete in Palestine’, Cement Age 10, no. 5 (May 1910), 371. I briefly discuss the history of early 
Zionist attempts to introduce modern cement and concrete as substitutes for local stone construction during 
the final decades of the Ottoman period in Chapter 1 below, relying primarily on Alexandrovich’s work. 
Alexandrovich, “Kurkar, Melet.” 
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British imperial hub. Nesher then set upon building what was to become Palestine’s 
single largest industrial plant and its sole producer of cement.14 Nesher’s monopoly, 
abetted by British policy, was met with Palestinian ventures to establish an alternative to 
the Jewish-owned factory. Palestinian capitalists turned outwards to “Arab cement” 
beyond Palestine’s boundaries, demanding the British reduce the tariffs protecting 
Nesher’s product. They also launched multiple endeavors to established competing 
factories within Palestine itself. These ventures, discussed in Chapter 1, formed one part 
of the Palestinian project of “building the land,” overshadowed in the historiography by 
its lauded Zionist counterpart. 
Cement and concrete’s rise did not mean stone’s demise. Palestinian stone masons 
and stone dressers were severely hurt by the decline of building stones as structural 
elements in building due to the growing preponderance of concrete.15 However, stone in 
various forms – from the limestone necessary to feed Nesher’s kilns, through façade 
cladding, to the smallest aggregate required to make concrete – remained an essential 
material. Here, in contrast to in cement production, the established Palestinian Arab 
quarrying industry clearly had the upper hand. Zionism’s “conquest of stone” (kibush ha-
 
14 Moshe Ben-Ner, Menachem Aviram and Menachem Levi (eds.), Ha-Melet ve-Yotzrav: ha-Ra‘ayon u-
Mimusho, 1923-2001 [Cement and its Makers: The Idea and its Fulfillment, 1923-2001] (Haifa: Nesher 
Portland Cement Company, 2002), 19-23. 
15 Sir John Hope-Simpson, Palestine: Report on Immigration, Land Settlement and Development (London: 
HMSO, 1930), 133. The exception to the relative decrease in the use of structural stone in construction was 
Jerusalem, where a British ordinance required all buildings be made of local limestone. Only in 1944 did 
the British alter the ordinance to allow for stone façades as well. Eyal Weizman, Hollow Land: Israel’s 
Architecture of Occupation (London: Verso, 2007), Chapter 1; Roberto Mazza, “‘The Preservation and 
Safeguarding of the Amenities of the Holy City without Favour or Prejudice to Race or Creed’: The Pro-
Jerusalem Society and Ronald Storrs, 1917–1926,” in Ordinary Jerusalem, 1840–1940: Opening New 




even), the attempt to unseat Palestinian dominance in the industry, which is the subject of 
Chapter 2, began in earnest in the early 1920s. The “conquest” took multiple forms: from 
individuals who studied quarrying and stonework under local Palestinian masters, to 
capital-intensive attempts at mechanizing existing quarries and establishing mechanized 
Jewish-owned quarries. The conquest of stone’s consistent frustration revealed Zionism’s 
dependence on Palestinian expertise and sensibilities, as well the limits Palestine’s 
geology – the tangible, material land – set for Zionist ambitions. 
 
The Nakba and the First Decades of the Israeli State 
The end of British rule brought dramatic, and tragic, changes as well. In late 1947, 
following the United Nations’ (UN) approval of a plan to partition Palestine, proposed by 
the UN’s Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), civil war erupted. Already as the 
British gradually withdrew, Jewish militias – most of which would morph into the Israeli 
Defense Forces’ regular army following Israel’s declaration of independence when the 
Mandate terminated on May 14, 1948 – forced hundreds of thousands of Palestinian 
Arabs from their homes through violence and intimidation. Palestinian’s forced migration 
continued as the civil war transformed into a regional one, when the standing armies of 
neighboring Arab countries intervened after the British had departed. By the time the war 
concluded in March 1949, over 750,000 Palestinians Arabs became refugees, spread 
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across the areas of Palestine which remained under Arab rule – the Jordanian-controlled 
West Bank and Egyptian-controlled Gaza Strip – and neighboring Arab states.16 
The events of 1947-1949, the Palestinian Nakba and Israel’s War of Independence 
(milḥemet ha-‘atzama’ut), generated immense demographic changes, which made 
construction once again a priority across the land. In the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and 
neighboring countries, the need to shelter hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees 
led to the construction of a network of refugee camps.17 At the same time, the new Israeli 
state had to house the hundreds of thousands of Jews, primarily Holocaust survivors from 
Europe and Mizrahi (Middle Eastern and North African) Jews, who arrived in the country 
in its initial years and roughly tripled its Jewish population. To do so, the state engaged in 
massive construction projects throughout its territory.18  
Because of construction’s central role in what many in Israel saw as the state’s 
primary mission in its initial years – immigration absorption (kliṭat ‘aliya) – “building the 
 
16 An immense body of scholarship has been dedicated to the study of the Nakba and the various stages of 
the 1947-1949 war, as it transformed from a civil war within Palestine, into a war involving the armies of 
other Middle Eastern nations. For examples of different approaches in this literature, see: Eugene L. Rogan 
and Avi Shlaim, eds., The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948, second edition (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007 [2001]); Ahmad H. Sa’di and Lila Abu-Lughod, eds., Nakba: Palestine, 
1948, and the Claims of Memory (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); Ariella Azoulay, From 
Palestine to Israel: A Photographic Record of Destruction and State Formation, 1947-50 (London: Pluto 
Press, 2011). 
17 For studies of Palestinian refugee camps in Palestine and beyond, including from architectural and 
planning perspectives, see for example: Rosemary Sayigh, Too Many Enemies: The Palestinian Experience 
in Lebanon (London: Zed Books, 1994); Julie Peteet, Landscape of Hope and Despair: Palestinian Refugee 
Camps (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005); Fatina Abreek-Zubiedat, “The Architecture 
of the Palestinian ‘Refugee Camps’ in the West Bank: Dheisheh Refugee Camp as a Case Study 1948-
1967,” (MSc thesis, Technion, 2015); Nasser Abourahme, “Assembling and Spilling-Over: Towards an 
‘Ethnography of Cement’ in a Palestinian Refugee Camp,” International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research 39, no. 2 (2015): 200–217. 
18 Yael Allweil, Homeland: Zionism as Housing Regime, 1860-2011 (London: Routledge, 2017), esp. 
Chapter 6; Smadar Sharon, “Kakh Kovshim Moledet”: Tikhnun u-Yishuv Hevel Lakhish be-Shnot ha-
Hamishim [“And Thus a Homeland is Conquered”: Planning and Settlement in 1950s Lakhish Region] 
(Haifa: Pardes Hotza’a la-Or, 2017). 
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land,” continued to be a national objective during the 1950s and 1960s. At the same time, 
however, Israel’s economy became increasingly defined by an “ethnic division of labor,” 
relegating Mizrahi Jews and Palestinian citizens to the bottom of the occupational 
ladder.19 The more physical tasks involved in construction, many of which were 
classified as so-called “unskilled” or “semi-skilled” labor, and which as Chapter 3 shows, 
were already declining in status by the early 1940s, became “low-status” occupations.20 
By 1957, Mizrahi Jews made-up roughly 40% of the construction workforce. By 1962, 
Palestinian citizens in Israel were more than twice as likely as Jews to work in 
construction.21  
Mizrahi immigrants were driven into construction work, agriculture, and other 
forms of manual labor as a result of economic necessity and European-Jewish elites’ 
 
19 Deborah Bernstein and Shlomo Swirski, “The Rapid Economic Development of Israel and the 
Emergence of the Ethnic Division of Labour,” The British Journal of Sociology 33, no. 1 (1982): 64–85; 
Raja Khalidi, The Arab Economy in Israel: The Dynamics of a Region’s Development, (London: Croom 
Helm, 1988); Aziz Haidar, On the Margins: The Arab Population in the Israeli Economy, 1949-90 
(London: Hurst, 1995); Aziza Khazzoom, Shifting Ethnic Boundaries and Inequality in Israel: Or, How the 
Polish Peddler Became a German Intellectual (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008). 
20 Paul Rivlin, The Israeli Economy from the Foundation of the State through the 21st Century (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 24. 
21 For the data regarding the percentage of Mizrahi Jews (classified under the heading of “Asian & African 
born”) in different industries, see: Central Bureau of Statistics, Labour Force Surveys (1957) (Jerusalem: 
Central Bureau of Statistics, 1959), 40, cited in K.J. Mann, J.H. Abramson, A. Nitzan and Ruth Goldberg, 
“Epidemiology of Disabling Work Injuries in Israel,” The Archives of Environmental Health Vol. 9, No. 4 
(1964), 511. There is some confusion regarding the statistics for Palestinian citizens in Israel in the 
workforce. In his seminal The Arabs in Israel, Sabri Jiryis presents data based on the Statistical Abstract of 
Israel. For most years, Jiryis calculates the number of Palestinians in the labor force based strictly on data 
provided in the Abstract (by deducting the number of Jews in the labor force from the overall labor force, 
since no separate statistics are given for Palestinians). However, for 1962, there is a considerable gap 
between the number Jiryis provides, and the results of this calculation. Accordingly, the percentage of 
Palestinian workforce employed in construction and public works in Jiryis’ calculation for 1962 is 19.1%, 
while a calculation according to the data in the 1963 Abstract shows it to be 16.2%. Jiryis’ figure for the 
percentage of Jews in the labor force employed in construction for 1962, 8.9%, is however, more accurate 
than the rounded-up figure of 9% provided in the Abstract. See: Sabri Jiryis, The Arabs in Israel (New 
York: Monthly Review Press, 1976), 304-305; Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel 
1963 (Jerusalem: Central Bureau of Statistics, 1963), 498-501. 
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racialized conceptions of Mizrahim’s affinity for unskilled, physical labor, an affinity 
they supposedly shared with Palestinians due to their “Arabness.” Palestinian workers, 
under a military administration which restricted their movement and employment in 
Israel before 1966 and in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip after 1967, navigated 
the contradictions between their self-perceptions, subjugated position, and trauma at the 
hands of the state, and the needs of survival. Some were able to harness construction 
work for social mobility and the physical reconstruction of their homes and communities 
despite state restrictions - subverting the Zionist ideal of “to build and to be built” by 
claiming it themselves. 
 
Relational History and Stepping Outside of Nationalism’s Shadows 
Scholarly and popular understandings of the Zionist-Palestinian conflict often overstate 
its history as driven chiefly by clashing ideologies, narratives, or other abstractions. 
There are, of course, bodies of literature which have been more attentive to the material 
aspects of this history. These include labor and economic histories, sociological studies, 
and most recently, histories of capitalism, science, and technology. Works within these 
bodies of literature have occasionally dealt with various moments in the history of 
construction work in twentieth-century Palestine/Israel through a variety of prisms: 
national and labor politics, concepts such as ethnic divisions of labor and dual economies, 
and discourses of development and modernity. Yet, for all the insight these works 
provide, the picture they portray can be alarmingly fragmentary. It is that of a history 
divided into neatly separated periods, and a society (or societies) divided into discreet 
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groups. This is also largely a history divorced from construction work as physical labor, 
from work’s materials and processes, and from the lives which workers and their 
communities built. 
The works of Zachary Lockman and Deborah Bernstein on the labor history of the 
British Mandate period are obvious touchstones for this dissertation.22 Both works break 
away from an earlier, primarily Zionist, body of scholarship which treated the histories of 
Arabs and Jews in Palestine as entirely separate and regarded interactions between both 
societies as external factors impacting their otherwise independent paths of development 
and change.23 Instead, Lockman and Bernstein, building upon the earlier works of Baruch 
Kimmerling, Gershon Shafir, and Michael Shalev, view the interactions and the colonial 
“encounter” between Palestinian Arabs and Zionist Jews as integral, indeed, defining 
elements of both communities’ development. Lockman and Bernstein differ from 
Kimmerling, Shafir, and Shalev, in that they take yet another step further away from the 
Zionist historiography whose primary object was always the Yishuv.24 The “relational 
 
22 Lockman, Comrades and Enemies; Bernstein, Constructing Boundaries. 
23 The classic example of this earlier approach to the history of labor during the Mandate is: Shapira, Ha-
Ma’avak ha-Nikhzav. 
24 Baruch Kimmerling, Zionism and Economy (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1983); 
Baruch Kimmerling, Zionism and Territory: The Socio-Territorial Dimensions of Zionist Politics 
(Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1983); Gershon Shafir, Land, Labor, 
and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1882-1914 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1996 [1989]); Michael Shalev, Labour and the Political Economy in Israel (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1992); Lockman, Comrades and Enemies; Bernstein, Constructing Boundaries. Shafir, Shalev, and 
Bernstein in particular, are indebted to Edna Bonacich’s Split Labor Market theory, which proposes a 
model for the study of societies in which two groups differentiated by race, ethnicity, or nationality – and 
importantly also by their relationship to state and capitalist power – meet in a single labor market. Bonacich 
argues that in such societies, labor market competition is a driving force behind racist and nationalist 
politics and divides among the working classes. See: Edna Bonacich, “A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism: 
The Split Labor Market,” American Sociological Review 37, no. 5 (1972): 547–59; Edna Bonacich, “Class 
Approaches To Ethnicity and Race,” Insurgent Sociologist 10, no. 2 (October 1980): 9–23; Edna Bonacich, 




history” Lockman and Bernstein pursue – a term Lockman adopted and which has since 
inspired a body of work which focuses on late-Ottoman and Mandate-era Palestine – is 
equally interested in the ways both Palestinian Arab society and the Zionist settler 
community were shaped, the boundaries between them constructed and defined by their 
interactions and relationships.25 
Lockman and Bernstein’s studies were not the first works to eschew nationalist 
frameworks in their treatment of the Mandate era, nor the first to take seriously the role 
of factors beyond nationalism in their analyses.26 However, the impact of Lockman’s 
work in particular, has extended well beyond studies which take up the mantle of 
“relationality” directly, ushering in a wave of studies which sought to “move beyond 
nationalism.”27 This desire to explore what lies outside of nationalism’s shadow, has 
brought forth critical histories of political economy, development, infrastructure and 
materiality, like Jacob Norris’s study of Ottoman and British development policy in 
Palestine, Sherene Seikaly’s history of Palestine’s evolving capitalist nahda (renaissance) 
during the 1930s and 1940s, and Fredrik Meiton’s work on the history of Palestine’s 
 
25 Among the works which have, explicitly or implicitly, adopted the relational paradigm to the study of 
late-Ottoman and British Mandate-era Palestine, see: LeVine, Overthrowing Geography; Michele U. 
Campos, Ottoman Brothers: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Early Twentieth-Century Palestine 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011); Jacobson, From Empire to Empire. See also: Yair Wallach, A 
City in Fragments: Urban Text in Modern Jerusalem (Stanford: Stanford University Press, forthcoming). 
Bernstein herself does not use the term, perhaps also because she had written much of Constructing 
Boundaries prior to the publication of Lockman’s book, but her work is clearly of a similar mind. 
26 Elia T. Zureik, The Palestinians in Israel: A Study in Internal Colonialism (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1979); Musa Budeiri, The Palestine Communist Party, 1919-1948 Arab and Jew in the Struggle for 
Internationalism, reprint edition (Chicago, Ill: Haymarket Books, 2010 [1979]); ʻAbd al-Qadir Yasin, 
Tarikh al-Tabaqa al-ʻAmila al-Filastiniyya, 1918-1948 [History of the Palestinian Working Class, 1918-
1948] (Beirut: Markaz al-Abhath, Munazamat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya, 1980); Joel Beinin, Was the Red 
Flag Flying There? Marxist Politics and the Arab-Israeli Conflict in Egypt and Israel, 1948-1965 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Barbara J. Smith, The Roots of Separatism in Palestine: 
British Economic Policy, 1920-1929 (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1993). 
27 Seikaly, Men of Capital, 13. 
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electrification, all of which touch upon aspects of the construction industry with which 
this dissertation is preoccupied.28 
This dissertation embraces the fundamental aspects of the relational approach to 
the history of Israel/Palestine, while expanding its scope to the years after 1948 and 
remaining attentive to some of the critiques which have been directed at relational history 
since its introduction into the field of Palestine/Israel Studies in the mid-1990s. I view 
Zionist and Palestinian history and Zionist and Palestinian self-perceptions as co-
constitutive. While the beginnings of each may perhaps be traced separately, they 
nonetheless became deeply entangled throughout the twentieth century.29  
With Lockman and Bernstein, and Shafir before them, I see labor in Mandate 
Palestine as a central arena for the formation of national self-perceptions and boundaries 
between communities in Mandate Palestine. At the same time, I agree with Rebecca Stein 
and Ted Swedenburg’s call for a “relationality that works more expansively in both scale 
and kind.”30 This dissertation attempts to achieve such “expansive” relationality in two 
ways. First, through pursuing what Stein and Swedenburg call “transnational 
 
28 Seikaly, Men of Capital; Norris, Land of Progress; Meiton, Electrical Palestine. 
29 The “separateness” of Zionism is, of course, precisely the conventional wisdom which the works of 
Kimmerling, Shafir, Lockman, and Bernstein, among others, sought to challenge. Pinpointing the ways in 
which Palestinian nationalism and self-perceptions evolved independently of Zionism, in contrast, has been 
considerably more contested, although one hopes this is changing as scholarship continues to foreground 
histories of Palestinian nationalism which either preceded Zionism or in which “reaction” to Zionism was 
not a primary driver. For earlier examples of this literature, see: Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The 
Construction of Modern National Consciousness (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Beshara 
Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine: Merchants and Peasants in Jabal Nablus, 1700-1900 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1995); Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal, The Palestinian People: A 
History (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2003); Camille Mansour and Leila Fawaz (eds.), 
Transformed Landscapes: Essays on Palestine and the Middle East in Honor of Walid Khalidi (Cairo: 
American University in Cairo Press, 2009). 
30 Rebecca L. Stein and Ted Swedenburg, “Popular Culture, Relational History, and the Question of Power 
in Palestine and Israel,” Journal of Palestine Studies 33, no. 4 (2004), 10. 
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relationality,” by drawing Israel/Palestine into broader conversations about racialized 
bodies and global racial politics. That is, by considering how Palestinian Arabs, Zionist 
Jews, and others located themselves along what W.E.B. Du Bois called “the color line.”31 
And second, through a examining a relationality that is arguably different “in kind” – 
how building materials, geology, and political economy all took part in forming 
Palestine/Israel’s relational matrix. Doing so, I believe, also addresses two additional 
critiques of the relational paradigm. The first, that it continues to portray Palestinians as 
essentially reactive. The second, that it risks obfuscating the structural power differential 
between Zionism’s settler colonial national movement, and Palestinians’ indigenous 
one.32 
 
Jewish Physical Regeneration and Palestine’s Labor Question 
When late-nineteenth-century Zionist thinkers such as Max Nordau (1849-1923), 
Theodor Herzl (1860-1904), and others articulated their vision for Jewish nationalism and 
national regeneration, they did not operate in an ideological vacuum. Alongside 
Zionism’s unique components, their thinking also drew upon contemporary European 
nationalist discourses.33 Among those elements drawn from European nationalisms was 
the notion that the Jewish people’s national regeneration was dependent in part on the 
 
31 W. E. B Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015 [1903]). 
32 Seikaly, Men of Capital, 9. Rana Barakat, “Reading Palestinian Agency in Mandate History: The 
Narrative of the Buraq Revolt as Anti-Relational,” Contemporary Levant 4, no. 1 (January 2019): 28–38. 
33 There are numerous intellectual histories of Zionism. See, for example: Shlomo Avineri, The Making of 
Modern Zionism: The Intellectual Origins of the Jewish State, 2nd edition (Basic Books, 2017 [1981]); 




physical reform of individual Jewish bodies.34 As Todd Presner has argued, the figure of 
the “new Jew” (ha-yehudi ha-ḥadash) and the accompanying ideal of “muscular 
Judaism,” characteristic of the Zionism of Nordau, Herzl, and some of their peers, 
demonstrated “an affinity with some of the more unsavory ‘regenerative’ discourses of 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, particularly Social Darwinism, eugenics, 
nationalism, and colonialism.”35 This affinity, Presner claims, arose “precisely because 
Zionism was both a Jewish response to- and extension of these very same discourses.”36  
Like the “muscular Christianity” popular in the United States and Britain, the 
Lebensreform (life reform) movement in Germany, and parallel movements in the Middle 
East, such “muscular Judaism” encouraged young Jews in Europe to engage in 
gymnastics and serve in their homelands’ militaries.37 In Palestine, meanwhile, physical 
labor constituted a crucial component of this regenerative project. There, Zionist thinkers 
argued, the renewed symbiosis between Jewish workers and the land itself would propel 
forward the process of regeneration. By working the land of Palestine, bettering it, and 
building upon it, “new Jews” and a revitalized Jewish nation would emerge.38 
 
34 Gluzman, Ha-Guf ha-Tsiyoni, 2007; Todd Samuel Presner, Muscular Judaism: The Jewish Body and the 
Politics of Regeneration (London: Routledge, 2007); Nadia Abu El-Haj, The Genealogical Science the 
Search for Jewish Origins and the Politics of Epistemology (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
2012). 
35 Presner, Muscular Judaism, 4. 
36 Presner. See also: Meira Weiss, The Chosen Body: The Politics of the Body in Israeli Society (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2002); Gluzman, Ha-Guf ha-Tsiyoni; Etan Bloom, Arthur Ruppin and the 
Production of Pre-Israeli Culture (Leiden: Brill, 2011). 
37 Clifford Putney, Muscular Christianity: Manhood and Sports in Protestant America, 1880-1920 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003); Presner, Muscular Judaism; Wilson Chacko Jacob, 
Working out Egypt: Effendi Masculinity and Subject Formation in Colonial Modernity, 1870-1940 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2011); Murat Cihan Yildiz, “Strengthening Male Bodies and Building 
Robust Communities: Physical Culture in the Late Ottoman Empire” (PhD diss., University of California 
Los Angeles, 2015). 
38 Presner, Muscular Judaism; Boaz Neumann, Land and Desire in Early Zionism, trans. Haim Watzman 
(Waltham: Brandeis University Press, 2011). 
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The project of physical regeneration through manual labor, however, encountered 
significant difficulties. As mentioned above, beginning with the first wave of European 
Zionist settlement in Palestine at the end of the nineteenth century, Jewish employers 
found Palestinian Arab workers were often willing to perform identical work for 
considerably lower wages than their less experienced and skilled European Jewish 
counterparts. Accordingly, employers often showed a distinct preference towards hiring 
the former. In response, members of the second wave of Zionist immigration from 
Eastern Europe in the early 1900s, many of whom were property-less and in dire need of 
employment, embarked on what became known as the “conquest of labor.” Their goal 
was to guarantee the exclusive employment of Jews by Jewish employers.39 
Contemporary Zionist observers construed this “conquest,” as an uphill battle. 
The reasons for this, they argued, were the different bodily and economic needs, cultural 
capacities, political acumen, physical abilities and professional skills of Eastern European 
Jewish immigrants and Palestinian Arabs. While Eastern European Jewish immigrants 
sought wage labor as their primary source of livelihood, Zionist thinkers and public 
figures claimed, Palestinian workers often used wages as supplemental income alongside 
subsistence farming. Palestinians were therefore willing to work for shorter periods of 
time than immigrants looking for permanent employment, a boon to employers in 
seasonal agriculture as well as in the construction industry. Moreover, Palestinian 
workers were often willing to work for lower wages than Eastern European Jews.  
 
39 Shapira, Ha-Ma’avak ha-Nikhzav; Shalev, Labour and the Political Economy; Shafir, Land, Labor; 
Lockman, Comrades and Enemies; Bernstein, Constructing Boundaries; Shaul A. Duke, The Stratifying 




This wage differential was naturalized by the Zionist leadership and others, by 
linking it to Palestinians’ supposedly lower “standard of living” compared to Eastern 
European Jewish workers – a concept which, as Chapter 2 shows, came under Palestinian 
criticism for its racial nature. Employers also saw Palestinian workers as less inclined to 
demand rights through the language of organized labor than their Eastern European 
Jewish counterparts and thus as easier to exploit. Finally, Zionist observers perceived a 
difference in skill between Palestinians and Eastern European Jews across various forms 
of labor. Gershon Shafir cites Zionist descriptions of “Arab workers” who worked from 
childhood, and thus embodying the skills necessary for labor in “all [their] limbs.”40 The 
Eastern European Jewish immigrant, meanwhile, was often inexperienced, required 
training, and was frequently regarded as “[lacking] the physical strength and stamina 
required for agricultural labor.”41 
Zionist functionaries often portrayed Mizrahim too as “natural workers,” using 
similar racializing terms to those they applied to Palestinian Arabs. They described 
Mizrahim as better suited for physical labor but lacking in intellect, technical capacities 
and culture, and their material and cultural needs – that is, their “standard of living” – as 
lesser than those of Eastern European Jews. Therefore, the argument went, like 
Palestinian Arabs, Mizrahim could be paid lower wages.  
 
40 Yaakov Levine, cited in Shafir, Land, Labor, 57. 
41 Shafir, Land, Labor, 57. The strategy which Zionist settlers employed as part of the “conquest of labor,” 
and which eventually gained permanence, was what Shafir refers to as “monopolization of skills.” This 
model, which resembled the French model for viniculture in Algeria, Tunisia and also in the French wine 
region of Languedoc, divided skilled, and therefore, higher paying jobs, and unskilled work along racial or 
class lines onto which its advocates mapped differences in “intelligence” and “culture.” As Chapters 1 and 
2 show, these caste-like divisions became an important device for Zionist efforts to infiltrate the building 
trades as well. Shafir, Land, Labor, 65-69. 
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As early as 1911, this notion of similarity between Mizrahi Jews and Palestinian 
Arabs – which extended also to understandings of their climatic suitability to Palestine – 
animated the mission of the labor Zionist activist, Shmuel Yavnieli, to Yemen. The 
purpose of Yavnieli’s mission, promoted by Arthur Ruppin’s Palestine Office and the 
Planter’s Union, which represented the planter class of the first wave of Zionist 
settlement, was to encourage Yemeni Jewish immigration to Palestine. New Yemeni 
immigrants, the mission’s architects argued, could join the existing Yemeni community 
in Palestine, many of whom had immigrated in 1881, roughly concurrently with the first 
groups of European Zionist settlers. As “Hebrew labor,” they could then substitute 
Palestinian Arab workers, while receiving similar wages and working conditions to those 
of the latter. That is, they would provide a path towards a conquest of labor which 
accorded with the planter class’ economic interests.42 
 
After 1948: Colonial Continuities 
Looking beyond the Mandate to the period after the Nakba and Israeli independence, the 
early decades of the Israeli state and specifically the state’s relationship with the 
Palestinians who remained within its boundaries have long constituted, in Shira 
 
42 Yosef Meir, Ha-Tn‘ua ha-Tziyonit ve-Yehudei Teiman: Shlihutu shel Yavnieli be-Or Hadash [The Zionist 
Movement and the Jews of Yemen: Yavnieli’s Mission in a New Light] (Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Afikim, 1982); 
Shafir, Land, Labor, Chapter 4; Yehouda Shenhav, The Arab Jews: A Postcolonial Reading of Nationalism, 
Religion, and Ethnicity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), Chapter 3. Etan Bloom points to 
Arthur Ruppin’s reliance on eugenic thinking in his approach to Yemeni and other Mizrahi Jews. Yehuda 
Sharim discusses how Mizrahi-Sephardic intellectuals adopted, challenged, and adapted these ideas about 
Mizrahi bodies and capacities during the Mandate period. Bloom, Arthur Ruppin; Yehuda Sharim, “The 
Struggle for Sephardic-Mizrahi Autonomy: Racial Identities in Palestine-Israel, 1918-1948” (PhD diss., 
University of California Los Angeles, 2013). 
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Robinson’s words, a “black hole” in historical scholarship.43 Robinson correctly points 
out that especially in the aftermath of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip in 1967, the nineteen years which passed between 1948 and 1967, began to be 
viewed through rose-tinted glasses. Liberal critics of Israel’s occupation, both within and 
outside of Israel, came to see the years before 1967 as the state’s “period of innocence.”  
And yet, as mentioned above, between 1948 and 1966, the majority of 
Palestinians within Israel were governed under a military administration, which 
drastically curtailed their freedoms and rights and Mizrahi Jews suffered harsh 
discrimination. For a significant period, works that critically examined Israel’s first 
decades, including the military administration, were few and far between.44 However, the 
past decade has seen a surge of innovative scholarship dedicated to their study. Hillel 
Cohen’s Good Arabs and Robinson’s, Citizen Strangers, were arguably the harbingers of 
this wave, followed by works by Yael Berda, Leena Dallasheh, Maha Nassar, Arnon 
 
43  Shira Robinson, Citizen Strangers: Palestinians and the Birth of Israel’s Liberal Settler State (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2013), 4-5. 
44 Among these, Sabri Jiryis’ classic The Arabs in Israel, first published in Hebrew in 1966 and translated 
into multiple languages, remains an invaluable source on the period. Jiryis, The Arabs in Israel. Other 
important works include: Zureik, The Palestinians in Israel; Ian Lustick, Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel’s 
Control of a National Minority (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980); Majid al-Haj, Education, 
Empowerment, and Control: The Case of the Arabs in Israel (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1995); Yair Bäuml, Tzel Kahol Lavan: Mediniyut ha-Mimsad ha-Isra’eli u-Fe‘ulotav be-Kerev ha-Ezrahim 
ha-‘Aravim be-Israel: ha-Shanim ha-Me‘atzvot: 1958-1968 [A Blue and White Shadow: The Israeli 
Establishment’s Policy and Actions among its Arab Citizens: The Formative Years: 1958-1968] (Haifa: 
Hotza’a la-Or, 2007). The geographer Ghazi Falah has authored multiple studies on the Israeli state’s land 
policies vis-à-vis Palestinian citizens in Israel. See: Ghazi Falah, “Israeli ‘Judaization’ Policy in Galilee,” 
Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. 20, No. 4 (Summer 1991): 69-85; Ghazi Falah, “The 1948 Israeli-
Palestinian War and Its Aftermath: The Transformation and De-Signification of Palestine’s Cultural 
Landscape,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 86, no. 2 (1996): 256–85. In Hebrew, 
Sarah Ozacky-Lazar has written considerably about the period as well. 
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Degani, Lana Tatour, and others.45 Much of this scholarship, as the introduction to 
Chapter 3 discusses, is dedicated to examining the continuities of colonial government 
policies toward Palestinians between the British Mandate and Israeli rule, as well as the 
Israeli state’s continued commitment to the settler colonial nature of the Zionist project in 
Palestine. This dissertation contributes to this emerging literature by demonstrating how 
such colonial continuities manifested in the realm of labor. The division of labor which 
developed in Israel’s initial decades, I argue, was largely the outgrowth of colonial and 
racial hierarchies established during the Mandate. 
 
Divisions of Labor in the Israeli State 
That Israel’s labor market was a segmented one already in the early 1950s, is hardly a 
novel argument. Mizrahi Jews and Palestinian citizens in Israel were disproportionately 
tracked into “unskilled” manual labor, dominating lower-tier jobs in branches like 
construction and agriculture. However, the scholarship on the period has, for the most 
part, discussed it as though there existed two parallel and separate divisions of labor: an 
 
45 Hillel Cohen, Good Arabs: The Israeli Security Agencies and the Israeli Arabs, 1948–1967, trans. Haim 
Watzman (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011); Robinson, Citizen Strangers; Yael H. Berda, 
“Colonial Legacy and Administrative Memory: The Legal Construction of Citizenship in India, Israel and 
Cyprus,” (PhD diss., Princeton University, 2014); Leena Dallasheh, “Troubled  Waters: Citizenship and 
Colonial Zionism in Nazareth,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 47, no. 3 (August 2015): 467–
87; Leena Dallasheh, “Persevering through Colonial Transition: Nazareth’s Palestinian Residents after 
1948,” Journal of Palestine Studies 45, no. 2 (February, 2016): 8–23; Arnon Yehuda Degani, “The Decline 
and Fall of the Israeli Military Government, 1948–1966: A Case of Settler-Colonial Consolidation?” Settler 
Colonial Studies 5, no. 1 (January 2015). Maha Nassar, Brothers Apart: Palestinian Citizens of Israel and 
the Arab World (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2017); Lana Tatour, “Citizenship as Domination: 
Settler Colonialism and the Making of Palestinian Citizenship in Israel,” Arab Studies Journal XXVII, no. 
2 (Fall 2019): 8–39. The Arab Studies Journal has been a particularly fruitful outlet for studies of the 
period. See: Benny Nuriely, “The Hunger Economy: The Military Government  in the Galilee, Ramle, and 
Lydda, 1948-1949,” Arab Studies Journal XXVII, no. 2 (Fall 2019): 64–84; Lily Eilan, “Paradise Lost: 
Land and Labor in 1950s Galilee,” Arab Studies Journal XXVIII, no. 1 (Spring 2020): 84-111. 
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intra-Jewish division, between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim; and a second “external” 
division, between Jews and Palestinians.  
Israeli government officials, social scientists, and frequently also public discourse 
justified and explained Mizrahi Jews’ proletarianization during the 1950s and 1960s by 
relying on then-popular modernization approaches. Such approaches argued that Mizrahi 
immigrants were overrepresented in low-status, manual labor because of their need to 
adjust to the transition from the “traditional” societies from whence they came, to the 
already developed Israeli society. These approaches were paired with discourses of 
physical and spiritual regeneration, like those applied previously primarily to European 
Jews. The core idea of forming “new Jews” through manual labor remained similar, but 
Mizrahi Jews were now its primary wanting objects.46 However, as Bernstein and Swirski 
have shown, 1950s Israel was hardly a developed industrial economy which would 
require such an adjustment process. Rather, it was precisely the proletarianization of 
Mizrahi Jews which allowed the state to industrialize and develop rapidly during its early 
decades.47  
State officials and the advocates of modernization theory applied a similar 
explanation to the proletarianization of Palestinian citizens in Israel during those decades, 
albeit stripped of most of its redemptive dimensions, since Arabs remained essentially 
inassimilable. The products of “traditional” Arab rural society, their proletarianization 
was a phase in their acculturation to the modern Israeli one.48 However, despite these 
 
46 Bernstein and Swirski, “The Rapid Economic Development,” 82. 
47 Bernstein and Swirski, “The Rapid Economic Development.” 
48 Khalidi, The Arab Economy in Israel, 9-13. 
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affinities, Bernstein and Swirski’s work and later investigations of the emergence of an 
ethnic division of labor among Jews in Israel rarely consider the place of Palestinian 
citizens in this division. Similarly, studies of the proletarianization of Palestinian citizens 
seldom mention the parallel process of Mizrahi proletarianization.49  
This tendency to treat each of these histories as though they were separate, has 
had serious repercussions for our understanding of the formation of social hierarchies in 
Israel/Palestine after 1948. Alongside the tendency of scholarship on the ethnic division 
of labor to define the establishment of the state as the division of labor’s starting point, it 
is partially responsible for what Yehouda Shenhav has described as the tendency of 
critical scholarship on Mizrahim in Israel to “miss out… on the colonial history” 
undergirding it.50 
To recapture both this colonial history and “the contemporary colonial reality,” 
Shenhav’s The Arab Jews studies the interactions between Zionist emissaries, Iranian and 
Indian workers, and Iraqi Jews, which took place on the backdrop of the construction 
projects carried out in Abadan, Iran by Solel Boneh, the contracting arm of the Palestine-
 
49 Bernstein and Swirski, “The Rapid Economic Development”; Khalidi, The Arab Economy in Israel; 
Haidar, On the Margins; Khazzoom, Shifting Ethnic Boundaries. For a different approach, albeit one 
examining a later period, in which the Mizrahi and the Palestinian experiences of labor and class mobility 
are studied alongside one another, see: Rami Adut, “‘Ve-ha-Kol be-‘Atzmi, Kim‘at!’ Havnayat ‘Atzmi 
‘Oved be-Kerev ‘Aravim u-Mizrahim be-Mahalakh Mobiliyut la-Ma‘amad ha-Beynoni: Mikrei Mivhan – 
Beit Safafa u-Gilo be-Yerushalaim” [‘All by Myself, Almost!’ Constructing a ‘Working-Self’ among Arabs 
and Mizrahim as Part of Mobility into the Middle Class: Case Studies – Beit Safafa and Gilo in Jerusalem] 
(PhD diss. Ben Gurion University of the Negev, 2017). 
50 Shenhav, The Arab Jews, 55. It is perhaps unsurprising that critical studies of Palestinian citizens’ 
marginalization and oppression in Israel have tended to be more attuned to this colonial history, that is, to 
the impact of the colonial encounter with Zionism and British rule on the Palestinians in the decades prior 
to 1948 and on the realities and experiences of Palestinians in Israel after 1948. This is true also for some 
studies which predated the recent wave of works mentioned above by Robinson, Berda, and Dallasheh. 
See: Henry Rosenfeld, “The Class Situation of the Arab National Minority in Israel,” Comparative Studies 
in Society and History 20, no. 3 (1978): 374–407; Khalidi, The Arab Economy. 
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based Histadrut (the Zionist General Federation of Trade Unions). Between 1942 and 
1944, Solel Boneh carried out construction at Abadan after receiving a tender from the 
British army. Alongside the works, the Yishuv’s leadership used the project as cover for 
sending Zionist emissaries to Iraq, to build ties with the longstanding and deeply rooted 
local Jewish community. Shenhav argues that the circumstances which surrounded the 
Abadan project – a meeting point between an explicitly imperial task on behalf of the 
British, and the nationalist task of engaging with Iraq’s Jewish community – made it a 
“terminus a quo [“zero point”] of relations between Zionism and the Arab Jews.”51 These 
relations, he claims, were historically defined precisely by such a meeting point, between 
Zionism’s colonial and nationalist facets. From the Zionist perspective, Arab Jews were 
both racialized, “ethnic subjects” and “possible candidates for integration into the Zionist 
project.”52 
That Shenhav locates this “zero point” at the construction sites of Abadan is, I 
would argue, more than merely fortuitous. Rather, it indicates the pivotal role which 
construction work and the construction industry played in the nexus between nationalism, 
colonialism, empire, and race in the twentieth-century history of Israel/Palestine – a role 
which extended even beyond the geography of the land itself.53 Many of the themes 
 
51 Shenhav, The Arab Jews, 33. 
52 Shenhav, The Arab Jews, 69. 
53 In addition to Shenhav’s study of the Abadan works, Haim Yacobi and Ayala Levin have explored the 
activities of Israeli contracting firms – most prominently Solel Boneh – and Israeli architects in several 
postcolonial African nations starting in the mid-1950s. They both show how these activities drew together 
colonial pasts, postcolonial nationalisms, and ideas about race and modernity. Haim Yacobi, Israel and 
Africa: A Genealogy of Moral Geography (London: Routledge, 2016); Ayala Levin, “Exporting 
Architectural National Expertise: Arieh Sharon’s Ile-Ife University Campus in West-Nigeria (1962-1976),” 
in Nationalism and Architecture, eds. Raymond Quek, Darren Deane, and Sarah Butler (London: Ashgate, 
2012): 53–66; Ayala Levin, “Haile Selassie’s Imperial Modernity: Expatriate Architects and the Shaping of 
Addis Ababa,” Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians 75, no. 4 (December, 2016): 447–68.  
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which Shenhav describes as unfolding in Abadan – Zionism’s need to navigate between 
nationalism’s valorization of manual labor and the colonial denigration of such labor; 
European Zionists’ often uneasy attempts to situate themselves in relation to a colonial 
racial hierarchy and division of labor and their conditional position as “white”; and the 
strains political economy placed on both – were, as Chapters 2 and 3 show, at stake 
already in Mandate Palestine as early as the 1920s.54  
 
Racialized Bodies, Racial Politics, and Colonial Legacies 
Race and racial politics have had a strange career in discussions of modern 
Palestine/Israel. The categories are seemingly everywhere. Yet the ways in which they 
have operated historically remain opaque, even if examining them is no longer entirely 
taboo.55 The question of “racism” – often encoded primarily as group discrimination 
disconnected from ideas about race per se as well as their histories – has featured 
 
54 Shenhav, The Arab Jews, Chapters 1 and 2. As will become apparent, the literature on-, and the historical 
processes of-, Mizrahi racialization in Zionist thought and practice are closely linked to the history this 
dissertation narrates. Regrettably, aside from sections of Chapters 3 and 4, which deal explicitly with 
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Shohat, Gershon Shafir, and Yehouda Shenhav has laid the groundwork for. Shohat is largely credited with 
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Text. She points out that outside the confines of academia, Mizrahi political movements like the Black 
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binding Mizrahi and Palestinian histories and futures together, already in the mid-1970s. Shafir’s analysis 
of the Yavnieli Mission as part of a study focused on the “origins of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,” 
remains a significant contribution. Ella Shohat, “Sephardim in Israel: Zionism from the Standpoint of Its 
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Palestinian Conflict, Chapter 4; Shenhav, The Arab Jews. 
55 Jonathan Marc Gribetz, Defining Neighbors: Religion, Race, and the Early Zionist-Arab Encounter, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 12-14. 
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prominently in popular and scholarly discourse about Palestine/Israel.56 The history of 
racial thought is at the heart of studies of Jewish, Zionist and Palestinian early 
engagements with bio-racism.57 Questions of racial politics animate applications of the 
settler colonial framework to the study of Israel/Palestine and analyses of the racial 
underpinnings of the land’s twentieth-century citizenship regimes.58 Much of the critical 
scholarship on the experiences of Mizrahim, too, elucidates the racial components of their 
discrimination in Israel.59 Most recently, activists and scholars have explored historical 
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and contemporary networks of global Black-Palestinian solidarity rooted in anti-racist 
and anti-colonial politics.60  
Outside of a few notable exceptions, however, historicizing the processes of 
racialization in Palestine/Israel – that is, how Palestinian Arabs and Ashkenazi and 
Mizrahi Jews came to be regarded as possessing different physical, intellectual, and 
cultural qualities – has remained largely beyond the purview of most of this scholarship. 
The same is true for the historical relationship between racial thought and racial politics: 
how racialization has shaped and sustained social hierarchies in Israel/Palestine over 
time.61 
By examining the racialization of construction labor in Palestine/Israel from the 
period of British rule to the early decades of the Israeli state, this dissertation argues that 
racialized conceptions of difference between and among Jews and Arabs were 
foundational to the formation of twentieth-century Palestine/Israel’s social hierarchies. 
The dissertation demonstrates how concepts of Arab and Mizrahi suitability for physical 
labor as opposed to European Jewish intellectual superiority, and of Arabs’ and 
Mizrahim’s lesser material and cultural needs, shaped Mandate Palestine’s and the Israeli 
 
Marginalities Within the Hegemony], Te’orya u-Vikoret, no. 48 (Summer 2017): 249-264; Smadar Lavie, 
Wrapped in the Flag of Israel: Mizrahi Single Mothers and Bureaucratic Torture, revised edition (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2018 [2014]). 
60 Alex Lubin, Geographies of Liberation: The Making of an Afro-Arab Political Imaginary (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2014); Keith P. Feldman, A Shadow over Palestine: The Imperial Life 
of Race in America (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015); Angela Y. Davis, Freedom Is a 
Constant Struggle: Ferguson, Palestine, and the Foundations of a Movement (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 
2016); Michael R. Fischbach, Black Power and Palestine: Transnational Countries of Color (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2019); Noura Erekat and Marc Lamont Hill, eds. “Black Palestinian 
Transnational Solidarity.” Special issue, Journal of Palestine Studies 48, no. 4 (Summer 2019). 
61 For works which do address these questions, some more so than others, see: Shenhav, The Arab Jews; 
Khazzoom, Shifting Ethnic Boundaries; Robinson, Citizen Strangers; Sharim, “The Struggle for Sephardic-
Mizrahi Autonomy”; Berda, “Colonial Legacy”; Tatour, “Citizenship as Domination.” 
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state’s divisions of labor, relegating Palestinians and Mizrahim to “inferior” labor and 
social status. In doing so, I follow scholarship which argues that, at its core, racialization 
operates upon and marks physical bodies, and works examining the racialization of labor 
in the Middle East and elsewhere.62  
The dissertation shows that these racializing processes, and the racial projects of 
which they were part, were embedded in regional, imperial, and global discourses about 
race, culture, and the body.63 These ranged from European-inspired Zionist ideas about 
collective and individual degeneration and regeneration, through British racial attitudes 
toward laboring bodies, to the transnational engagements of Jews and Arabs with the 
concepts of whiteness and racial hierarchy and appeals to anti-racist politics. The 
 
62 For the body as the object of racism and racialization, see: Hortense J. Spillers, “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s 
Maybe: An American Grammar Book,” Diacritics 17, no. 2 (1987): 65–81; Sara Ahmed, “Racialized 
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Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014); Michael 
Omi and Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United States, third edition (New York, NY: Routledge, 
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63 For the notion of “racial projects,” see: Omi and Winant, Racial Formation. 
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dissertation thus demonstrates how local actors in Palestine/Israel placed themselves and 
others along a global “color-line” defining hierarchies, alliances, and divisions of labor.64 
 
Dissertation Structure 
Chapter 1 traces cement’s biography in Palestine/Israel through its formative stage, the 
period of British rule, from 1918 to 1948. First, it examines Zionists’ continued attempts, 
rooted in the late Ottoman-period, to claim cement and concrete as materials of exclusive 
Jewish expertise. Then, it surveys cement’s political economy, shaped by the interplay 
between British interests, the Mandate’s legal structures, the Jewish-owned Nesher 
Portland Cement Company, and the initiatives of Palestinian capitalists. Analyzing the 
latter in the context of a broader Palestinian discourse about construction, the chapter 
demonstrates the crucial role accorded by Palestinians to building as part of a national 
and anti-colonial project. The repeated unraveling of such materialist nation-building 
endeavors, meanwhile, was the product of the very real vicissitudes of Palestinian 
 
64 Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk; Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line: 
White Men’s Countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Beeta Baghoolizadeh, “Seeing Race and Erasing Slavery: 




history, the abstractions of British racial thought and ideas about corporate personhood, 
and Palestine’s underlying geological substrata. Finally, the chapter discusses the 
transformation of cement from a material imbued with future promise to a “mournful 
commodity” – one which embodied the civilian crises of World War II in Palestine and 
the years immediately following. 
In a similar vein to the first chapter, Chapter 2 centers on the history of a specific 
building material and its production during the Mandate period. The chapter exchanges 
stone for cement, quarries for cement factories, and a focus on work processes and the 
body for political economy. It begins by following a photographic controversy that stirred 
Palestine in Summer 1931, as the images at its center blurred the lines between two 
different kinds of machines – quarry drills and machine guns. The chapter’s second 
section then explores how British racial thought, Palestinian anti-racist critiques, and 
labor Zionism’s shifting stance towards colonial divisions of labor came to frame 
competition over employment during the construction of the Haifa harbor and work in its 
Athlit quarry, between 1928-1931. The third and fourth sections examine the evolution of 
the Zionist “conquest of stone,” from the early 1920s to the 1940s. They demonstrate 
how Zionist fantasies about reviving an immediate connection between Jewish bodies 
and the physical land of Eretz Yisrael (the Hebrew name for Palestine) depended first on 
the adoption of Palestinian knowledge, skills, and sensibilities, and then on the wide scale 
use of machinery to displace and replace Palestinian workers. The chapter concludes with 
a brief study of a critique of mechanization published in 1935 in the Palestinian economic 
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journal, al-’Iqtisadiyyat al-‘Arabiyya, which offers an almost diametrically opposite 
approach to the one eventually embraced by Zionism’s conquest of stone. 
Chapter 3 moves away from the sites of production and into the rooms in which 
Histadrut officials and the Yishuv’s leadership debated and planned the management of 
labor. The chapter traces Israel’s post-1948 racial division to historical processes and 
ways of thinking which originated in the final decade of British rule. Accordingly, it is 
the sole chapter in the dissertation which focuses almost entirely on Zionist discourse and 
relies mostly on Zionist sources. The chapter opens with a 1942 Histadrut Executive 
meeting, in which some members expressed concern regarding the declining numbers of 
Jewish construction workers and the preponderance of exploitative employment of 
Palestinian Arabs by Histadrut-owned companies, while others brushed such concerns 
aside, citing “survival” over moral obligations and institutional strength over ideals. 
These discussions framed Histadrut-owned companies’ increasing reliance on cheaper 
Arab labor in relation to distinctly racialized notions of colonial exploitation and “coolie” 
labor. At the same time, they also suggested a shift in the sense of the Yishuv’s coercive 
potential to affect such labor regimes, on the one hand, and in the political calculations 
which informed the Zionist leadership’s attitudes towards them. 
The second half of Chapter 3 examines the work of the politicians, administrators, 
and academics, which the Yishuv’s Emergency Committee (Va‘adat ha-Matzav) charged 
with planning a Ministry of Labor for a future Jewish state following UNSCOP’s 
September 1947 recommendation to partition Palestine. Specifically, I focus on the 
discussions and the plans various experts proposed for managing what they referred to as 
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the “Arab labor problem,” in the future state. These were plans for a state that never came 
to be: a Jewish state with a population which was roughly forty-five percent Palestinian, 
and which was bound by UNSCOP’s proposal to instituting open borders with the new 
Arab state which was planned to be set up alongside it. The war of 1947-1949 and the 
Palestinian Nakba nullified partition and decimated the Palestinian population in the 
eventual Israeli state. However, planners’ approaches to solving the theoretical 
“problem,” shed considerable light both on these appointed experts’ perceptions of the 
place of Palestinians in a Jewish state and economy, and on the measures of labor control 
and coercion which were eventually adopted by the Israeli state. 
Chapter 4 returns to the sites covered in the second chapter, Palestine’s – and now 
Israel’s – stone quarries, in the aftermath of the Nakba and Israeli independence. The 
chapter shows how the alignment between Palestine’s geological substrata, Zionist 
patterns of settlement and colonization, and Palestinian strategies of struggle and survival 
rendered many stone quarries stubbornly Palestinian, even after the catastrophic events of 
the Nakba. Quarries stood at the center of several of the period’s most crucial junctures: 
from Palestinian citizens’ struggles against land confiscations and the state-directed 
policies of spatial “Judaization,” to the discriminatory incorporation of recent Mizrahi 
immigrants into the workforce, often as part of the same Judaization policies and 
explicitly at the expense of Palestinians. The chapter focuses on the tumultuous history of 
the stone quarries of the Shaghur valley (known in Hebrew as Beit ha-Kerem valley) in 
the Western Galilee between 1948 and 1964, while also drawing upon reports and events 
recorded in other quarries. During these years, I argue, stone quarries emerged as 
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political, social, and economic flashpoints between the state and its military 
administration, business interests, and the country’s most marginalized populations. At 
the same time, quarries became bastions of Palestinian and Mizrahi self-sufficiency and 
the backdrop for reimagining self-perception, community, and culture. 
The dissertation’s final chapter explores the experiences of Palestinian citizens in 
Israel’s construction industry in the twenty-five years following 1948. The chapter relies 
primarily on the narratives of thirteen Palestinian individuals who were construction 
workers, foremen, contractors, organizers, and activists, as well as their family members, 
all of whom I interviewed in October 2018. Since the chapter is methodologically 
different to the other chapters in the dissertation, its first section is dedicated in part to a 
methodological and practical discussion of how I approached conducting and analyzing 
these interviews. The chapter then combines my interlocutors’ oral history narratives with 
archival and secondary sources to examine four facets of their experiences in Israel’s 
construction industry: 1) the conditions and considerations which drove Palestinian 
citizens, many of them teens, to effectively become migrant workers in the Israeli job 
market, and specifically in the construction industry; 2) workers’ attempts and 
experiences of creating spaces of safety and intimacy away from home with their peers 
and, at times, even with Jewish employers; 3) the pressures workers felt to conceal 
themselves in Jewish spaces because of their racialized hyper-visibility, on the one hand, 
and their experiences of the conditions of social invisibility which made their exploitation 
possible, on the other; and 4) how workers, their families, and their communities made 
use of the knowledge, skills, and material resources they gained in an industry into which 
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many of them were driven out of necessity, to rebuild and reimagine their own 





CHAPTER 1: BUILDING TO SURVIVE 
 
“These people are really committing suicide . . . why [they] deprive us and 
themselves of cement baffles me.” 
– Emile Boutagy, February 26, 1941 
 
“[I]f the subject of this letter (the vexed question of cement) does not 
come within your schedule, would you pass it on, with my apologies, to 
the officer who deals with the affairs of this mournful commodity.” 
– Ivan Lloyd-Phillips, December 14, 1946 
 
“Oh cement, oh beloved/you are always on my mind” 
– Islam Ayoub, “The Cement Song (Longing, Oh, Beloved),” 
Gaza, 2014 
 
Portland cement, a hydraulic cement first patented in England in the early nineteenth 
century produced by fusing limestone and aluminosilicates, has played a crucial role in 
the history of Israel/Palestine for almost a century. From the first sacks unloaded in Jaffa 
in the 1890s to those clandestinely transported into the besieged Gaza Strip through 
tunnels from the Egyptian border area since 2007, cement has stood at the center of two 
of the defining experiences of Palestinian society: modernity writ-large and the encounter 
with Zionism.65 Cement, and concrete for which it is a key constituent, have had far-
 
65 “Concrete in Palestine,” Cement Age 10, no. 5 (May 1910): 371; Jon Donnison, “Gaza Tunnel Trade 
Squeezed by Egypt ‘Crackdown’,” BBC News, August 21, 2012, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-
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the form of “modern Portland cement” produced beginning in the late nineteenth century, and which 




reaching impact on infrastructure, the built environment, and the building professions 
globally.66 However, cement, in presence and absence, has also intertwined in unique 
ways with Palestinians’ everyday lives and political horizons: Its abundance has defined 
the changing landscapes of Palestinian towns and, after 1948, refugee camps; its scarcity 
– the product of Israeli restrictions – has caused contemporary Gaza’s constant state of 
disrepair; its malleability has shaped the experiences of Palestinian construction workers 
in Israel and the settlements; and its solidity has wrought the separation wall.67 
This chapter focuses on the period of British rule (1918–48), which I argue was 
the formative stage of cement’s biography in Palestine/Israel.68 During this period 
construction was a central component in both the Zionist and the Palestinian nation-
building projects. In the process, the consumption and production of cement became 
 
important to note that even among Portland cements there have historically been variations. Modern 
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indexical of the ability to construct not only modern built structures but also 
communities. While tracing cement consumption became one method of quantifying “the 
movement of construction” (Arabic: harakat al-bina’; Hebrew: tnu‘at ha-binyan), its 
production was understood as crucial to the prospect of economic independence and 
liberation from colonial domination.69  
As part of the broader narrative of this dissertation, which posits construction and 
construction work as central pillars of the structures of inequality and domination in 
twentieth-century Palestine/Israel, the chapter illuminates cement’s role in the formation 
of these structures and in the strategies of struggle and survival Palestinians would deploy 
in their shadows. The first two sections follow the failed attempts to make cement and 
concrete an exclusive object of Hebrew labor through specialization and expertise, which 
coalesced with British racial ideologies and foreshadow the central role Palestinian men 
would eventually come to play in constructing the Jewish state.70 The subsequent sections 
examine the formation of the Nesher cement company’s monopoly over cement 
production, abetted by British support, and the thwarted attempts of Palestinian capitalists 
to establish an Arab cement company during the Mandate. These developments set the 
stage for Nesher’s ability to maintain its monopoly, largely unabated, well beyond 1948. 
The struggle over cement production also presents new questions regarding the history of 
corporations and race in Mandate Palestine. The chapter’s final section binds together 
 
69 Yehoshua Ziman, Binyan ha-Aretz, 1882–1945 [Building the Land, 1882–1945] (Jerusalem: Defus R. H. 
Cohen, 1946), 87. 
70 This reversal is even more remarkable when one considers that “wet jobs,” work in cement and concrete, 
would become those most identified with Palestinian laborers in the Israeli construction industry. Leila 
Farsakh, Palestinian Labor Migration to Israel: Labor, Land, and Occupation (London: Routledge, 2005), 
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these layers. The accumulation of cement’s various significances meant that in times of 
scarcity, such as during World War II and in its aftermath, cement emerged as an object 
eliciting intense emotion, intimately connected to life itself and to the possibility of 
survival. 
 
“It Has No Other Experts” 
As Or Alexandrovich has shown, Early Zionist efforts to transition from the “traditional” 
construction materials of Palestine, such as gravel and limestone, to “modern” materials, 
in particular cement and cement bricks, were an essentially political transition linked 
directly to the idea of Hebrew labor.71 Focusing on the construction of the first “modern” 
Hebrew neighborhood, Ahuzat Bayt, just north of Jaffa in 1909, Alexandrovich describes 
an emerging consensus in Zionist circles whereby Palestinian construction workers were 
considered more skillful, indeed “naturally inclined,” toward construction in local 
materials and methods. They were imagined as having known the local stone “for 
generation upon generation,” making them “greatly preferable” to Jewish laborers.72 
Zionist contractors and entrepreneurs viewed the construction of Ahuzat Bayt as an 
opportunity to introduce a new set of building materials and methods to unsettle this 
hierarchy of expertise. The material chosen to foster this shift by the neighborhood’s 
 
71 Alexandrovich, “Kurkar, Melet.” As noted in the introduction, in early twentieth-century Labor Zionism, 
“Hebrew labor” was considered a crucial component in the creation of a “new Jew,” which was able-
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Bernstein, Constructing Boundaries. 
72 Alexandrovich, “Kurkar, Melet,” 68–69. Alexadrovich quotes Arthur Ruppin, then director of the 
Palestine Office of the Zionist Organization and a key operative of the Zionist movement. 
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contractor, Akivah Aryeh Weiss (1868-1947), and his business partner, David Arber 
(1861-1924), was the concrete brick (also referred to as a “cement brick”), to be made of 
imported Portland cement in Arber’s new factory.73 Their goal was to ensure that Jewish 
hands would construct Jewish houses.74 
Weiss’s and Arber’s foray into replacing local stones and local workers was 
unsuccessful. In Or Alexandrovich’s telling, it was only after World War I, with the mass 
production of silicate (sand lime) bricks starting in 1922, that a serious contender to stone 
and masonry emerged.75 However, the underlying logic of Weiss’ initiative – the 
suggested affinities among specific kinds of labor, materials, and race – continued to 
resonate strongly in Zionist circles. As the use of cement and concrete proliferated, the 
materials themselves were incorporated into competing visions of the land’s future. Like 
Hebrew labor and “building the land,” cement and concrete held a unique place in 
idealized visions of building. This is perhaps most famously captured in Nathan 
Alterman’s “Morning Song” (1932), where dressing the land “in a gown of concrete and 
cement” becomes central to performing the love of the land.76  
In this climate, the idea that Jewish laborers were more adept at work in modern 
materials, particularly concrete and cement, took on additional weight. British racialized 
conceptions of the different capacities of Jews and Palestinian Arabs further bolstered 
 
73 Alexandrovich, “Kurkar, Melet,” 76–77. 
74 This goal went well beyond the need to supply Jewish workers with employment and the economic goals 
generally identified with “Hebrew labor.” Weiss employed a discourse of sanctity and impurity regarding 
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75 Alexandrovich, “Kurkar, Melet,” 83–85. 
76 Eric Zakim, To Build and Be Built: Landscape, Literature, and the Construction of Zionist Identity 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 169–175. 
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this line of thought. In 1929, the British high commissioner John Chancellor weighed in 
on the increasingly contested matter of the unequal division of labor in Palestine, arguing 
that “the rivalry between the Jews and Arabs [in the matter of the division of labor and 
wage inequality],” was “mitigated by the fact that the two races tend to become naturally 
segregated in different kinds of labor.”77 Juxtaposing the “superior physique” of Arabs to 
the “greater intelligence” of Jews, he used concrete work, among other things, as a case 
in point for this contradiction-riddled racial ideology, stating that 
 
By reason of their greater intelligence and manual skill the Jews are 
economically superior to the Arabs in some of the more modern forms of 
skilled and semi-skilled work, such as reinforced concrete, care of 
machinery and electrical work [emphasis mine]. 
 
Champions of Hebrew labor seized upon these distinctions, effectively mirroring earlier 
frustrations with the inadequacy and disadvantages of Jewish hands working in local 
Palestinian stone. In place of the Palestinians’ “natural” or “traditional” affinity, Jewish 
labor offered expertise and specialization. The right-wing newspaper Do’ar ha-Yom 
reported with unconcealed glee that, following the devastation of the 1927 earthquake, 
Arab employers increasingly saw Hebrew construction, particularly in concrete, as more 
durable. As a result, the paper stated, Arab contractors in the Jerusalem area increasingly 
employed Jewish laborers. Prior to the earthquake “a small number of [Jewish] 
professionals in concrete work had worked . . . for Arab employers.” Now, it was in 
 
77 The National Archives (United Kingdom) (TNA): Colonial Office (CO) 733 (Colonial Office: Palestine 
Original Correspondence from 1919-1965)/165/2, 91. 
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concrete work in particular, “which among the Arabs has no specialists,” that Arab 
contractors in and around Jerusalem sought to employ Jews.78  
Opportunities to celebrate Jewish dominance of concrete work were found even 
when bemoaning the hardships of the Hebrew labor struggle. In March 1929, the 
newspaper Davar, identified with mainstream labor Zionism, complained that due to 
Arab laborers’ low salaries, Jewish workers were entirely blocked from the Jerusalem 
Electric Company’s works. The article took some solace however in “a small concrete 
work [as part of the electric company’s projects] that employs several Jews, since it has 
no other experts.”79 
Jewish mastery of cement was frequently juxtaposed with Arab failures to do so. 
In 1931, Davar complained that the Jerusalem municipality hired an Arab contractor to 
build the city’s new refuse incinerator and slaughterhouse. The contractor was “of course 
employing only Arab laborers in all simple labors.” However, Davar remarked, his 
attempt to boycott Hebrew labor “in the professional work as well” proved unsuccessful: 
the quality of the incinerator’s walls, “cast” – indicating they were made of concrete – 
initially by Arab laborers, was so poor, that Jewish laborers were hired to rebuild them.80  
A striking example of this trope is found in a book dedicated by the Construction 
Workers Union to one of the Jewish construction industry’s pioneers, Chaim Flexer 
(1902-1979), celebrating his seventieth birthday. In an undated speech before the 
Construction Workers Association in Jerusalem, Flexer reminisces of his days working in 
 
78 “‘Avoda ‘Ivrit Etzel ‘Aravim,” Do’ar ha-Yom, August 28, 1927. 
79 “Herem ‘al ‘Avoda ‘Ivrit,” Davar, March 18, 1929. 
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the city, first in stone masonry, then in concrete: “As I passed the Shaykh Jarrah 
neighborhood, I was reminded of the Mufti – Hajj Amin al-Husayni (1895-1974) – who 
invited Jewish laborers in 1934 to fix the concrete ceiling that had collapsed in his office, 
immediately after it was cast by Arab laborers.”81  
The crux of Flexer’s recollection, apocryphal though it may be, is clear: that a 
nationalist figure of al-Husayni’s standing invited Jewish laborers to fix the shoddy 
workmanship of his compatriots is ultimate testimony to what the discourse of Jewish 
expertise rendered an almost “natural” Jewish superiority in cement and concrete work 
and beyond. Flexer’s memory may have already been tinged by the widespread 
association in Jewish Israeli culture between “Arab labor” and poor work, but it might 
also point us toward some of its origins.82 This neat narrative of exclusive Jewish 
expertise in cement and concrete and the corresponding depiction of Palestinian 
construction as always falling apart, fell apart readily itself. Throughout the Mandate 
period, Palestinian contractors and laborers carried out projects, large and small, that 
made extensive use of concrete and cement.83  
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The idea that Portland cement and its products could restructure the building trade 
was not unique to Palestine: from the early nineteenth century, part of what made these 
materials appealing to capitalist and socialist visionaries alike was their potential to do 
just that. In both Europe and the United States, construction in concrete was supposed to 
facilitate a redistribution of skill within the building trades. However, rather than 
fostering a new class of expert laborers, it was perceived as circumventing established 
building crafts, permitting cheaper, “unskilled” labor to engage in the manual work of 
construction, while emphasizing the skills of engineers and other technical experts.84  
From the perspective of labor, Hebrew or otherwise, the introduction of cement 
and concrete as materials of expertise was fraught to begin with. Working in a 
“deskilling” material, most Jewish construction workers seem to have had very little 
actual advantage over their Palestinian peers. At the same time, despite the capacity of 
Palestinian contractors and workers to incorporate the new materials into their repertoire, 
the introduction of cement and concrete on a large scale had considerable adverse impact 
on Palestine’s established building crafts. As early as 1930, the Hope-Simpson report 
noted that Palestinian stonemasons and stone dressers were severely hurt by the 
expanding use of “cement, reinforced concrete and silicate brick, all manufactured by 
Jews.”85 
 
Houses,” in Haifa Before and After 1948: Narratives of a Mixed City, eds. Mahmoud Yazbak and Yfaat 
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During the Mandate Period: Qaraman and Gerstel Meet on the ‘Seam Line’,” in Haifa Before and After 
1948, 43–68. 
84 Forty, Concrete and Culture, Chapter 8; Slaton, Reinforced Concrete. 
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Cement transformed construction work in Palestine, but not in the ways the 
Hebrew press or Zionist entrepreneurs imagined. Its wide-scale introduction succeeded in 
weakening the standing of Palestinian craftbuilders. That in itself could not guarantee 
Zionist dominance in construction. Labor, however, was not the only area in which the 
ability to construct in Palestine was contested.  
Attention to Zionist preoccupations with material acts of building as part of a 
nation-building project, studied from perspectives as diverse as literature, political 
philosophy, and architecture, may have occluded the importance Palestinian anticolonial 
projects conferred upon construction, evident already during the Mandate.86 In the press, 
in their interactions with the British, and in business correspondence, Palestinians 
articulated visions of national futures bound together by cement. These visions came up 
against a considerably more substantial obstacle than Zionist claims for labor 
specialization, however, one shaped in no small part by British policy: the Jewish 
monopoly over cement production. 
 
Empire’s Monopoly 
The Nesher Portland Cement Company, founded in 1923 by the Russian-born 
industrialist and entrepreneur Michael Pollak, maintained throughout the Mandate and 
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beyond a monopoly over cement production.87 The Nesher factory’s establishment was 
the realization of plans laid by a group named the Palestine Portland Cement Syndicate. 
By the time Michael Pollak became involved, the syndicate, led by several prominent 
British Jews, had already selected land near the town of Yajur, southeast of Haifa, for the 
factory and its quarries. Once conditions of the land’s purchase were agreed upon, Pollak 
registered the new “Portland Cement Company ‘Nesher,’ Ltd.” in London, so a viable 
legal entity could make the purchase. London remained the center of Nesher’s financial 
operations until Pollak sold his stake in the company and its London holdings were 
liquidated in 1945.88 
 
87 The company’s ability to secure protective tariffs on imported cement and duty-free import of raw 
materials for exporting industries has served, alongside the granting of the consignments of the Dead Sea 
potash works and the Electric Company to Jewish entrepreneurs, as evidence for British intervention 
favoring Jewish industry. See Smith, The Roots of Separatism, 166–71; Seikaly, Haifa, 86–88. For the 
history of the electric company, see: Ronen Shamir, Current Flow: The Electrification of Palestine 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013); and Meiton, Electrical Palestine. For the Dead Sea potash 
works (PPL), see Jacob Norris, Land of Progress, especially Chapters 1 and 4. More recent engagements 
with Mandate Palestine’s economic and development history also touch upon Nesher, attesting to its 
centrality as an industrial and economic endeavor. See, for example: Seikaly, Men of Capital; Norris, Land 
of Progress. Nesher as a “mixed” employer (of both Arabs and Jews) and a site of workers’ struggles, 
which occasionally brought together Arab and Jewish workers, has drawn considerable attention from labor 
historians of Palestine. See: Deborah Bernstein, “Yehudim ve-‘Aravim be-Mif‘al ‘Nesher’” [Jews and Arabs 
in the Nesher Factory], Cathedra 76 (1995): 82–102; David De Vries, “Ma’avakei ‘Avoda u-Samkhut be-
Kerev Po‘alei ha-Ta‘asiya be-Eretz Yisrael: Po‘alei Beit ha-Haroshet ‘Nesher’ be-Shnot ha-‘Esrim” 
[Struggles of Labor and Authority among Industry Workers in Eretz Yisrael: The Workers of the Nesher 
Factory in the Twenties], Yahadut Zmanenu 8 (1993): 177–215; Lockman, Comrades and Enemies, 85–88, 
207–10. 
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and English webpages cite a passage supposedly taken from Herzl’s highly influential 1902 utopian novel, 
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found in the novel. Even its prescriptive tone is at odds with the narratorial voice of the novel. Herzl does 
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Nesher’s increasing profits and the company’s strengthening hold over Palestine’s 
cement market, beginning in the late 1920s, coincided with a steady increase in the use of 
cement in the land. In 1922 and 1923, cement imports into Palestine – approximating 
consumption in the absence of local manufacture – totaled roughly thirty thousand tons 
annually. By 1929, consumption was estimated at nearly sixty-two thousand tons.89 
Although British ideologies of racial and civilizational hierarchy contributed to 
the Mandate administration’s more favorable view of industrial endeavors led by 
European Jews than ones led by Palestinian Arabs, Nesher’s ability to maintain its status 
as a monopoly seems also to have been rooted in its management’s ability to navigate 
British local and imperial interests and discourses.90 Pollak’s efforts in the summer of 
1925, immediately before beginning production, to institute duty-free admission for raw 
materials for exporting industries were instrumental to the company’s success. Here, the 
reasoning Pollak provided was entirely local: without concessions, the company risked 
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collapse, resulting in loss of jobs.91 However, earlier that year, Pollak had attempted to 
convince the British to raise the tariff on imported cement to protect Nesher’s product 
using a more “imperial” argument. Unlike imported European cement, Pollak contended, 
Nesher’s production would rely solely on British coal, thus contributing to the Metropole. 
When authorities formed a committee to discuss the tariff on cement in May 1926, Pollak 
again justified protection not only because the firm employed “250 Jewish workers and 
100 Arab workers,” but also because it provided a living for “about 200 English workers 
in coal mining and transport. [And] England is now in dire need of exporting coal.”92 
The decision to employ Palestinians in the company’s quarry, despite the protests 
of the advocates of Hebrew labor, which Chapter 2 discusses in detail, was in line both 
with economic considerations, given the wage discrimination between Arabs and Jews, 
and with the ongoing prevalence of ideas regarding the suitability of certain bodies for 
certain forms of labor and materials. Yet Pollak’s outward reasoning also brought 
together political expediency and economy, demonstrating attention to British and 
regional sensitivities and to the struggle over cement’s identity. The employment of 
Arabs, he argued, was intended to prevent accusations by consumers in Palestine and 
beyond that Nesher’s cement was “Jewish.” Furthermore, a company registered in 
England should rightly employ both peoples.93 Whether or not Pollak’s reasoning was 
genuine, Norris notes that for the British, the makeup of Nesher’s workforce was a 
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decisive factor in directing the Haifa harbor’s construction – the largest construction 
project in Palestine until that point – to utilize Nesher’s cement.94 
 
Cement: To End Colonial Domination 
Despite the profound differences between a settler movement and an indigenous one, the 
objective of “building the land” in a material sense and as part of a national project – for 
so long perceived as a uniquely Zionist project and concern – was also shared by 
Palestinians. Palestinian capitalists, builders, and others took note of cement’s growing 
popularity. By the late 1920s, they began to see the material not only as an economic 
opportunity, but potentially an important factor in economic and national emancipation. 
Discussions about Palestinian access to cement, the prospects of “Arab cement,” and 
Nesher’s stranglehold over the local market emerged alongside increased attention to the 
act of building itself. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, the Palestinian press frequently 
covered the “movement of construction” (ḥarakat al-bina’) in various Palestinian cities, 
reported on the changing costs of construction materials and labor, featured articles about 
construction methods and the economics of construction, and closely followed 
governmental building schemes, the availability of housing, and the granting of building 
permits.95  
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The records and correspondence of Palestine’s Chambers of Commerce and the 
contemporary Arabic press prove key sources for unearthing Palestinian visions of 
national futures. These sources further reveal the centrality of construction, and in 
particular of cement – a material which became identified with modernity and national 
liberation – to these visions. The chambers, as an increasingly important hub for the 
activities of Palestine’s “men of capital,”96 were often closely involved in initiatives to 
introduce “Arab cement” into the Palestinian market, either through regional cooperation 
or through local manufacture.  
The press, meanwhile, served as a platform for highlighting cement’s centrality, 
benefits, and emancipatory potential. Newspapers also placed Nesher at the center of 
their critiques of British protection of Jewish industry and sought to encourage 
alternatives. Opposition to the government’s preferential treatment of Nesher seems to 
have emerged forcefully toward the end of 1929. Nesher’s success after initial 
difficulties, the sharpening contours of conflict in the wake of the violent clashes of 
summer 1929, and the British decision (succumbing to Nesher’s pressures) to raise the 
tariff on imported cement to 850 mils per ton all likely played a role in the timing. 
Furthermore, the establishment of the Syrian National Cement Manufacturing Company 
in Damascus in early 1930 meant that there was now a self-styled Arab national 
 
“safe” investment in tumultuous times, Palestinian capitalists transformed the city: “Ten years ago [one] 
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alternative to Nesher, and the Syrian company’s founders specifically courted Palestinian 
investors through the press.97 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the emphasis on cement and concrete as decidedly 
“scientific” materials at the time, one of the earliest written responses to this call for 
Palestinian investors was a two-part article describing the benefits of cement “from the 
chemical perspective.”98 Its author, Majdi al-Shawa (1899-1979), a Gazan doctor of 
chemistry, specifically stated his objective was not to comment on whether Palestinians 
should invest in the Damascene firm, since “all were convinced of the necessity of 
cooperating in and assisting the national economy.” Rather, he provided readers with a 
history of cement’s evolution, Portland cement’s invention, the differences between 
natural and industrial cements, and between non-hydraulic and hydraulic cements. The 
article’s second installment discussed the benefits of cement in the face of structural 
threats, focusing on earthquakes and drawing on examples from concrete construction in 
Japan – no doubt a pertinent focus given the disastrous impact of the 1927 earthquake 
still fresh in the local memory. Despite his initial claim not to opine on investing in the 
Syrian factory, al-Shawa concluded this second part by clarifying that initiatives like the 
Arab cement factory were crucial for the Arab lands’ economic independence, and that its 
founders sought no less than to end colonial domination. 
 
97 Al-Yarmuk, October 8, 1929; Mir’at al-Sharq, December 29, 1929; Filastin, February 23, 1930. 
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Al-Shawa’s writing stands out among other contemporary discussions of cement 
in its materials science approach. However, the tone of much of the discourse, 
particularly among those Palestinians calling for tariff reform and the end of preference 
for Jewish industry, was often framed as scientific in a different fashion: it was anchored 
in economic calculations. In December 1929, Mir’at al-Sharq estimated that the tariff on 
imported cement cost Palestine’s government fifty-two thousand pounds a year, 
accounting for the customs lost on imports, the losses of shipping, and of porterage 
income at the ports.99 In February 1930, the prominent Palestinian accountant Fu’ad Saba 
(1902-1984) sent the acting chief secretary of the Mandate administration an evaluation 
of the government’s cement tariff policy in light of Nesher’s 1927 and 1928 financial 
reports. Saba concluded that given Nesher’s already “very fair return” in 1928 there was 
no justification for the 1929 tariff increase. Saba’s evaluation, of which his firm kept a 
copy in a folder titled “Government Neglect of Arab Industry” (ihmal al-ḥukuma lil-
ṣina‘a al-‘Arabiyya), included calculations that demonstrated that Nesher’s “heavy 
protection” was not economically viable, but rather part of a pattern of neglect and 
preference, accorded to Arab and Jewish industries respectively.100 
The press continued to follow the progress of the Damascus factory, and to 
critique the tariff policy on cement during the period from 1930 to 1931.101 In one article, 
a “prominent” Haifa merchant told Filastin that the degree of Nesher’s “tyranny” could 
 
99 Mir’at al-Sharq, December 29, 1929. 
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be revealed by posing different questions: instead of asking why European cement is so 
expensive in Palestine, the merchant suggested, one should ask how Nesher could sell its 
own cement in Syria at a lower price than in Palestine, despite additional transportation 
costs. The tariffs, in the merchant’s view, encouraged precisely this sort of behavior, 
since they meant that Palestinian consumers had little alternative to Nesher. To combat 
this, he continued, the Arab Executive and the other national bodies should demand the 
government force Nesher to sell its produce in Palestine at the same prices as in Syria. 
Failing this, the alternative was simple – the same national bodies should call for the 
establishment of a national cement corporation. Supporters and investors were sure to 
approach immediately, since cement “was a necessary material, and the profit in it was 
without doubt.” He added, “Palestine’s people have had their fill of meetings and 
statements, it is time for action.”102  
Perhaps here the idea of a Palestinian Arab national cement factory was born. By 
early 1935, reports appeared of Arab and Jewish initiatives to compete with Nesher. The 
coincidence of initiatives by “a group of people from Bayt Jala who had recently returned 
from America” to establish a cement factory in the Nablus area, and a Jewish 
entrepreneur who established a company named the Shimshon Cement Company in the 
‘Artuf area west of Jerusalem, indicates that it was likely the economic boom of 1934–35 
was motivating both.103 The Bayt Jala initiative seems to have dissipated quickly. 
 
102 Filastin, October 6, 1931. A similar claim regarding Nesher having “dumped” cement in Syria in the 
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the Department of Customs, Excise and Trade. “Imports of Cements,” December 6, 1940, ISA-
NonGovernment-ArabCommrcChambJer-000zt5k. 
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Shimshon would remain in a perpetual state of commencing operations “shortly” for two 
decades.104 
For Palestinian consumers, the 1936 general strike seems to have made appeals to 
products’ “Arabness” particularly attractive and concerns that products were secretly 
benefitting Jewish investors graver. Two articles from al-Difa‘ and an advertisement for 
Syrian cement, all published in January 1937, demonstrate this. The first al-Difa‘ article 
discusses the rising enthusiasm of Arab consumers for Arab goods and its impact on 
Nesher, whose sales were increasingly threatened by the Syrian National Cement factory 
in Damascus and the Chekka factory near Tripoli.105 In the second article, the same 
Chekka factory responded to rumors that the company was owned by Jewish investors by 
affirming that Chekka was a pure (ṣarifa) Arab company, its cement made by Arab hands 
(maṣnu‘a bi-ayadi ‘Arabiyya), and that among its five hundred workers and its 
shareholders “there is not a single Jew.” In an advertisement in Filastin, Chekka’s 
Damascene competitor used similar language, stating that the company’s cement was 
made “entirely by Arab hands” and of “good Arab soil,” and that all company shares 
were owned by Arabs. Ownership of capital, the laboring bodies involved in production, 
and the soil from which the cement was made all played a role in defining it as properly 
Arab.106 
 
104 The factory faltered initially due to funding issues and questions potential investors posed as to the 
trustworthiness of its founder, Nachum Menn. Construction began multiple times, but production began 
only in 1955. In 1969, Nesher purchased Shimshon to become once again a production monopoly. 
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Also in early 1937, the first Palestinian Arab initiative to gain considerable 
momentum toward establishing a cement factory took shape. This plan likely sought to 
capture some of the revolt’s energy, but it was the revolt that would ultimately undo it.107 
A group of prominent Palestinian capitalists, including Ahmad Hilmi Pasha (1883-1963) 
of the Arab Bank and later the Arab National Bank, Hajj ‘Abd al-Rahim al-Tamimi, 
Fakhri al-Nashashibi (1899-1941), Elias Gelat, and George Khader led the initiative. 
Having struck a partnership with the German MIAG firm, the new company began 
conducting scientific surveys of suitable sites in the Nablus, Jerusalem, and Haifa areas, 
eventually settling on a site near ‘Artuf – where the Shimshon company had also planned 
its location. However, the arrest and exile of Ahmad Hilmi and others during the revolt 
put an end to the project, and all its documentation was lost when Fakhri al-Nashashibi 
was murdered in Iraq in 1941.108 
 
The Binds of War 
The severe economic downturn in the latter part of the revolt seems to have stymied 
Palestinian initiatives, while the Histadrut took advantage of these circumstances to gain 
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a foothold in Nesher’s quarry. The quarry’s Arab workers were pushed out completely in 
1938 by David Hacohen of Solel Boneh, the Histadrut’s contracting firm, who two years 
prior had replaced Musbah Shaqifi – the contractor who operated the quarry since its 
establishment.109 If British enthusiasm toward Nesher’s product was, initially at least, due 
in part to its employment of both Jews and Arabs, the revolt and the eruption of World 
War II changed British calculations dramatically. As safe shipping routes became fewer 
and other regions in the empire consumed their local cement production entirely, the 
British became dependent on Nesher. 
During World War II, Palestine was transformed into Britain’s second-largest 
military base in the Middle East, generating unprecedented demand for materials, 
produce and goods.110  Palestine’s manufacturing industry grew rapidly, mainly to satisfy 
British military demands, and unemployment was considerably reduced.111 At the same 
time, severe inflation dramatically curtailed the purchasing power of Palestine’s 
inhabitants. To combat this and to assure sufficient supplies for the military stationed in 
Palestine and beyond, authorities installed an austerity regime, with price control and 
rationing measures on manufactured goods and produce. This regime failed to prevent 
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59 
 
scarcity, however – in goods from foodstuffs to building materials, and cement in 
particular.112 
The war also spurred immense government construction, and Nesher became the 
exclusive source of cement for British military needs in Palestine. Between 1942 and 
1943, it sold 80 percent of its cement to British forces, and throughout the war the 
government was required to approve all civilian purchases.113 Dependency spawned 
intense government cooperation and coordination with Nesher. This included instituting 
monthly coordination visits at the factory, setting production quotas, intervening on 
Nesher’s behalf with suppliers of oil and coal in order to meet quotas, and having 
Nesher’s representatives advise the general headquarters in Egypt.114 The war proved 
immensely profitable for Nesher, even though cement was throughout a controlled 
material, its price fixed and its civilian use prohibited, generating a severe housing 
shortage.115 
Many Palestinians felt that Nesher, like other large Jewish-owned firms, was 
profiteering, granting preference to Jewish needs, and neglecting and exploiting 
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Palestine’s Arab population.116 Furthermore, the war had cut off Palestinians from 
neighboring countries, circumscribing the regional visions that animated earlier calls to 
turn to Syrian cement instead.117 Limited by British wartime control policies, the Arab 
Chambers of Commerce requested that the government either allocate some of Nesher’s 
product for civilian needs, drastically reduce the tariff, or allow import from neighboring 
countries once again. 
As the war in Europe ended, Nesher’s workers embarked on a lengthy strike, 
protesting the prices they paid while the company profited. In November 1945, after 
several months of negotiations and deliberations, Pollak sold the company to the shared 
ownership of Solel Boneh, and a coalition of industrialists and contractors organized as 
the Central Palestine Company for Trade and Investment.118 The 50–50 split between the 
trade union’s contracting firm and private capitalists was framed as an ideological 
decision.119 For Palestinians, it meant that what little claim Nesher ever had to having 
been a disinterested party was now completely gone. Under the joint ownership of Zionist 
workers and contractors, the newspaper al-Sha‘b stated, the company had become 
entirely subservient to the conquest of labor and colonization.120 
 
116 Seikaly, Men of Capital, 117–18, 170; Cement – Various, 10/1940-2/1944, ISA-NonGovernment-
ArabCommrcChambJer-000zt5k.  
117 Seikaly, Men of Capital, 118; Secretary of the Conference of the Arab Chambers of Commerce of 
Palestine to the Economic Advisor, November 28, 1938, ISA-MandatoryOrganizations-MandatMisc-
000y6tb. 
118 Ben-Ner, Aviram, and Levi, ha-Melet, 115–21. 
119 Ben-Ner, Aviram, and Levi, 115-121. 
120 Al-Sha‘b, December 19, 1946. 
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The war’s end brought little economic respite. The housing shortage, which 
resulted in immense crowding and even plague, continued.121 The cement shortage itself, 
according to British sources, lasted until December 1947, when Nesher’s production 
finally began catching up with post-war reconstruction.122 Throughout, and despite 
countless appeals, the government maintained the 850 mills tariff on imports.123 The 
urgent need for construction, Nesher’s inability to produce sufficient cement to satisfy 
demand, and the continued sense that the company and its agents were actively granting 
preference to Jewish needs, led to what became known in the Arabic press as the “cement 
crisis” (azmat al-asmant).124 
 
“It Is Impossible for a Company to Possess Race”  
Out of this crisis emerged the Arab Cement Works (ACW). According to a memorandum 
by the Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce, the cement works grew out of two competing 
initiatives. The first was centered in Nablus and led by ‘Abd al-Rahim al-Tamimi, who 
 
121 The Fight against the Plague, August 18, 1944 – April 3, 1946, Haifa Municipal Archive 6050 
00311/22. The fight waged in Haifa against the plague was also dependent on the ability to secure cement 
to seal openings in structures which could potentially house rats.  
122 Acting Commissioner for Commerce and Industry to Chief Secretary, January 7, 1948, ISA-
MandatoryOrganizations-SecretaryCommerce-000m8p3. As mentioned in Chapter Three, below, 
Alongside the cement shortage, the war’s aftermath also witnessed a shortage in construction workers – 
particularly among the Jewish population. Furthermore, Nesher’s ability to catch up with the construction 
needs of the land in December 1947, would prove to be only temporary. A second cement shortage beset 
the newly founded state of Israel in the following years. 
123 Acting Commissioner for Commerce and Industry to Chief Secretary, January 7, 1948, ISA-
MandatoryOrganizations-SecretaryCommerce-000m8p3. 
124 Filastin, December 13, 1945; al-Sha‘b, December 19, 1946; al-Difa‘, January 23, 1947; Anis Nasr, Vice 
President of the Haifa Chamber of Commerce to Chief Secretary, 24 February 1947, ISA-
MandatoryOrganizations-SecretaryCommerce-000m8p3. Several reports indicate in fact that the removal of 
the controls regime on September 15, 1946 had in fact lessened cement’s availability dramatically, 
fostering additional profiteering. District Commissioner’s Office, Gaza to Acting Chief Secretary 
Dalgleish, December 14, 1946 ISA-MandatoryOrganizations-SecretaryCommerce-000m8p3; Filastin, 
December 11, 1946; al-Sha‘b, December 19, 1946. 
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had also been involved in the 1937 initiative. The other was headed by ‘Abd al-Hamid 
Shoman (1888-1974) of the Arab Bank. Realizing that “the Nablus scheme” was 
progressing rapidly, Shoman threw his support (but not his finances, the memorandum 
states) behind Tamimi’s initiative, and the ACW was incorporated in Palestine on June 
22, 1945.125 Even before official incorporation, Filastin had written of “peak enthusiasm” 
(ḥamasa yablugh al-dhurwa) among investors for the initiative, which received the 
support of both of Palestine’s Arab banks, and al-Difa‘ had reported that the project was 
garnering interest in Transjordan as well.126 
 
Fig 1.1 Arab Cement Works certificate of shares, ‘Innaba, 1946, Birzeit University Research Center. 
 
125 “The Palestine Arab Cement Scheme,” December 4, 1946, ISA-NonGovernment-
ArabCommrcChambJer-000zy9l. In late July 1944, the solicitor Anton (Antun) ‘Atalla, sent the British 
chief secretary a proposal on behalf of the newly formed Riad Building Company and Arab Building 
Company to establish a cement factory. Initially refused by the British due to inability to import the 
necessary machinery due to the war, ‘Atalla sent a second proposal after hostilities in Europe concluded 
and was granted a meeting. This time, the government was willing to permit the companies import 
machinery after the end of 1945. I was unable to find evidence of any further actions taken by either 
company. Arab Cement Factory (1945), ISA-Privatecollections-ArabLawyers-001081p. 
126 Filastin, May 24, 1945; al-Difa‘, July 17, 1945. 
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During the first year of its operation, the company appointed a board and auditors, 
reached an agreement with a machinery manufacturer to supply all necessary equipment, 
and selected land for purchase. In purchasing machinery, the ACW initially pursued a 
strategy not dissimilar to Michael Pollak’s in Nesher’s early days. It began negotiations 
with the British-Danish FL Smidth company, due to ACW’s “initial desire to give 
priority to British Manufacturers.” Smidth’s supply schedule proved slow, however, 
prohibiting even partial fulfilment in the 26-month period ACW had set for beginning 
production. In a letter to the Controller of Heavy Industries (CHI), the company 
explained that despite their preference for British machinery, they were forced to sign an 
agreement with the U.S. Kennedy company. Given Palestine’s urgent need for cement, 
the speedy launch of operations was a priority. At this stage, all that stood in the ACW’s 
way appeared to be an import license for the machinery and the release of U.S. currency 
to fund the purchase. The company applied to the CHI for both on October 31, 1946 and 
began searching for a director and an office near al-Ramla.127 By late spring 1947, those 
who followed the ACW’s progress in the press had reason to be optimistic. On May 28, 
Filastin reported that “after mighty efforts” the company had secured an import license 
for the machinery and the U.S. currency to pay for it. With this news, the value of the 
company’s shares rose.128 Sixteen years since a Palestinian national cement factory was 
first suggested, and after a series of unrealized initiatives over the previous decade, this 
“great national economic project” seemed to finally be getting off the ground.  
 
127 “The Palestine Arab Cement Scheme,” December 4, 1946.  
128 Filastin, May 28, 1947. 
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Behind the scenes, however, it was the ground that was the problem. In December 
1946, the Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce reported that the ACW had purchased plots 
of land between ‘Innaba and Jimzu in al-Ramla district, after “experts from the Hilwan 
Cement Works of Egypt” examined the soil and recommended its suitability.129 A 
January 1947 letter from ‘Abd al-Rahim al-Tamimi to the High Commissioner reveals 
that the purchase of the lands was done “in trust” by “some members of the Board of 
Directors as a temporary measure.” Tamimi explained that the administrator general had 
responded positively to the ACW’s request to purchase the lands in its name according to 
the Companies Ordinances of 1929/39.  
Difficulties arose when the ACW applied to register them with the Registrar of 
Lands.130 Ya‘qub ‘Atalla of the Registrar of Lands had confirmed that the company was 
eligible to purchase the lands in accordance with the Companies Ordinances. Under the 
Land Transfer Regulations of 1940, however, “the transfer of any land from a Palestinian 
Arab to a non-Palestinian person in Area A is forbidden.” Since race was one of the 
“assumed qualifications” (al-quyud al-mafruḍa) of the regulations, it was these, not the 
Companies Ordinances, that prohibited the ACW from registering the lands. Regardless 
of the owners of the company, ‘Atalla explained, “It is impossible for a company to 
possess race” (la yumkin li-sharika an taktasib al-jinsiyya).131 It is important to note that 
the translation of jinsiyya as “race” is not an obvious one. The term was most frequently 
 
129 “The Palestine Arab Cement Scheme,” December 4, 1946. 
130 Abdul Rahim Tamimi to High Commissioner, January 29, 1947, ISA-MandatoryOrganizations-
SecretaryLand-000nji2. 
131 Ya‘qub ‘Atalla, Department of the Registrar of Lands to President of President of the Board of 
Directors, AWC, January 20, 1947, ISA-MandatoryOrganizations-SecretaryLand-000nji2.  
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used to refer to nationality, but could interchangeably describe race, ethnicity, sexuality, 
and even tribal affiliation in certain contexts. However, as will become evident below, in 
the case of the AWC, the potential ambiguity of the Arabic term is amply clarified by 
how other British officials discussed the regulations.132 
The registrar’s reasoning, upheld by the high commissioner on two separate 
occasions, raises multiple issues. First, it seems to run counter to the purpose of the 1940 
Land Transfer Regulations. The British had presented these regulations, put into place 
following the publication of the 1939 White Paper in the context of the 1936–39 revolt, 
as a measure to protect the Palestinian population from the increasing threat of 
landlessness. That is, restrictions on the transfer of lands from Palestinian Arabs to 
“anyone other than a Palestinian Arab” – understood to mean Zionist settlers, first and 
foremost – was intended to ensure that “‘the rights and position’ of the Arab population 
be duly preserved.” In certain areas (referred to as “Zone A” in the regulations, and 
including the area between ‘Inabba and Jimzu where the ACW had conducted surveys 
and where its board members had purchased lands in trust), Palestinians’ rights were 
accounted the strictest protections and the transfer of land therein would be prohibited 
“save in exceptional cases.”133 
The registrar had correctly anticipated that the ACW would claim that the fact 
that it was “100% per cent Arab in Capital and in Membership,” should suffice to exclude 
the company from being considered “non-Arab.” When the ACW appealed, the office of 
 
132 See, for example, the various uses of jinsiyya (and jins, from which it is derived) in the context of late 
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Egypt: Troutt Powell, A Different Shade. 
133 “Land Transfer Regulations, 1940,” Official Gazette Extraordinary, February 27, 1940, no. 988, 
Supplement No. 2, 337–39. 
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the acting secretary general suggested that the company apply for consideration again 
through the district commissioner.134 Although the company’s second application is 
missing from the file found at the Israel State Archives, the July 1947 response from the 
office of the general secretary states once again that a company is “not a ‘Palestinian 
Arab’” within the definitions of the Land Transfer Regulations. The High Commissioner, 
it adds, rejected the application since he “has no power to grant permission for the 
transfer.”135  
The Mandate administration’s reasoning – that “it is impossible for a company to 
possess race” – further raises questions about the scope of corporate personhood and the 
applicability of race as a category in the Palestinian context. If the legal notion that 
corporations are persons, widely accepted in British law by the second decade of the 
twentieth century and enshrined in the 1922 Palestine Order in Council, still makes us 
somewhat uneasy, then the very question of whether a corporation can possess “race” can 
seem altogether dumbfounding.136 In the United States, race has been intricately linked to 
the legal history of corporate personhood. These links began with Dred Scott v. Sandford 
(1857) and extend through the long history of corporations basing claims to legal rights 
on the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution – introduced during 
Reconstruction, partially as a corrective to the Dred Scott decision, to ensure the 
 
134 E. Matta, on behalf of the Chief Secretary to the AWC, February 9, 1947, ISA-MandatoryOrganizations-
SecretaryLand-000nji2. 
135 E. Matta, on behalf of the Acting Chief Secretary to the District Commissioner, Lydda District, July 31, 
1947, ISA-MandatoryOrganizations-SecretaryLand-000nji2.  
136 Palestine Order in Council, 1922, article 2; Peter Stein, “Nineteenth Century English Company Law and 
Theories of Legal Personality,” Quaderni Fiorentini per la Storia del Pensiero Giuridico Moderno 11/12, 
no. 1 (1982–83): 503–519. 
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citizenship rights of freed black American slaves.137 In the British Empire, however, such 
links appear to have been less pivotal, or at the very least have been less well documented 
and researched.138 
In Palestine, links between race and corporate personhood seem to have first 
arisen directly in relation to the Land Transfer Regulations. The regulations mention 
companies only in their capacity as potential mortgage holders. However, Amendment 
16D to the Palestine Order in Council, put forward on May 25, 1939 to facilitate the Land 
Transfer Regulations, introduced the category of “bodies of persons corporate or 
unincorporated” as separate from the categories of Arab and Jew.139 This in itself hardly 
suffices to interpret race as the operative category here. Shira Robinson has rightfully 
noted the “slippery boundaries” that existed between race, culture, nation, and people in 
international law, within the Mandate system, and in British Mandate Palestine 
specifically.140  
 
137 Austin Allen, “The Political Economy of Blackness: Citizenship, Corporations, and Race in Dred Scott,” 
Civil War History 5, no. 3 (2003): 229–260; john a. powell and Caitlin Watt, “Corporate Prerogative, Race, 
and Identity under the Fourteenth Amendment,” Cardozo Law Review 32, no. 3 (2011): 885–904. 
138 Brenna Bhandar’s work on the Canadian, Australian and Palestinian/Israeli contexts argues for the 
“conjoined articulation” of private property relations and racial formations in settler colonial contexts. 
Joseph R. Slaughter’s work, meanwhile, traces the evolution of corporate personhood in international law 
(and indeed of the very idea of persons as subject to international law and human rights) to the 
safeguarding of nineteenth century imperial charter companies’ territorial and trade interests in Africa. 
Taken alongside one another, such works indicate that perhaps here too, as in the US instance, property 
served a crucial mediatory role between the categories of race and the corporation. See: Bhandar, Colonial 
Lives of Property; Joseph R. Slaughter, “However Incompletely, Human,” in The Meaning of Rights: The 
Philosophy and Social Theory of Human Rights, ed. Costas Douzinas and Conor Gearty (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014): 272-297. 
139 “Part II: Executive,” Consolidated Palestine Orders in Council, 1922–1927, Article 16D.  
140 Shira Robinson, Citizen Stranger, 15–18. Laura Robson describes the British turn to racial 
categorization and distinction between “Arab” and “Jew” in Palestine, instead of the previously accepted 
“communal” categorization adapted from the Ottoman Empire, beginning in the early 1930s. The British 
use of racial distinctions in the early months of the construction of the Haifa harbor as early as 1928, 
discussed in detail in Chapter 2 below, indicates that the management of labor may have been an entry 
point for such categorization. See: Robson, Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine, 106-109. 
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Yet the Land Transfer Regulations appear to have inspired British officials to 
employ systematic racial thinking. In May 1940, roughly three months after the 
publication of the Regulations, the British chief secretary issued directions for the 
submission of land transfer applications, noting that for each “transferee and transferor 
[in each application] should be included race, nationality and where habitually 
residing.”141 The inclusion of race as a category quickly spurred questions and doubts as 
to how British officials should classify different Palestinians racially in this context. 
Within months, the director of land registration for Jerusalem and the district 
commissioners of Jerusalem and Haifa raised questions of whether Palestinian Druze and 
Palestinian Armenians should be considered Palestinian Arabs under the regulations. The 
chief secretary opined that “Druzes are Arabs who profess the Durzi creed. [Therefore] I 
think that a Palestinian Durzi is a Palestinian Arab in the sense of the . . . Land Transfer 
Regulations.” Regarding a potential Armenian transferee, the chief secretary decidedly 
stated that, “[h]e may be regarded as ordinarily resident in Palestine; but he is not an 
Arab. Ethnologically he belongs to the Aryan race.” The regulations seemed to have 
awoken the inner race-scientist in some.142 
 
141 Chief Secretary to Assistant District Commissioners, May 30, 1940, ISA-MandatoryOrganizations-
SecretaryLand-000mppd. 
142 ISA-MandatoryOrganizations-SecretaryLand-000mppd: Jerusalem District Director of Land 
Registration to Chief Secretary, August 24, 1940; Haifa District Commissioner to Chief Secretary, 
September 14, 1940; Jerusalem District Commissioner to Chief Secretary, October 5, 1940; C.S.O. Minute 
Paper, September 27, 1940, and October 15, 1940. A later case saw the Director of Land Registration issue 
a detailed explanation of the racial and social standing of Circassian Palestinians. Responding to an inquiry 
from the chief secretary regarding a potential Circassian transferee, the director stated that Circassians 
“may be said to form part of the Arab community.” However, in terms of race he found that he was “able to 
discover very little regarding the origin of the Circassians . . . One theory connects them with the Goths.” 
He then concluded that “the Circassian communities are undoubtedly an established and accepted part of 
the population, but on the other hand they are racially entirely foreign to the Arabs.” Director of Land 




By the time the problem of determining the race of corporations arose several 
years later, the idea that the terms Arab and Jew in the regulations were first and foremost 
racial categories was firmly ingrained. In a March 1945 letter seeking legal advice 
regarding the regulations’ application to companies, the director of land registration 
expressed his understanding that “the fundamental principles of the Regulations are based 
on race and residence and whilst a company may enjoy the latter, the former does not 
reside in it.” Several months later, the acting chief secretary affirmed the legal opinion of 
the attorney general, without mentioning race specifically. Rather, he returned to the 
distinctions made in Amendment 16D to the Palestine Order in Council between Arabs, 
Jews, and “bodies of people corporate or unincorporate [sic].” The attorney general 
explained that 
 having regard to the express reference in Article 16D to bodies corporate, it 
seems to me that the words “Arab” and “Jew” therein, do not include 
corporations. “Person” is nowhere mentioned in the article (except as “bodies of 
persons”) and accordingly one cannot introduce the definition of the word person, 
in conjunction with the word “Arab.”143 
 
This legal opinion shaped the application of the regulations for the remainder of the 
Mandate. 
British approaches to the Land Transfer Regulations’ application to companies 
were not limited to legalistic argumentation regarding corporate personhood or ideas 
about race. There were those among the British authorities who argued that companies be 
excluded from the regulations to better fulfill the “spirit of the White Paper” – that is, to 
 
143 ISA-MandatoryOrganizations-SecretaryLand-000mtyn: Director of Land Registration to Chief 
Secretary, March 6, 1945; C.S.O Minute Paper, June 19, 1945; Acting Chief Secretary to Director of Land 
Registration, June 29, 1945. 
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safeguard the Palestinian peasants (fallaḥin) in danger of becoming landless against 
potential Zionist attempts to subvert the regulations. In November 1945, the Land 
Transfer Inquiry Committee, appointed earlier that year to investigate alleged 
contraventions of the regulations and make recommendations regarding their 
implementation, issued its final report. Among other issues, the report addressed 
proposals to exclude Arab companies from the ruling that no company is a Palestinian 
Arab. The committee argued against such an exclusion, “since a nominal Arab company 
might in reality be controlled, either in the present or in the future, by Jews.”144 In the 
same breath it recognized that, “under the present ruling the development of legitimate 
Arab companies is frustrated by inability to acquire necessary land.” Accordingly, they 
recommended the exclusion be temporary, to be removed following “the provision of 
adequate safeguards.” The fate of the Arab Cement Works demonstrates that no such 
safeguards were ever put in place. 
An article which appeared in Filastin on 28 March 1948, when war was already 
raging in the land, described the ACW’s annual company meeting held in Nablus the 
morning before. The company, at least as a business entity, seemed to have survived the 
registrar’s decision. However, the article made no mention of machinery en route from 
America, nor of the progress of the company’s plant construction. The registrar’s 
decision was likely a death blow, the last in a series of events which over fifteen years 
stymied any Palestinian attempts to challenge Nesher’s monopoly. Whether the logic 
behind the registrar’s decision was that of limiting corporate personhood, as Ya‘qub 
 




‘Atalla’s original letter implied, or of upholding the spirit of the White Paper, against the 
specter of “nominally Arab companies” potentially “controlled by Jews,” the results were 
the same. The very measures designed to protect Palestinian land rights were turned 
against a venture that, for nearly two decades, many Palestinians saw as crucial to their 
ability to build their futures.145  
 
A Mournful Commodity 
In late February 1941, Palestinian capitalist Emile Boutagy wrote heartfelt letters to five 
of the most powerful British officials in Palestine. All five letters dealt with the abrupt 
cancellation of an import license for one thousand tons of cement from Syria, obtained by 
two businessmen, Malas and Budayr. More striking than the details of the transaction’s 
cancellation, whose reversal Boutagy sought, it is the language Boutagy used to write 
about cement. The letters offer variations on the same theme: because Nesher’s produce 
was entirely consumed by the war effort and importing cement from overseas was 
impossible, cement had become in Boutagy’s words, “a matter of life and death,” which 
“would be a God send for those hungering for [it].” It was, after all, a material which “no 
 
145 The establishment of a Palestinian cement factory has, in fact, remained an unfulfilled goal, still 
frequently cast in nationalist, even anti-colonial, terms. A 1998 report authored by Mahmoud Abu Rob of 
al-Najah University set out to explore the prospects of founding a cement factory in the West Bank at the 
time. Abu Rob mentions two previous attempts, the first in Hebron (al-Khalil) in 1978 and the latter again 
in Nablus in 1993. Mahmoud Abu-Rob, Afaq Sina‘at al-Asmant fi Filastin [Establishing a Cement Factory 
in Palestine] (Nablus: al-Da’ira al-Iqtisadiyya, Markaz al-Buhuth wa-l-Dirasat al-Filastiniyya, 1998), 114–
15. More recently, the Sanad Construction Resources Company, a subsidiary of the Palestinian Authority’s 
Palestine Investment Fund, announced plans to establish the Palestine Cement Factory in the Bethlehem 
area. The decision was officially announced in October 2016, but local communities near the selected site, 
primarily the people of ‘Arab al-Rashayda, have shown considerable resistance to the plan, citing concerns 
for their livelihoods. See: “West Bank Cement Factory,” Environmental Justice Atlas, last updated April 
15, 2019, http://ejatlas.org/conflict/gaza-cement-factory-palestine  [accessed: June 20, 2020]; Andrew 
Ross, Stone Men: the Palestinians who Built Israel (London: Verso, 2019), 191–98. 
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country in the world can exist without.”146 Boutagy’s writing was often flowery and 
dramatic, even when arguing for the necessity of gramophone records to lift up British 
troops’ morale during the war, or of original Kiwi shoe polish as opposed to “monstrous 
imitations.”147 None of Boutagy’s writing elsewhere, however, matches the existential 
tone of his writing about the cement shortage. In a more informal letter to George As‘ad 
Khader, secretary of the Arab Chamber of Commerce in Jerusalem (figure 1.2), Boutagy 
wrote of the British decision to cancel the import license: “These people are really 
committing suicide.” 
 
Fig. 2.2. Letter of Emile Boutagy to George As‘ad Khader, February 28, 1942, Israel State Archives. 
 
146 ISA-NonGovernment-ArabCommrcChambJer-000zt5k: Emile Boutagy to British Commercial Agent, 
February 25, 1941; Emile Boutagy to Director of Public Works, February 25, 1941; Emile Boutagy to 
Chief Secretary, February 25, 1941; Emile Boutagy to JCD Cox Esq., Barclay Bank, Haifa, February 25, 
1941; Emile Boutagy to High Commissioner, February 28, 1941. 
147 ISA-MandatoryOrganizations-SecretaryCommerce-000m3p9: Emile Boutagy to Chief Secretary, June 
14, 1942; Emile Boutagy to Colonial Secretary, August 21, 1944. 
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Boutagy was not alone in equating the ability to build – and specifically to build 
in cement – and the preservation of life itself. The discourse of the “cement crisis” after 
World War II also was rife with portrayals of cement as a provider of jobs and shelter, as 
a commodity linked to “the welfare of the country,” the supply of which was part of 
“safeguarding the rights of the public.”148 An “incessant flow of appeals and grievances” 
led the Haifa Chamber of Commerce, for example, to write to the British chief secretary 
of the crisis having “detrimental bearing on the vital nourishment of building projects.” 
Cement, more than any other material, became synonymous with the capacity and 
necessity to build in order to survive.  
Although the press and the chambers of commerce may be seen as stirring up 
emotions for the benefit of commercial interests, there is some evidence that the link 
between building materials and the capacity to build held similar emotional significance 
for others as well. In 1942, for example, Sitt Amina al-Khalidi, left an endowment (waqf) 
for the establishment of a new hospital in Jerusalem’s Shaykh Jarrah neighborhood. That 
summer, the executors of Khalidi’s will appealed to the British to approve the hospital’s 
location and release the necessary building materials for its construction. Progress on the 
location seemed to be made quickly, but Khalidi’s trustees apparently sensed that the 
issue of building materials might require additional pressure.149 Thus, in mid-November, 
 
148 Samaan Abdo (Sam‘an ‘Abdu), Secretary of the Arab Tile & Cement Products Factory Owners 
Association to the Chief Secretary, December 10, 1946, ISA-MandatoryOrganizations-
SecretaryCommerce-000m8p3. 
149 Initial reports of progress securing the land were overly optimistic. Beginning November 18, 1942, only 
days after the first petitions on building materials were sent, a dispute arose between Amina al-Khalidi’s 
heirs and those she had charged with the waqf. The hospital was never completed. Ahmed Samih al-Khalidi 
on behalf of the Trustees of Sitt Amineh Khalidi’s Hospital to H. Kendall Esq., Town Planning Adviser, 
July 22, 1942, ISA-MandatoryOrganizations-MandateHealth-000zbow; Waqf of Amineh bint Bader el-
Khaldi (sic), ISA-MandatoryOrganizations-SecretaryMuslims-000tdej. 
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a coordinated series of petitions with over three hundred signatories were sent from 
multiple locations in Palestine to the high commissioner, to pressure the government to 
release the materials necessary for construction. While some of the petitions requested 
the British to facilitate the construction of the hospital more broadly, others explicitly 
referred to the release of building materials. Many of the telegrams used distinctly 
emotional, even heartrending appeals. They described the facilitation of the hospital’s 
construction – that is, the release of building materials – “as a measure of reducing the 
tortures of which humanity is suffering,” “a contribution toward the alleviation of the 
sufferings of the poor,” and “a measure of service to humanity.”150 The capacity to 
construct, reduced to access to building materials, meant the world. 
The multiple facets of cement’s history endowed the seemingly drab material with 
emotional resonance.151 Within the discourse of Hebrew building expertise in cement and 
concrete, Palestinian structures made of these materials were always ready to collapse, 
their disintegration inevitable and imminent. The ideal materials for building the Jewish 
homeland anew were imagined as somehow beyond the grasp of Palestinians. Of course, 
from the point of view of skill, of capacity, of initiative, they never were. Yet, the Yishuv 
garnered advantages elsewhere. The political and economic order that developed during 
 
150 Building Materials for the Construction of a Moslem Hospital in Jerusalem: Late Amineh al-Khaldi 
[sic], ISA-MandatoryOrganizations-SecretaryCommerce-000lp5q.  
151 The work of cultural theorist Sara Ahmed is useful in understanding how an object like cement can 
become so emotionally charged. Ahmed defines an affective economy, as the economy-like circulation of 
subjects or objects and the discourses related to them which generate positive or negative emotional 
attachments. In other words, “a theory of passion not as the drive to accumulate…, but as that which is 
accumulated over time.” Sara Ahmed, “Affective Economies,” Social Text 22, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 117–
39. While Ahmed centers her work on the affective economy of fear as an emotion which “sticks” to the 
racialized bodies of immigrants, others have already extended the concept to “mundane” objects. See, for 
example, Alev P. Kuruoğlu and Güliz Ger, “An Emotional Economy of Mundane Objects,” Consumption 
Markets & Culture 18, no. 3 (2015): 209–38. 
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the Mandate, solidifying Nesher as a monopoly, seemed to withstand any challenge 
thrown its way. Time and again, British interests appeared to coalesce with those of the 
company. What Palestinians lacked during the Mandate then was neither expertise nor 
skill; rather, empire and its racialized legal structures, not labor, ended up structuring the 
political economy of cement. 
At the same time, these very materials became intertwined not only with visions 
of the national future cultivated by economic and cultural elites, but more importantly, 
with tangible, concrete needs. The prolonged “cement crisis” transformed cement’s 
absence into something that was felt by countless Palestinians daily. As the notion of 
crisis circulated, cement, more than any other building material, became an object of 
desire and longing – the key to the capacity to build and to live. It was, as Ivan Lloyd-
Phillips from the Gaza district commissioner’s office put it, “a mournful commodity.”152 
These configurations did not suddenly cease to exist with the catastrophe of 1948. 
Dreams and nightmares of cement and concrete continued to haunt Palestinians well 
beyond the Nakba, taking different yet eerily familiar forms.153 Seemingly defying their 
own physical properties, cement and concrete traveled alongside those who were forced 
to leave and sat heavy on those who remained, somehow always maintaining a fleeting 
sense of promise, echoed in 2014, with a bitter smile, by Gazan artist Islam Ayoub: “Oh, 
cement, oh, beloved/you are always on my mind.”154
 
152 I. Ll.-Phillips, District Commissioner’s Office, Gaza to Acting Chief Secretary Dalgleish, December 14, 
1946, ISA-MandatoryOrganizations-SecretaryCommerce-000m8p3. 
153 Weizman, Hollow Land; Jabareen and Dbiat, Adrikhalut ve-Orientalizm; Abourahme, “Assembling and 
Spilling-Over”; and Rubaii, “Concrete and Livability in Occupied Palestine.” 
154 Islam Ayoub, Misthaq ya-Ghali/Mishtaq Ashufak, online at 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=DAokpPN9yw4 (last accessed: 1 July 2020). 
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CHAPTER 2: WHERE I END AND YOU BEGIN: ARABS, 
JEWS, AND MACHINES IN MANDATE 
PALESTINE'S STONE QUARRIES 
 
For a brief period in the summer of 1931, the city of Haifa was abuzz with conversation 
of a mysterious photograph, the provenance and nature of which were unclear. The first 
to report on the photograph was the leading Palestinian Arabic daily, Filastin. On Friday, 
August 21st, 1931, the newspaper’s “Haifa Dispatch” included a story titled “Machine 
Gun or Rock-Breaking Machine” (Arshash am Makinat Taksir Hijara), which reported 
that the people of Haifa were exchanging rumors (yatadawal al-nas fi Haifa ḥadith) of a 
photograph of ten Jewish men training to use a machine gun.155  
Following some investigation, the article states, Filastin’s reporter was able to 
trace the photograph back to Rashid al-Hajj Ibrahim (1889-1953), a leading Haifa 
businessman. Ibrahim, a member of Palestine’s class of “men of capital,” told the reporter 
that he had indeed received the photograph, but that it had been seized by the police.156 
The reporter, following what he “saw as [his] journalistic duty” (min wajibi al-ṣuḥufi), 
then went to inquire with Haifa’s Deputy Chief of Police on the matter. The Deputy 
reassured the reporter that he himself had looked into the photo, and that it in fact 
depicted not Jewish men training to fire a machine gun, but working at the Athlit quarry – 
 
155 Filastin, August 21, 1931, 4. 
156 Filastin, August 21, 1931, 4. Ibrahim appears as a primary figure among Palestine’s “men of capital” in 
Sherene Seikaly’s book of the same name. Seikaly, Men of Capital. 
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a government quarry just south of Haifa, which supplied stone for the ongoing 
construction of the Haifa deep-water harbor. What people were saying was a machine 
gun, the Deputy noted, was in fact a machine for breaking rocks. Nonetheless, the Deputy 
Chief promised Filastin’s reporter that he would go to the quarry the following day and 
photograph the people and the machine from the original. He would then provide the 
newspaper with both the original and the new photograph for comparison.157 
The rumors surrounding this mysterious photograph – the focus of this chapter’s 
first section – accompanied a broader controversy regarding firearms which the British 
authorities provided to Jewish settlements in the wake of the bloody events of summer 
1929.158 It was therefore reasonable to conclude as the British did, that the matter could 
be laid to rest simply by convincing the public that what the photographs depicted was a 
drilling machine, not a machine gun. That is, to assume that for the Palestinian public, the 
fear of armed Jewish settlers was all that was at stake. However, in this chapter, I argue 
that the controversy and confusion as to the nature of the objects portrayed in these 
photographs can be explained not merely by a similarity in physical form - the fact that 
certain machine guns of the period and certain drilling apparatuses could appear similar 
to the lay public. By placing the two instruments alongside one another, this controversy 
calls attention to how such drilling apparatuses, while by no means commensurate with 
machine guns, did become tools in the gradual, long-term processes of Palestinian 
 
157 Filastin, August 21, 1931, 4. 
158 On the violent clashes of 1929, known in Arabic as Thawrat al-Buraq (the al-Buraq Revolt) and in 
Hebrew as Me’ora‘ot Tarpa”t (the 1929 Events), see: Rana Barakat, “Thawrat al-Buraq in British Mandate 
Palestine: Jerusalem, Mass Mobilization and Colonial Politics, 1928-1930” (Ph.D. diss., University of 
Chicago, 2007); Hillel Cohen, Year Zero of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1929, trans. Haim Watzman 
(Waltham: Brandeis University Press, 2015); Barakat, “Reading Palestinian Agency in Mandate History.” 
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replacement and displacement from labor and land. That is, quarry drills, jackhammers, 
compressors, and other such instruments, allowed Zionist settlers and institutions to enact 
the sort of “unspectacular” processes, which Rob Nixon has called, “slow violence.” At 
the same time, it is important to note that the “weaponization” of the quarry extended to 
more directly observable and immediate forms of violence as well, adding yet another 
layer to the “confusion” between which the machine gun or rock-breaking machine 
controversy. As early as the first decade of British rule, more militant Zionists quickly 
found that quarries – by virtue of the labor processes and materials they involved – were 
ideal settings for weapons training and explosive manufacture. There, loud explosions 
were par for the course, providing an aural cover for weapons training, while the 
explosives themselves could be repurposed for military uses.159 
In Palestine’s quarries, British racial ideologies intersected with differences in skill 
and productivity, the economic logic of “Hebrew labor” and the racialized concept of a 
differential “standard of living” for Arabs and (European) Jews. As a result, machinery and 
mechanization processes became a necessary ally in the Zionist “conquest of stone” (kibush 
ha-even). Jackhammers, drills, excavators, and other machines became the means with 
which Jewish workers could “infiltrate” the stone industry. They allowed Jewish workers 
to displace Palestinian ones by overcoming what was, at times begrudgingly, conceived of 
 
159 Mordekhai Raikher, ed., ha-ʻEmda ha-Kidmit : Migdal Tsedek ba-ʻAvoda, ba-Shemira, ba-Milhamah 
[The Forward Post: Migdal Tsedek in Work, on Guard, in War] (Petah Tikva: Beit Neta [Harpaz], 1968); 
Rob Nixon, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2011). Several recent works have considered Nixon’s idea of “slow violence” in relation to contemporary 
Palestinian realities in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and the Naqab/Negev desert. See, for example: 
Sophia Stamatopoulou-Robbins, Waste Siege: The Life of Infrastructure in Palestine, (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2019); Isabelle Hesse, “Sensory Siege: Dromocolonisation, Slow Violence, and Poetic 




as the formers’ physical deficiency in comparison to the latter, as well as “pure” economic 
considerations such as productivity and profitability. 
The chapter’s first section follows Filastin’s investigations into the mysterious 
photograph, the British reactions to the affair, and the regional, and even global, 
circulation of multiple images claiming to truthfully represent what the original 
photograph had captured. It places the photographic affair in the context of the “armory 
scare” of the summer of 1931, regional interest in the intensifying frictions between Jews 
and Arabs in Palestine, and the emergence of Palestinian mass party-politics. The 
chapter’s second section uses the construction of the Haifa deep-water harbor and its 
Athlit Quarry as entry-points to examine the racializing and anti-racist discourses about 
bodily, intellectual, and cultural capacities and needs of workers which emerged under 
the British Mandate. It demonstrates that historical actors articulated both the 
justifications for a racialized division of labor and opposition to it in terms drawn from 
global and imperial discourses about race, whiteness, and racial subjugation.  
The two sections which follow examine how individuals who took part in the 
Zionist conquest of stone discussed quarrying work and the quarrying industry, both in 
contemporary debates as well as in their memoirs. I ask how the Zionist project of 
national regeneration of land and self, founded in part upon the idea of recovering the 
relationship between Jewish bodies and the Jewish homeland, took shape in an industry 
which proved particularly difficult to “conquer.” In Palestine’s stone quarries, I argue, the 
processes of refashioning the land and the self – which Zionist thinkers frequently 
envisioned as driven by unmediated desire and connection between the two – in fact 
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rested upon material and cultural mediators: the Palestinian quarrier, and quarrying 
machinery.  
During the mandate, the stone industry had no Jewish success stories like that of 
the Nesher Cement Factory. Beginning in the early 1920s, Zionist attempts at the 
conquest of stone frequently took the form of apprenticeship under Palestinian, and at 
times, Mizrahi masters. The chapter’s third section studies Jewish quarriers’ dependence 
on Palestinian expertise. It demonstrates that Zionist imitation of indigenous Palestinian 
practices extended beyond self-Orientalizing aesthetic practices, with which it is most 
associated. In the stone quarry, among other places, both the creation of the “new Jew” 
and the regeneration of the Jewish homeland depended on the appropriation of 
Palestinian skills, knowledge, sensibilities, and bodies.  
The fourth section shows how machinery emerged as a primary weapon in what 
was, at its core, a struggle to replace and displace Palestinian quarry labor. The adoption 
of mechanization as part of an economic discourse of efficiency and productivity aligned 
Zionist institutions’ strategies with racial and colonial divisions of labor which the 
ideology of labor Zionism ostensibly rejected. Finally, this section juxtaposes this 
embrace of mechanization with an article on the very same question published in 1935 in 
the Palestinian economic journal, al-’Iqtisadiyyat al-Arabiyya. The article’s author, 
Edward F. Nickoley, discusses the relationship between labor power and mechanization 
throughout “the Near East.” However, read in the Palestinian context and on the 
backdrop of Zionism’s increasing embrace of mechanization as a means of “slow 
violence,” Nickoley’s article reveals an alternative approach to the relationship between 
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machinery and labor: one which regards displacement and replacement as threat rather 
than promise. 
 
Machine Gun or Rock-Breaking Machine? 
The headline, “Machine Gun or Rock-Breaking Machine” made its second appearance in 
the pages of Filastin on Tuesday, August 25th, four days after the first story. The 
newspaper’s Haifa correspondent notified readers that in the interim, he had visited the 
Deputy Chief of Police again as agreed. During the visit, the Deputy presented the 
reporter with the original photograph which had inspired the rumors, alongside a second 
one which he had taken during his visit to the quarry, allowing the reporter to examine 
both photos side by side. Unfortunately, the reporter’s conclusions from the comparison 
were somewhat equivocal. The machine in the second photograph appeared to him larger 
than that appearing in the first. The photograph portrayed only five men, and not ten. He 
did, however, identify the five as being among those who appeared in the original.160 
Despite his prior agreement with the Deputy Chief, the reporter’s attempts to 
receive copies of both photographs so that they could be published in Filastin - 
presumably to allow readers to judge for themselves - came to naught. Still not altogether 
convinced, the reporter admitted to his readers that he knew little about either machine 
guns or quarrying drills. Therefore, he writes, he arranged for an acquaintance, ‘Izzat Bey 
al-Qassem, a former officer in the Ottoman army, to visit the Deputy Chief the following 
day and examine the photographs for himself. Upon examination, the readers of Filastin 
 
160 Filastin, August 25, 1931, 4. 
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are told, ‘Izzat Bey was more decisive in his conclusion: he declared the two photos to be 
of the same machine, and that the machine itself was undoubtedly intended for rock-
breaking.161 
‘Izzat Bey’s conclusions seem to have convinced Filastin’s reporter, as the 
newspaper ceased to question the British claims about the photograph in its reporting. 
Convincing the wider public, however, proved more difficult. The British authorities, 
likely eager to quell such rumors at a time when Palestinian Arab fears of the arming of 
Palestine’s Jewish settlements were rampant, decided to address it publicly. On August 
26th, a day after Filastin apparently put its inquiries to rest, an official government 
communique addressing the matter appeared in multiple Arabic, Hebrew, and English-
language newspapers: 
In the course of an article which appeared recently in an Arabic newspaper the 
Government was asked if it would publish the results of its enquiries on the 
subject of a photograph which was found in Haifa on or about August 10, and 
which was supposed to represent a cannon or machine-gun surrounded by a group 
of Jewish men.  
A copy of the photograph has been procured and it has been ascertained that the 
photograph was taken at the Athlit Quarries, that the young men are members of a 
party of quarry workers, and that the implement which has been mistaken for a 
gun is a machine for drilling holes in the rock for quarrying purposes.162 
 
Yet, despite the broadly circulated communique, “the machine gun myth,” as the 
British eventually referred to it, quickly circulated beyond Palestine’s boundaries, 
 
161 ‘Izzat Bey’s precise involvement in the events may have been more extensive than simply providing 
expert testimony, or at least the British authorities suspected it to be. On September 1, a week after Filastin 
published his statement on the photograph, the authorities searched ‘Izzat Bey’s home, along with those of 
Husni ‘Abd al-Hadi and Hamza Tuqan, in connection with the photograph’s publication. Palestine Bulletin, 
September 3, 4; Filastin, September 4, 1931, 4; Mir’at al-Sharq, September 5, 1931, 4. 
162 Filastin, August 26, 1931, 5; Davar, August 26, 1931; Palestine Bulletin, August 26, 1931, 1; Davar, 
September 27, 1931, 1. 
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subsequently also resurfacing within them. Within days of Filastin’s articles and the 
British rebuttal, three regional newspapers, the Egyptian al-Ahram and al-Lata’if al-
Musawwara and the Lebanese al-Ahrar, reported of the affair. Their coverage, in turn, 
featured a third iteration of photographic evidence, depicting not ten or five men as in the 
previous photographs, but a single individual sitting in front of a machine the newspapers 
thought similarly enigmatic.  
Multiple Palestinian publications reported that the Mandate authorities attempted 
to seize all copies of the newspapers featuring the new photograph.163 In a conversation 
with Filastin, Major Partridge, the same Deputy Commander of the Haifa District Police, 
explained the seizure, claiming that “the photograph published by al-Ahram and al-Ahrar 
and the text written beneath it were written in an incendiary and misleading manner.”164 
Filastin, for its part, unequivocally dismissed the new photograph as fraudulent. Its Haifa 
 
163 Filastin, August 29, 1931, 4. The survival of a single copy of this variation on the photographic 
evidence of the affair sent from Palestine (fig. 1), indicates that some copies were likely not successfully 
seized. The copy, a rough negative of the image as published likely in either al-Ahrar or al-Lata’if al-
Musawwara, was sent by Harry (Tzvi) Vitales, the manager of the Central Bank for Cooperative 
Institutions in Palestine to his peers in the Palestine Economic Corporation (PEC) in London and New 
York City on September 3, 1931. It found its way into the PEC’s archive at the New York Public Library, 
where I first encountered it and the story of the photograph. Box 24, folder 2, New York Public Library 
(NYPL), Palestine Economic Corporation (PEC) Collection. See also: al-Jami‘a al-‘Arabiyya, August 30, 
1931, 3; al-Jami‘a al-‘Arabiyya, August 30, 1931, 3; al-Jami‘a al-Arabiyya, August 31, 1931, 3; Mir’at al-
Sharq, September 2, 1931, 4,5. The pan-Arab Jerusalem-based al-Hayat, offered a particularly interesting 
and poetic reading of the photograph when reporting of the seizure: “I saw it in al-Ahram before al-Ahram 
was seized, then I saw it in al-Lata’if, before al-Lata’if was seized, and I read in it lines (suṭuran), 
witnessed vestiges (rusuman) and foretold secrets (iktahanat asraran). I read in it profound lines (suturan 
balighan) warning the Arabs in these lands (bi-hadhihi al-diyar) of an imminent danger (bi-khaṭar muḥdiq) 
that threatens their existence and intends to destroy what they built (literally, “their building,” 
bunayanuhum). I read in it lines, their letters, flying sparks, and their words a burning fire, and I witnessed 
in it vestiges, among them the vestige of the endeavor (rasm al-tumuḥ) to destroy what the Arabs had built 
(literally “the building of the Arabs”) in these lands, in iron and fire, and the erection of Zionism’s edifice, 
in iron and fire. And as I was scrutinizing it, visions (akhila) passed through my mind (marrat bi-dhihni) 
and warnings were revealed and thoughts gathered, however, I heard them at last delivering a sermon and 
saying: Oh Arabs, your opponent is strong and stubborn, he has the equipment and the ammunition… be 
strong… do not weep and do not worry.” Al-Hayat, September 2, 1931, 1. 
164 Filastin, August 30, 1931, 4. 
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correspondent, who had led the initial reportage and investigation, stated that since in the 
original photograph there were “ten young Jewish men around the instrument and not one 
[as in the new photograph],” the image which the Egyptian and Lebanese newspapers 
featured was “not the same photograph… and demands correction.”165  
Upon examination, the captions accompanying the photograph (figs. 2.1 & 2.2), 
which the Deputy Chief of Police had described as “incendiary and misleading,” seem to 
have leaned more towards the latter, perhaps not even intentionally so. Rather, they 
reflected and addressed the confusion and uncertainty which continued to surround the 
whole affair. The longer caption, appearing alongside the copy sent to the PEC offices in 
London and New York, describes the individual in the photograph as “said to be a Jew 
sitting behind a machine-gun;” states that the original photograph had been given to the 
Haifa Police by “those protesting against the arming of the Jews;” and narrates the British 
denial and explanation in full. Moreover, the editors clarify that they “do not know if this 
is the same photograph,” and accordingly present it “without commentary, leaving the 
judgment of whether what it represents is a machine gun or a device (masura, lit. ‘pipe’) 
for rock excavation, to the experts and specialists among the men of war and of 
quarries.”166  
 
165 Filastin, August 30, 1931, 4. 
166 Harry Vitales to Paul Singer, September 3, 1931, Box 24, Folder 2, Palestine Economic Corporation 
(PEC) Collection, Manuscripts and Archives Division, New York Public Library (NYPL). From the 
standpoint of the British, the forceful reaction to the publication of this photograph was likely linked to the 
wider reach and greater credibility of these newspapers in comparison to the pamphlets which circulated 
the original image. It may also have been rooted in the fact that, at least to those “experts and specialists 
among the men of war and quarries” the caption called upon, the photograph al-Ahram and other regional 
newspapers carried, may not have been altogether too confusing. The instrument gripped by the young man 
in it appears almost certainly to have been a Vickers machine gun, which would likely have been familiar 





Fig. 2.1. Copy of photograph published in unspecified Arabic language newspaper. Box 24, Folder 2, 
Palestine Economic Corporation Collection, Manuscripts and Archives Division, New York Public Library. 
 
photographs, it is impossible to tell how similar or dissimilar this instrument was to the ones the British had 
previously claimed to be a quarrying device. I thank Ciruce Movahedi-Lankarani for calling my attention to 
the similarity between the instrument portrayed in Figure 3, and the Vickers machine gun. See: John Ellis, 




Fig. 2.2. Frontpage of the Egyptian al-Ahram, August 27, 1931. The photograph appears at the top of the 
page, under the headline Midfa‘ Mitraliyoz am Masura Naqr al-Ahjar [Mitrailleuse Gun or Stone Carving 
Device (lit. “pipe”)]. The caption beneath dryly describes the Palestinian Arab and British claims regarding 
what the photograph depicts. 
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In the immediate background to the alarm the photographs raised were broader 
Palestinian concerns about the threat of Mandate authorities arming Zionist settlers. Such 
concerns, although not entirely new, had recently been sparked again in June of 1931. Al- 
Jami‘a al-‘Arabiyya, a Jerusalem-based newspaper identified with the political line of the 
Mufti Hajj Amin al-Husayni and his supporters, reported that the British police were 
training Jewish settlers in the Tulkarm area, northwest of Nablus, to fire machine guns. 
Authorities’ attempts to appease the Palestinian public and media by explaining that the 
arms provided were to be kept in sealed armories and for defense purposes only, as part 
of the changes made to the Palestine police force in the aftermath of the violent clashes of 
1929, were largely unsuccessful.167  
Weldon C. Matthews shows that the revelation of the sealed armories became an 
important rallying cry for Palestinian nationalists, particularly among those who later in 
1932 founded the Istiqlal (Independence) Party, Palestine’s first mass-politics based 
party. Activists, many of whom were from Nablus, organized two congresses there on 
July 16 and 31 to discuss the armories, as well as subsequent protest strikes in Nablus and 
other cities on August 15.168 Thus, when the pamphlet featuring the ten men and the 
mysterious machine first appeared in Haifa on or around August 10, it fed into a fear 
already shared by many. Rashid al-Hajj Ibrahim, who played a pivotal role in the 
quarrying machine/machine gun controversy, was among the Istiqlal Party’s founders, 
 
167 That the armories had been kept a secret until al-Jami‘a al-‘Arabiyya exposed the story likely inspired 
little confidence. Al-Jamiʿa al-ʿArabiyya, June 26, 1931, 3. Cited in: Weldon Matthews, Confronting an 
Empire, Constructing a Nation: Arab Nationalists and Popular Politics in Mandate Palestine (London: I.B. 
Tauris, 2014), 90-96. 
168 Matthews, Confronting an Empire, 90-96. 
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and was closely tied to the campaign against the Jewish armories. The photograph and 
the armory “scare,” it appears, were deeply intertwined.169 
 
A Colonial Division of Labor: Race at the Haifa Harbor Works 
As chapter one has shown, by the late 1920s Zionist popular and British official 
discourses shared certain racialized conceptions of skill in working with specific 
materials – namely, cement and concrete, as opposed to local stone. The Zionist discourse 
of Jewish expertise in cement and concrete was embedded in the conquest of labor and in 
attempts to restructure the building trades in Palestine. British officials, meanwhile, 
turned to ideas about the innate physical and intellectual differences between Jews and 
Arabs as offering possible solutions to growing conflicts over labor between Palestinian 
Arabs and Jewish settlers, especially in government works where the British were forced 
to intervene.  
The need for the British to find such solutions became more pressing as 
construction of the new deep-water harbor in the port city of Haifa was set to begin in 
late 1928. The largest government-led construction project since the beginning of British 
rule, and one of imperial importance, the harbor works promised to be a major employer 
both during construction and when the harbor began operations.170 This combination of 
high profile and promise, made the harbor works a site of particularly potent contestation 
over employment. Beginning in the fall of 1928, the Histadrut pressured the mandate 
 
169 Ibrahim was even charged with financing an effort to buy weapons for Palestinian villages near Jewish 
settlements in response to the armories’ threat. Matthews, Confronting an Empire, 94. 
170 Norris, Land of Progress, Chapter 3. 
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authorities to grant fifty percent of positions at the harbor works to Jewish workers. The 
same Histadrut officials also insisted that Jewish immigrants’ supposedly higher standard 
of living be met by paying them higher wages than their Palestinian peers.171  
For British officials seeking a salve for the intensifying competition over 
employment in government works, of which the Haifa harbor was merely the most 
prominent example, racial thought offered a possible remedy. Wary of introducing 
differential wages between Jews and Arabs fulfilling similar duties alongside one another 
in such a sensitive endeavor as the harbor, some officials, including then High 
Commissioner, John Chancellor (1870-1952), suggested that the “natural tendencies” of 
each “race” serve as the basis for the division of labor between Jews and Arabs.172 What 
these “tendencies” amounted to, according to Chancellor and others, was Jews’ “greater 
intelligence,” and therefore gravitation towards “skilled and semi-skilled labor,” as 
opposed to Arabs, “superior physique,” and better fit for “heavy unskilled labor.”173  
Discussions and correspondences between British officials charged with 
overseeing the harbor’s construction are replete with iterations of this distinction. Jews 
are consistently referred to as physically incapable of certain kinds of “unskilled work,” 
at the same time as they are depicted as possessing “greater intelligence” than their 
Palestinian peers.174 The latter, meanwhile, are discussed as “very raw material,” suited 
 
171 See the protocols of the meeting between the Officer Administering the Government and the Head of the 
Department of Public Works, and between representatives of the Histadrut, which the government officially 
communicated to the English, Arabic, and Hebrew press in Palestine: The Palestine Bulletin, October 7, 
1928, 2; “Waqa’i‘ al-Ijtima‘ fi-Dawa’ir al-Hukuma”, Filastin, October 9, 1928, 7; Davar, October 10, 
1928, 3.  
172 TNA: CO, 733/165/2, 91. 
173 TNA: CO 733/161/6, 3. 
174 TNA: CO 733/161/6, 3; TNA: CO 733/165/2, 162-163. 
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for “the commonest kind of labor.”175 Palestinian’s longer working hours (nine to ten 
hours a day, as opposed to the eight hours of Jewish workers) explained by “the ‘natural 
bent’ of the Arab… to work from sunrise to sunset.”176 The British thus envisioned a 
division of labor at Haifa which would play to each “race’s” supposed strengths: 
Palestinians would work in the Athlit Quarry, work which the British regarded as 
unskilled and reliant primarily on physical strength and tolerance. Jews, meanwhile, 
would occupy more technical tasks including the operation of heavy machinery and work 
in modern construction technologies including reinforced concrete and concrete 
blocks.177 
However, when the British first proposed to divide labor in the Haifa harbor 
works along racial lines in this manner, Zionist organizations mounted what appeared to 
be a coordinated effort to oppose it. In mid-February 1929 the Zionist Executive and the 
Histadrut’s Executive Committee sent memoranda to the Mandate’s Chief Secretary and 
High Commissioner, respectively, criticizing the proposed arrangement as impractical, 
unjust, and fundamentally undermining the establishment of a Jewish National Home in 
Palestine.178 It was impractical, they argued, because unskilled, semi-skilled, and skilled 
 
175 TNA: CO 733/161/6, 72; TNA: CO 733/165/2, 60-61; TNA: CO 733/189/3, 71. 
176 TNA: CO 733/198/6, 78. Such British observations about the tendencies of “the Arab,” were, of course, 
directly contradicted by British colonial experience with labor struggles in Egypt. Racial assumptions were 
a convenient pretext for exploitation, even when experienced flew in their face. See: Joel Beinin and 
Zachary Lockman, Workers on the Nile: Nationalism, Communism, Islam, and the Egyptian Working 
Class, 1882-1954 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); John T. Chalcraft, The Striking Cabbies of 
Cairo and Other Stories: Crafts and Guilds in Egypt, 1863-1914 (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 2004). 
177 TNA: CO 733/189/3, 65. British discussions of the division of labor in the Haifa harbor works make no 
reference whatsoever to Mizrahi Jews. Even so, as the introduction has shown, their notions of “natural 
segregation” in the workforce echo earlier conversations among Zionist settlers about the division of labor 
between European Jews, Yemeni Jews, and Palestinian Arabs, which placed an emphasis on the “cultured” 
and technical tendencies of the first, as opposed to the “physicality” of the latter two. 
178 TNA: CO 733/165/2, 100-140. 
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labor were often difficult to neatly separate and define, and because many forms of 
skilled labor depended on the products of unskilled laborers. It was unjust to both Jews 
and Arabs to limit their employment to specific occupations, and particularly unjust 
towards Jewish workers given the growing preponderance of unskilled and semi-skilled 
labor in government work. Most importantly, the arrangement fundamentally undermined 
the establishment of the Jewish National Home – an objective enshrined in the mandate 
Britain received from the League of Nations in 1923.179 Such a national home, the 
Histadrut’s memorandum argued, was dependent on Jewish workers “[undertaking] any 
kind of work, be it the roughest.” Jews did not 
… come to Palestine as to a colony to benefit here by the labour of others. We 
have no intention of forming a skilled labour aristocracy, by the side of a mass of 
native labourers to be looked upon as the “hewers of wood and drawers of 
water.”180 
 
The threat of becoming a colonial labor aristocracy loomed large over Zionist 
settlers, particularly over those who viewed themselves as part of a proletarian labor 
Zionism. Early twentieth-century labor Zionists merged Eastern European socialist and 
nationalist thought with an expressed disdain towards what they viewed as the 
exploitative colonial social structure which earlier Zionist settlement and its planter class 
had engendered.181 The threat was not merely moral or economic. It also had an 
embodied dimension. If even the “new” Jewish body, forged through labor in Palestine, 
 
179 TNA: CO 733/165/2, 100-140; For the British Mandate’s ongoing obligation to the establishment of a 
Jewish national home, see fn. 7 above. 
180 TNA: CO 733/165/2, 117. 
181 Shafir, Land, Labor, 56-7. 
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was considered unsuitable, even deficient, for certain forms of physical work, what 
would this mean for the “new Jew” and the project of national regeneration? 
And yet, the rejection of a colonial division of labor was belied by how Zionist 
penetration into construction and quarrying throughout the Mandate period were 
frequently discussed and conducted. As noted above, the discourse of Jewish expertise in 
cement and concrete dovetailed with British racialized attitudes towards labor. Moreover, 
segregated labor arrangements at Jewish-owned companies such as the Nesher Cement 
Company – where Jews were employed directly by the company in the factory, and 
Palestinian Arabs employed by a contractor in the quarry – as well as in projects of the 
Zionist Palestine Electric Company, were hailed by the British as successful models for 
precisely such skill-stratification along racial lines.182 
Indeed, even before the British proposed a racial division of labor at the Haifa 
harbor, the Palestinian Arab newspaper Filastin – whose reporting on the “machine gun 
or rock breaking machine” controversy was discussed above – criticized the Histadrut’s 
demands regarding the harbor’s construction as effectively calling for racial 
discrimination. On October 9, 1928, Filastin published an editorial on its first page which 
bore a remarkable title – “Arab Workers and Jewish Workers: Back to the “White Man’s” 
Tune – Where Are You, Oh Arab Leaders?” (‘Umal al-‘Arab wa-‘Umal al-Yahud: ‘Aud 
‘ila Naghmat “al-Rajul al-Abyad” – Ayna Antum ya Zu‘ama’ al-‘Arab?).183 The editorial 
responded to the aforementioned publication of proceedings from the mid-September 
 
182 TNA: CO 733/165/2, 8. For the history of Palestine’s electrification, see: Meiton, Electrical Palestine. 
183 “‘Umal al-‘Arab wa-‘Umal al-Yahud: ‘Aud ‘ila Naghmat “al-Rajul al-Abyad” – Ayna Antum ya 
Zu‘ama’ al-‘Arab?,” Filastin, October 9, 1928, 1. 
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meeting between Mandate officials and Histadrut representatives regarding the harbor 
works. In the meeting, the Histadrut presented three conditions regarding the construction 
of the Haifa harbor – 1) a prohibition on employing foreign labor (a category from which 
Jewish immigrants were excluded); 2) the enforcement of a fair wages clause, taking into 
consideration the supposedly higher Jewish standard of living; and 3) the employment of 
a definite percentage of Jewish workers reflecting the relative Jewish contribution to 
Palestine’s economy, rather than their significantly smaller share in the population.184 
Filastin’s editorial took no issue with the first condition. This would be to the 
benefit of both Arabs and Jews. However, its author used the second and third conditions 
to launch a critique of the concept of a differential “standard of living,” a concept which 
had become fundamental to the Zionist principle of Hebrew labor and the conquest of 
labor. Filastin argued that behind the argument for higher wages based on the idea of a 
higher Jewish standard of living, was a thinly veiled request that the government 
discriminate (tumayyizu) between Jewish and Arab workers: the Histadrut was, in fact, 
appealing to a sense of whiteness and “cultural refinement,” which European Jews 
supposedly shared with the British.185 
Through a series of rhetorical questions under the subheading “Why this 
discrimination (limadha hadha al-tamyiz)?” the editorial asked whether Jewish laborers 
showed evidence of being stronger or more perseverant in the face of hardships than Arab 
laborers, or whether the cultural needs of the Jewish worker justified such a gap in wages 
since he needed to take “his sweetheart” to “theaters and places of entertainment every 
 
184 See fn. 171 above. 
185 “‘Umal al-‘Arab wa-‘Umal al-Yahud,” Filastin, October 9, 1928, 1. 
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night?” What the Histadrut was demanding, Filastin argued, was a “return to the ‘white 
man’s’ tune.” That is, “raising [the ‘white man’] over the ‘black man’ in all matters.” In 
other words, it was a demand that wages be proportional not to workers’ productivity but 
“to [their] refinement, whiteness of faces, and redness of lips.”186 If the Histadrut’s tactics 
were intended to gain benefit from a world ordered according to the “white man’s tune,” 
Palestinians, the editorial was effectively claiming, were among that unjust world’s black 
people. 
Filastin’s appeal to global discourses of whiteness and blackness in this article 
reflected a longstanding engagement of the Arabic press and Middle Eastern intellectual 
circles with questions of race. This engagement was multi-faceted. It included critiques of 
race-relations in the United States and of colonialism by some, alongside the adoption 
and adaptation of bio-racism by others. Such modes of thought were not simply 
wholesale “importations” of Western racial thought but had cultural and social histories 
of their own in the Middle East and Africa, often intertwined with enslavement and 
conquest.187 
In this context, Maha Nassar has demonstrated how, beginning in the 1930s, 
Palestinian Arabic newspapers sympathetically covered the oppression and struggles of 
Black Americans and the movement of Black solidarity with Ethiopia in the face of the 
1935 Italian invasion.188 It is important to note, however, that at least prior to the 1930s, 
like other groups able to stake a claim for whiteness at a time when it emerged as what 
 
186 “‘Umal al-‘Arab wa-‘Umal al-Yahud,” Filastin, October 9, 1928, 1. 
187 See, for example, the works cited in fn. 64 above. 
188 Maha Nassar, “Palestinian Engagement with the Black Freedom Movement Prior to 1967,” Journal of 
Palestine Studies 48, no. 4 (August 1, 2019): 17–32. 
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W.E.B. Du Bois described as a “new religion,” many Palestinians, particularly Christians, 
were attempting to gain recognition of their own whiteness. This was true in Palestine, in 
the diaspora, and in Palestinians’ roles as colonial officials.189 At the same time, many 
Jews attempted to establish their own pathways to whiteness in the US and Europe, 
through their own involvement in colonial enterprises, and in Palestine itself.190 
In a period when the “global color line” became an important factor in 
international politics, the casting of Palestinians as the black victims of British-Jewish 
white supremacy, as Filastin’s 1928 article suggested, was perhaps radical, but not 
unthinkable.191 The newspaper’s critique of the concept of the standard of living as a 
device for racial discrimination, presages the insights of historians of the US and Europe 
who, since the 1990s, have shown that this concept was frequently deployed to allow for 
racial, class, and gender exclusion from the workforce, or to create and maintain 
hierarchies within it.192 That Filastin’s casting of Zionist Jews as attempting to benefit 
 
189 On Du Bois definition of whiteness as a “new religion, see: W. E. B Du Bois, “The Souls of White Folk, 
in W.E.B. Du Bois Darkwater: Voices from within the Veil (Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications, 1999 
[1920]). On how Palestinian, Syrian, and Lebanese Arabs negotiated whiteness in a variety of contexts, see: 
Sarah M. A. Gualtieri, Between Arab and White: Race and Ethnicity in the Early Syrian American 
Diaspora (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009); Sherene Seikaly, “The Matter of Time,” The 
American Historical Review 124, no. 5 (December 1, 2019): 1681–1688. 
190 On Jews and whiteness, see: Karen Brodkin, How Did Jews Become White Folks and What Does That 
Say about Race in America? (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1999); Eitan Bar-Yosef and Nadia 
Valman, eds. “The Jew” in Late-Victorian and Edwardian Culture: Between the East End and East Africa 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Eric L. Goldstein, The Price of Whiteness: Jews, Race, and 
American Identity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Eitan Bar-Yosef, Villa ba-Jungel (Villa in 
the Jungle) (Jerusalem: Van Leer Institute and ha-Kibbutz ha-Me’uhad, 2013); Tisa Wenger, Religious 
Freedom: The Contested History of an American Ideal (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2017). 
191 Lake and Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line. 
192 Lawrence Glickman, “Inventing the ‘American Standard of Living’: Gender, Race and Working-Class 
Identity, 1880–1925,” Labor History 34, no. 2–3 (June 1993): 221–35; Dana Simmons, Vital Minimum: 
Need, Science, and Politics in Modern France (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015); Thomas C. 
Leonard, Illiberal Reformers: Race, Eugenics, and American Economics in the Progressive Era (Princeton: 




from the “wages of whiteness”193 took place only several years before Nazism would 
begin its all-out assault on Jews as Europe’s ultimate racial others; that historians of the 
standard of living have noted how Jews in particular were often considered a threat to or 
as lying outside the “national standard”;194 and that within the same article Filastin itself 
resorted to European antisemitic tropes, shows just how volatile and contextually 
dependent such “obtained” whiteness could be.195 
 
Learning to Love the Stone 
The British suggestion of a racial division of labor in the Haifa harbor works provoked 
not only Labor Zionism’s broad colonial anxieties, the historical basis of which Filastin’s 
editorial had laid bare. By designating that quarry work specifically be carried out by 
Palestinian Arabs, it also hit a raw nerve: Zionism’s continuous failure to gain a foothold 
in Palestine’s stone industry. Throughout the period of British rule, the Zionist “conquest 
 
“Capitalism and Cheap Labour-Power in South Africa: From Segregation to Apartheid,” Economy and 
Society 1, no. 4 (November 1, 1972): 425–56. 
193 David R. Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class 
(London: Verso, 2007 [1991]). 
194 Leonard, Illiberal Reformers, Chapters 8 & 9. 
195 Filastin, 8 October 1928. This volatility calls to mind Eve Troutt Powell’s concept of the “colonized 
colonizer,” which she uses to explore Egyptian colonization of the Sudan while under British colonial rule, 
as well as Sherene Seikaly’s exploration of the fragility of Palestinian Christians’s “civilized,” or “white-
adjacent” status, when in the service of empire (again in Sudan, in the case of the Palestinian physician 
Naim Cotran). The category of “colonized colonizer” is useful in dismantling the supposed neat binary 
between its two components. The realities of Zionist settlement in Palestine under the British Mandate 
obviously differed immensely from those of colonized Egyptians in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth 
centuries, to the extent that even referring to Zionist settlers in Palestine as “colonized” is problematic. 
Nonetheless, Zionist understandings of the Mandate period often relied on the “colonizer” and “colonized” 
binary and conceived of Zionism itself as anti-colonial. This approach is captured in the popular use of the 
name “The War of Liberation” (milḥemet ha-shiḥrur) to refer to the 1948 war. Shira Robinson narrates a 
1966 meeting between then former Israeli Prime Minister David Ben Gurion and the Palestinian Israeli 
Member of the Israeli Knesset, Tawfiq Tubi, in which Ben Gurion crystalized this mode of self-perception, 
or self-presentation. When Tubi accused Israel of treating its Palestinian citizens, “like ‘natives’,” Robinson 
writes, Ben Gurion responded by stating that “[u]nder the British we were all ‘natives’.” Troutt Powell, A 
Different Shade; Robinson, Citizen Strangers; Seikaly, “The Matter of Time.” 
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of stone” remained constant, but also consistently elusive. Stone, unlike cement and 
concrete, where Zionist expertise could be manufactured as if of whole cloth, appeared 
somehow unruly. 
The double meaning of the title of the Even va-Sid (literally “Stone and Lime,” 
although the company’s English name was Lime and Stone Industries) Company’s 
company history published in 1984, Adam Mul Selʻa – “Man Facing Rock” – 
encapsulates much of the mythical dimensions of the Zionist conquest of stone.196 The 
relationship between Zionism’s new Hebrew man (and to a lesser extent, also its new 
Hebrew woman) and the stones and rocks of Palestine/Israel is portrayed as at the same 
time antagonistic and intimate.197 In this sense, the portrayal echoes the erotic desire for 
the land which historian Boaz Neumann has described as characteristic of the “pioneers” 
(ḥalutzim) of the second and third waves of Zionist European immigration (in Hebrew 
 
196 David Faians, Adam Mul Selʻa : Avnei Derekh le-Orekh Shishim Shenot Yetsirah be-Kibush ha-Even ve-
ha-Sid [Man Facing Rock: Stepping Stones along Sixty Years of Creation in the Conquest of Stone and 
Lime] (Haifa: Ta‘asiyat Even va-Sid, 1984). 
197 The history this dissertation narrates is, at least in part, also the history of the masculinization of wage-
base construction labor in Israel/Palestine. During the early twentieth century, Palestinian women were 
integral to communal construction, particularly in rural locales. As Chapters 4 and 5 show, this remained 
true to some extent also in construction and quarry work among Palestinian citizens in Israel, where 
communal building practices, albeit dramatically different in methods, designs, and materials, remained 
prevalent. Women’s roles in the “Hebrew” construction industry followed a different trajectory. In line 
with the egalitarian rhetoric of labor Zionism in particular, Jewish women fought to gain a footing in wage-
based construction work and road paving. However, despite this egalitarian ethos, they encountered 
significant gendered barriers and resistance to their participation. Because I focus on construction work as 
wage labor, these histories of women in construction are largely missing from this dissertation. For a 
personal account of these struggles, see: Henya M. Pekelman, Hayei Po‘elet ba-Aretz [The Life of a 
Worker in her Homeland] (Beer-Sheva: Kinneret, Zmora-Bitan, Dvir, 2007). For a study of women-
workers’ struggles to take part in these industries, see: Liat Taub, “Solelet Bonah: Jewish Women-
Workers’ Struggle to Participate in the Road-Building and House-Construction in Mandatory Palestine 
During the 1920s and 1930s,” (MA thesis, University of Haifa, 2019); For some accounts of the role of 
women in stonework, particularly road paving and the production of gravel, see: Hillel Dan, be-Derekh lo 
Selula: Hagadat Solel Boneh [On an Unpaved Road: The Chronicle of Solel Boneh] (Tel-Aviv: Schocken, 
1963)  ̧9-10; ‘Imanu’el Bar-Hayim, ba-Derekh el Ramat Rahel [On the Road to Ramat Rahel] (Jerusalem: 
ha-Sifriya ha-Tziyonit, 1972), 70; Mordechai Ish Shalom, be-Sod Hotzvim u Vonim: Otobiyografyah 
[Among Quarriers and Builders: An Autobiography] (Jerusalem: Agudat “Shalem”, 1989), 109. 
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‘aliya, ascendance. Pl. ‘aliyot) to Palestine. This desire gendered the land feminine and 
often virginal and cast the young Zionists as set to “conquer” and give life to her/it and 
themselves, through manual labor.198 
A history of the Zionist conquest of stone in Israel/Palestine as a process shaped 
both by physical labor and political economy, however, reveals multiple other parties 
instrumental to the enactment of desire Neumann described, unsettling its supposed 
intimacy. First among these were the Palestinian Arabs, and somewhat less frequently 
Palestinian and other Middle Eastern Jews, from whom many European Jewish 
immigrants learned the work in the first place. The history of Zionist apprenticeship to 
Arab masters in quarrying and stonework reintroduces learning from and imitating 
Palestinian Arab labor as a pivotal piece in the broader Zionist conquest of land and 
labor. It also draws together the material and the cultural in these practices of imitation 
and sheds new light on the phenomena of Jewish and Zionist Orientalism.199  
Scholars have examined Zionist practices of imitating Palestinian Arabs’ dress, 
language and customs in para-military organizations like Hashomer (“The Watchman”) 
and the Hagana (“The Defense”), in the aesthetic practices of photographers and artists, 
and in the literary and poetic depictions of the pre-state era. However, their emphasis has 
often been on the role of the Palestinian Arab as a model and vehicle for the negotiation 
and articulation of Zionist self-perception. These scholars regard the Palestinian Arab, 
particularly the Bedouin and the fallaḥ, and at times also the Palestinian or Middle 
 
198 Neumann, Land and Desire, 95-100. 
199 On Jewish and Zionist Orientalism, see: Shohat, “Sephardim in Israel”; Aziza Khazzoom, “The Great 
Chain of Orientalism: Jewish Identity, Stigma Management, and Ethnic Exclusion in Israel,” American 
Sociological Review 68, no. 4 (2003): 481–510; Shenhav, The Arab Jews, Chapter 2. 
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Eastern Jew, primarily as having served a mediatory role in the Zionist cultural 
imagination, linking the returning European Jews to their Middle Eastern origins, often 
through the “hybrid” Sephardi Jews.200 A focus on labor processes however demonstrates 
that this aesthetic and symbolic role was in some cases inseparable from practical 
considerations. When it came to working on the land, Jewish self-fashioning in light of an 
Arab model extended beyond the adoption of an aesthetic or habitus, into the realm of 
fashioning an economically productive body.201 
Zionist attempts to gain a foothold in Palestine’s stone quarries dated back to the 
final decades of the Ottoman Empire. However, as in cement production, the most 
significant efforts to introduce “Hebrew stone” began with the advent of British rule over 
Palestine.202 The sources of capital invested in setting up Zionist-owned quarries, the 
structures of the various quarrying firms, and the ways in which labor was organized in 
 
200 Oz Almog, The Sabra: The Creation of the New Jew (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 
esp. Chapter 5. Gil Eyal, The Disenchantment of the Orient: Expertise in Arab Affairs and the Israeli State 
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006), Chapter 2; Israel Bartal, “Kozak u-Vedui: ‘Olam Ha-
Dimuyim ha-Le’umi ha-Hadash [Cossak and Bedouin: The New National Imaginary],” in Kozak U-
Vedui :"ʻAm" ve-"Erets" ba-Leʻumiyut ha-Yehudit [Cossack and Bedouin: “Land” and “People” in Jewish 
Nationalism] (Tel Aviv: ‘Am ‘Oved, 2007), 68–79; Yael Zerubavel, “Memory, the Rebirth of the Native, 
and the ‘Hebrew Bedouin’ Identity,” Social Research 75, no. 1 (2008): 315–352. Dor Guez, Oryentalizm 
Terom-Yisreʼeli: Dyokan Metzulam [Pre-Israeli Orientalism: A Photographic Portrait] (Tel Aviv: Resling, 
2015). 
201 Dafna Hirsch’s work on masculinity among Zionist ḥalutzim is an exception to the rule. While also 
preoccupied with the more commonly discussed elements of Zionist mimicry of Arab dress and language, 
Hirsch is careful to note the embodied aspects of such mimicry and their relationship to labor, as well. 
Dafna Hirsch and Dana Grosswirth Kachtan, “Is ‘Hegemonic Masculinity’ Hegemonic as Masculinity? 
Two Israeli Case Studies,” Men and Masculinities 21, no. 5 (December 2018), 691-693. 
202 In 1921, one Mr. Archavsky - likely the engineer Yitzhak Archavsky – attempted to organize a Palestine 
Stone Quarries Syndicate, registered in London and funded largely by Jewish-British capital, a structure 
similar to the Cement Syndicate which eventually spawned the Nesher Portland Cement Company 
discussed in Chapter 1 above. According to a 1927 report by Nahum Thischby of the Zionist Executive 
Department of Commerce and Industry, Archavsky initially intended for the Syndicate to quarry in the 
Athlit area and had hoped to supply stone for the British Haifa harbor project. However, the Syndicate’s 
plans never came to fruition as it was only able to raise 6000 Egyptian Pounds of the 50,000 it had 




them varied: from decidedly capitalist ventures, through the first incarnation of the 
Histadrut’s Solel Boneh contracting company with its allegiance to mainstream labor 
Zionism, and the collectivist Gdud Ha-Avoda (“Labor Brigade”), and finally to the jointly 
Palestinian-Zionist owned, Even va-Sid, by far the period’s most successful effort. 
Throughout, the need to learn how to manage, organize and operate a quarry, and how to 
work in one, was a constant. Few European Jewish settlers had arrived in Palestine with 
experience in stone quarrying and cutting, or in overseeing a quarry’s operations.  
Whether “Hebrew stone” was to be achieved by targeted capital investment and 
the establishment of “Hebrew” quarries and quarrying firms, or by introducing Hebrew 
labor into existing quarries, the vanguard of stone’s Jewish conquerors would first have 
to learn what the work entailed and how to do it. To this end, management and capital 
consulted frequently with foreign experts.203 Workers themselves, meanwhile, found the 
expertise they required was overwhelmingly local. Archival sources are relatively silent 
about the need to learn from and emulate Palestinian expertise in the stone industry. 
However, the memoirs of Jewish quarry workers who learned the craft and others who 
were involved in the industry during the 1920s are not.  
 
203 Various companies hired an Italian quarrying expert named Amadeo Morelli multiple times during the 
1920s to advise on the establishment and management of new quarries and to assess the performance of 
existing ones. One quarrying enterprise brought a Mr. Simons, a “well known Jewish quarry expert,” from 
the United States to consult on several initiatives. The Zionist Executive hired L. Green, a British engineer 
who had previously served in the colonial service in India, to produce reports and inspect Jewish-operated 
quarrying sites. The German-born Leo Picard, who immigrated to Palestine in 1924 and established the 
Hebrew University’s Department of Geology that same year, was also consulted frequently, as were other 
immigrant scientists and engineers who made Palestine their home. Thischby to Sacher, November 22, 
1927, Box 12, Folder 1, PEC, NYPL; Meeting of the Temporary Committee for the Matters of the Stone 
Industry – Protocol, June 17, 1925, CZA S9\1810\1; Bar-Hayim, ba-Derekh el Ramat Rahel, 88; Ish-
Shalom, be-Sod Hotzvim u-Vonim, 112. 
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In some instances, authors gloss over the actual processes of learning the trade or 
the identities of those it was learned from entirely.204 Other accounts acknowledge the 
apprenticeship process but leave the masters unmentioned. Zvika Dror’s biography of 
Yitzhak Sadeh (Landsberg) (1890-1952) – later a key figure in the militarization of labor 
Zionism, but in the early 1920s still a leader of the Labor Brigade and an aspiring 
quarrier – praises Sadeh’s “[understanding] that [quarrying] was a trade that required 
knowledge and skills.” Thus, Dror writes, when the Labor Brigade first engaged in 
quarrying in the Majdal (Migdal) area north of Tiberias in 1921, Sadeh sent Abrasha 
Hassin (1900-1976), a key figure in the conquest of stone, and others to “train in a quarry 
near Haifa.”205 While Dror leaves the episode at that, such training most likely meant 
working in an apprenticeship capacity for Palestinian Arab quarriers. As will be shown 
below, Jewish settlers who undertook such apprenticeships adopted Palestinian quarriers’ 
repertoire of skills and sensibilities, as well as the Arabic professional lexicon through 
which they ordered and understood Palestine’s quarries and stones. 
In his memoirs, Hillel Dan (1900-1969), a long-time head of Solel Boneh, offers 
one such narrative of apprenticeship. Recalling his first year in Palestine, Dan writes of 
 
204 See for example, David Hacohen’s description of how Binyamin Kav-Venaki, who, like Hacohen, was 
part of the post-World War I wave of Zionist immigration, established himself as a supplier of lime for 
Solel Boneh in the early 1920s. Kav-Venaki, Hacohen writes, “[produced] lime in the Arab fashion, 
[working] with them [the Arabs], his brother and three or four other friends who followed him in this 
trade.” Even if Hacohen does not mention it, producing the lime “in the Arab fashion,” would have entailed 
Kav-Venaki and his peers learning such local techniques in the first place. Indeed, when Kav-Venaki’s 
brother, Issar, was interviewed for Even va-Sid’s aforementioned company history, Man Facing Stone, ten 
years after Hacohen’s memoirs were published, he stated that when they began producing lime on Mount 
Carmel they had been given guidance by “Arabs who had experience in the work. David Hacohen, ’Et 
Lesaper [Time to Tell] (Tel Aviv: ’Am ’Oved, 1974), 44; Faians, Adam Mul Sela‘, 24. Hacohen’s 
autobiography has also appeared in English. See: David Hacohen, Time to Tell: An Israeli Life, 1898-1984 
(New York, Cornwall Books, 1985). 
205 Zvika Dror, Matzbi le-lo Srara : Sipur-Hayav shel Yitzhak Sadeh, “ha-Zaken” [A Ruler with no 
Dominion: the Lifestory of Yitzhak Sadeh] (Tel Aviv: Ha-Kibbutz ha-Me’uhad, 1996), 72. 
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the first government contract received by the Ahdut Ha-Avoda (a left-wing Labor Zionist 
party) Works Office in late 1920. The contract was for paving a road between the city of 
Tiberias and Samakh (Tzemakh), along the Sea of Galilee.206 Since the British authorities 
did not recognize political parties like Ahdut Ha-Avoda as contracting bodies, when the 
Works Office received the tender, the government required that an individual signatory 
bear responsibility for it. At the time, Dan writes, not one among the Works Office’s 
personnel knew even the names of the materials used in road-paving. The party 
leadership thus selected one individual, a “’sacrificial victim’” (“korban”) [quotation 
marks in the original], to be the signatory and notified the authorities. However, when the 
day of signing arrived, the man was nowhere to be found. After several days, concerns as 
to his fate began mounting. Then,  
Just as he had vanished, he suddenly appeared, all glowing and rolling with 
laughter at the sight of his friends’ worried faces. Instead of answering their 
inquisitive looks, he uttered a long stream of strange words, in a throaty 
guttural pronunciation. 
“Ḥami,” he uttered between his teeth. “Ṭobjeh, Maṭbaḥ.” We looked at him 
astonished. “Stick a Lamina in my hand,” he roared and waved his arm.207 
Only when he saw that we were beginning to question his clarity of mind, he 
acquiesced to telling his story. 
When the role [of signatory] was forced upon him, he went to an Arab 
contractor in Haifa and asked him to hire him as a quarrier. Only after much 
 
206 Hillel Dan, be-Derekh lo Selula, 24-25. 
207 Here Dan provides a footnote explaining the meanings of these “strange words”, stating they are 
“Arabic words: ‘Ḥami’ is a quarried stone which has only had its four corners processed by the 
stonemason. ‘Ṭobjeh,’ is a stone which the stonemason left with a convexed face…. ‘Maṭbah,’ is stone 
given a rectangular shape by the mason. The face of the ‘maṭbah’ is flat and has been pierced with small 
holes for decorative purposes. ‘Lamina,’ is a quarrying rod.” His definitions, and the words themselves, 
differ slightly from those mentioned in scholarly treatments of local quarrying tools and methods. Omar 
Hamdan defines khami stone (al-ḥajjar al-khami) literally as “unprocessed stone” (al-ḥajar al-ghayr 
madquq). The “ṭobjeh” Dan mentions, is “ṭobzeh.” A maṭbaḥ is a kind of hammer used to create the pierced 
face of the stone Dan refers to by this name. Finally, the ‘lamina’, is likely the iron rod named balamina, a 
name Shmuel Avitzur believes is of Italian origins. See: Omar Hamdan, al-‘Imara al-Sha‘abiyya fi-Filastin 
(al-Bireh, Palestine: Markaz al-Turath al-Sha‘abi al-Falastini, 1996), 571, 574, 597; Shmuel Avitzur, Adam 
va-’Amalo : Atlas le-Toldot Klei ʻAvoda u-Mitkkane Yitsur be-Erets-Yisraʼel [Man and his Work: A 
Historical Atlas of Tools and Workshops in the Holy Land] (Jerusalem: Karta, 1976), 126. 
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pleading did he [the contractor] agree to employ him. Within a few days, the 
man learned the terms [of the trade] and even etched into his memory work-
methods, blasting processes, etc. His daily wages, those of a novice Arab 
laborer, were not enough even [to pay] for breakfast… 
The man’s ingenuity worked in our favor. He signed the contract with the 
British and surprised them with [his] “expertise” [quotation marks in the 
original].208 
 
Members of the Labor Brigade also recorded narratives of learning the stone trade 
in the Jerusalem area. In several of these, the apprenticeship narrative is more explicit 
still, pointing to a specific individual rather than to an unnamed Arab “guide.” Dror’s 
biography of Sadeh, and the memoirs of two other members of the brigade, ‘Imanu’el 
Bar-Haim (1902-1974) and Mordechai Ish Shalom (1902-1991), all mention a guide they 
refer to as Abu Ibrahim. In these sources, Abu Ibrahim is said to have been from one of 
the Palestinian villages on the western outskirts of Jerusalem: Dror identifies him as 
 
208 Dan, be-Derekh lo Selula, 24-25. Dan structures the episode in a manner that seems to follow a pattern 
of biblical prophetic revelation stories, in accordance with what Robert Alter has called a “type-scene”, 
after Walter Arend’s formulation from his 1933 study of Homer. The protagonist, Natan Haruvi, separates 
from the collective at a moment of distress. He then sets alone on a journey from which he returns with 
newfound knowledge which remedies the collective’s plight. The encounter here, of course, is not with the 
divine, as in biblical narratives of revelation, but with the nameless Arab contractor, and while in the type-
scene it is usually the protagonist who shows reluctance to accepting the divine revelation and mission, 
here it is the Arab contractor who is reluctant to accept Haruvi as an apprentice. The structure of the 
narrative nonetheless resembles that of theophany type-scenes, as studied by George Savran. Other 
components of the story also echo biblical narratives of revelation: Haruvi’s journey took him to Haifa, 
most likely to a quarry on Mount Carmel, which is a location with a rich prophetic history. When Haruvi 
returns, Dan describes his face as “glowing,” a motif which could have been lifted directly from Moses’ 
glowing face as he descended Mount Sinai. Haruvi’s appearance to his peers as potentially having lost his 
clarity of mind and uttering unrecognizable words, the pronunciation of which seems physically out of 
place (“guttural” and “throaty”), could indicate that Dan was also incorporating other, non-biblical 
prophecy narratives which include the phenomenon of “speaking in tongues.” See: Walter Arend, Die 
typischen Szenen bei Homer (Berlin: Weidmann, 1933); Robert Alter, The Art of Biblical Narrative, second 
edition (New York: Basic Books, 2011 [1981]), chapter 3; George Savran, “Theophany as Type Scene,” 
Prooftexts 23, no. 2 (2003): 119–49. I thank Steven Weitzman for calling my attention to the concept of the 
type-scene and Alter and Savran’s work 
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being from Lifta, while Ish-Shalom writes that he was from al-Shaykh Badr, a few 
kilometers to the southeast.209  
According to Dror and Ish Shalom, Sadeh was responsible for recruiting Abu-
Ibrahim as a guide for the quarry work at Giv‘at Shaul, just south of Lifta.210 Ish Shalom 
describes Abu Ibrahim as “an excellent quarrier,” and a “craftsman.”211 For Bar-Haim, 
who was anxious to become a quarrier but only granted the chance to do so when 
previous groups of the Brigade left the quarry to pursue better earnings, “[it was] very 
likely, that without the personality and guidance of Abu Ibrahim, I would not have stuck 
with this toilsome work [i.e., quarrying] for long.” Work alongside Abu Ibrahim was “a 
source of pleasure. I learned the trade from him, I learned to know and love the stone and 
the process of production.”212  
 
209 Bar-Haim, ba-Derekh el Ramat Rahel, 47-49; Ish Shalom, be-Sod Hotzvim u-Vonim, 104-105; Dror, 
Matzbi le-lo Srara, 81; Yossi Spanier, “Mahtzevot ha-Har, Yozmot le-Hakamat Mahtzavot Even ba-
Hityashvut ha-Yehudit Saviv la-Yerushalayim ‘ad Tasha”h” [The Mountain Quarries, Initiatives to 
Establish Stone Quarries in the Jewish Settlements around Jerusalem before 1948], Mehkarei Yehuda ve-
Shomron 20, 137-8. My use of Spanier’s work, published in Mekhkarei Yehuda ve-Shomron (Judea and 
Samaria Research Studies), necessitates some commentary. This publication is a product of the deeply 
controversial Ariel University in the occupied West Bank. Because it resides outside of Israel’s 
internationally recognized sovereign territory, the institution was granted university status by Israel’s 
Ministry of Defense and the IDF, rather than the Ministry of Education and the Council for Higher 
Education in Israel, which are the accrediting institutions according to Israeli law. Its recognition as a 
university has been a rallying point for Israeli right-wing attempts to further entrench the occupation of the 
West Bank. The publication itself, as its use of the name “Judea and Samaria” to refer to the West Bank 
indicates, is ideologically dedicated to the erasure and elision of Palestinian claims and history in 
Palestine/Israel. Yet, ironically, precisely because of its focus on geography, topography, and the land itself 
– a product of its desire to strengthen Zionist claims to rootedness and question Palestinian ones - the works 
featured in this publication can at times also be used to undermine such historical sleights of hand. By using 
this article, I by no means condone the journal’s political objectives. Rather, I approach it as a source for a 
considerably more complex history wherein the Zionist relationship to such aspects of “the land itself” was 
mediated by Palestinian Arab attachments to it (and to a lesser extent by those of Palestinian and Middle 
Eastern Jews), by virtue of the latter groups’ indigeneity. Thus even in the most deeply entrenched attempts 
to erase Palestinian history, the historical dependence of the Zionist project on Palestinian Arabs hides 
between the lines. 
210 Dror, Matzbi le-lo Srara, 81. 
211 Ish Shalom, be-Sod Hotzvim u-Vonim, 104-105. 
212 Bar-Haim, ba-Derekh el Ramat Rahel, 47. 
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These narratives also dismantle the racialized British idea of quarry work being 
“simple, brute labor” fit for “unskilled” workers and the “physically superior” Arab 
rather than for the “greater intelligence” of the Jew. In them, quarrying appears as a craft 
that required finesse and the development of particular sensibilities, rather than brute 
force. Both Ish Shalom and Bar-Haim describe Abu Ibrahim’s “hazings” of Jewish 
quarriers who sought to approach the splitting of stone at the quarry with force alone. 
Abu Ibrahim would let the novice quarriers exert themselves by swinging the large 13-
kilogram hammer again and again, “for a quarter of an hour and more,” and then would 
approach the stone, take the hammer and with “two-three strikes” would expertly split the 
slab.213  
Part of what Abu Ibrahim imparted on the Jewish quarriers, it seems, was a sense 
of intimate knowing. Ish Shalom’s descriptions of this process of learning to know the 
stone is particularly rich in its sensory and emotional content. “It took time before we too 
learned to listen to the sounds emerging from the stone. To feel where the crack is 
revealed in it, and to hit it in the right place,” Ish Shalom writes. Like Bar-Haim, he too 
describes “growing attached to the stone and the rock. [Learning] to love them and the 
work with them.” More than half a century later – at a time when, Ish Shalom writes, 
 
213 Bar-Haim, ba-Derekh el Ramat Rahel, 48; Ish Shalom, be-Sod Hotzvim u-Vonim, 104-105. Their 
recorded respect of Abu Ibrahim’s craftsmanship aside, it is interesting to note that both Ish Shalom and 
Bar-Haim comment on Abu Ibrahim’s supposedly lacking computational and measurement skills. In works 
which required precise measurements and calculations, both write, the Palestinian craftsman had to turn to 
his Jewish apprentices. While impossible to rule out entirely that the two provide an accurate description of 
Abu Ibrahim’s personal limitations, this emphasis does call to mind the widely accepted devaluation of the 
intelligence of Palestinian Arab workers which has been discussed above. Dror’s description of Abu 
Ibrahim’s expertise and role accords even more closely with such dismissive depictions, contradicting how 
Ish Shalom and Bar-Haim depict the Palestinian quarrier. Dror writes that Abu Ibrahim’s contribution was 
“limited,” due to the “simple work methods” he used, and his “[difficulty] to understand [the motives of the 
members of the Brigade].” Dror, Matzbi le-lo Srara, 81. 
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“there is no [no longer any] Jewish quarrier nor Jewish stonemason” – he portrays his 
relationship with the quarry’s stones as more than merely an interaction with inanimate 
objects,  
When you work in the quarry, you learn that the stone has sounds and colors, and 
the rock has tendons and arteries. You face a rock, but in truth it is as if it were 
alive before you. You remove its outer shell with the shakuf [a Hebrew 
mispronunciation of the Arabic shakush], and you notice [the stone’s] geological 
composition. When you are familiar with the division of a slab, it is easier to split. 
When you hit a stone according to the tendons and arteries, it responds to you and 
splits with great ease. 
…There is light gray stone, and dark gray. There is reddish stone, and yellowish 
stone, and there are stones in which there is a combination of colors. Each kind of 
stone has its own sound. When you strike a mizi yahudi stone you hear a distinct 
sound, while the voice of the soft stone is dull and thin.214 
 
And yet, the voices of the stone were not the only ones Ish Shalom heard in the 
quarry which had left a lasting impression on him. In the introduction to his memoirs, 
which he titles “Opening in Two Voices,” as though it were a musical piece, he casts the 
voices of Abu Ibrahim and his wife Fatima, in the titular role. Ish Shalom mentions that 
Abu Ibrahim guided the Brigade’s quarrying group, however the focus of the introduction 
is not on the craftsman’s professional skills, of which the reader learns later in the 
memoirs. Rather it is on how Abu Ibrahim and Fatima’s interactions shaped Ish Shalom’s 
perception of himself within Palestine’s landscape.  
As Abu Ibrahim and Fatima engaged in a call-and-response conversation between 
Giv‘at Shaul and al-Shaykh Badr (which Ish Shalom explains he could not understand, 
 
214 Ish Shalom, be-Sod Hotsvim u-Vonim 105. Jeffrey Jerome Cohen’s study-come-meditation on stone in 
medieval literature indicates that such relationships with stone have a long history and are not limited to 
those working in stone directly. Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, Stone: An Ecology of the Inhuman (Minneapolis: 
University Of Minnesota Press, 2015). 
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since he did not speak Arabic) covering the aerial distance with their voices, Ish Shalom 
“confronted in a very tangible manner, what awaited us here, in Eretz Yisrael, in 
Jerusalem.” He recalls first fully perceiving the “wilderness” (ha-shmama) of the land 
and the need to “quarry stones from the mountains of Jerusalem and to build the city with 
them,” through the “cry of the wilderness (ze‘akat ha-shmama) that came to [his] ears in 
Abu Ibrahim’s and Fatima’s voices.”215 Ish Shalom repeatedly emphasizes how unlikely 
it was that this mundane vocal exchange had such a momentous impact on him. The story 
he weaves around the exchange neatly encompasses foundational Zionist tropes of 
“making the wilderness bloom”, “redeeming the land” and building it. However, a single 
sentence, one which appears somewhat out of place in this overarching narrative, might 
perhaps offer a better indication of why the exchange was so formative. The vocal 
exchange between the village and the quarry, between husband and wife, demonstrates 
Ish Shalom’s realization that the life-long “quest” his memoir narrates entailed dislodging 
more than stones from the land around him, but also people: “The two [Fatima and Abu 
Ibrahim] shouted to each other in high voices, because they are the masters of [this] space 
and [this] wilderness, and they are their proprietors.”216 
 
 
215 The idea of Palestine as a wilderness or wasteland – shmama – has, of course had an important role in 
justifying the Zionist project of “building the land,” mentioned above. See: Alan George, “Making the 
Desert Bloom: A Myth Examined,” Journal of Palestine Studies 8, no. 2 (1979): 88–100; Haim Gerber, 
“Zionism, Orientalism, and the Palestinians,” Journal of Palestine Studies 33, no. 1 (October 1, 2003): 23–
41; Sandra M. Sufian, Healing the Land and the Nation: Malaria and the Zionist Project in Palestine, 
1920-1947 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008). For an examination of how the image of 
Palestine/Israel’s “wilderness,” has shaped North American concepts of the “wilderness,” see: W. J. T. 
Mitchell, “Holy Landscape: Israel, Palestine, and the American Wilderness,” Critical Inquiry 26, no. 2 
(2000): 193–223. 
216 Ish Shalom, be-Sod Hotzvim u-Vonim, 13-15. 
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Bodies and Machines 
If the Zionist conquest of stone was intended to obtain a significant hold over Palestine’s 
quarries and stone resources, the approach adopted by the Labor Brigade – training under 
local masters and adapting local methods – very quickly proved to be insufficient. 
Beginning in the early 1920s, a succession of local committees and foreign experts 
proposed a broad range of alternative strategies.217 Eventually, one idea took hold – 
viable “Hebrew stone” would necessitate the widescale mechanization of quarry work.  
At the heart of this idea - promoted most decisively by Director of the Commerce 
and Industry Department of the Zionist Executive, Nahum Thischby (1885-1952) – was 
an economic calculus. Not only was the cost of Jewish labor considerably higher than 
Palestinian Arab labor, the productivity of Jewish workers was frequently lower. While 
members of the Labor Brigade initially opposed “revolutionizing” quarries through 
mechanization, by 1927 Thischby could somewhat triumphantly offer a retrospective 
evaluation, stating that  
As competition with the Arabs by working by hand is out of the question, 
modern machinery ought to have been introduced, and should continue to be 
introduced in the future.218 
 
 
217 On the foreign experts involved in the conquest of stone, see fn. 203 above. In late 1923, the Histadrut 
established a “Quarry Committee,” which called for the strategic purchase of land and the pooling of 
institutional resources to fund equipment and subsidize workers in training. In 1925, several Zionist 
institutions founded a “Temporary Committee for the Matters of the Stone Industry,” which included 
representatives of the Histadrut’s “Quarry Committee,” officials from the Palestine Zionist Executive, the 
Jewish National Fund, and other Zionist organizations. Its members debated whether successful 
competition with Palestinian Arab quarries could perhaps be achieved by the “Hebrew” stone industry 
facing outward and producing for export, relying also on the aura of stones from the Holy Land and on the 
“national feelings” of Jews elsewhere. Exporting Palestinian stone, specifically for gravestones, was 
considered one potentially lucrative avenue. CZA S9\1760\1; Folder 1, Box 12, PEC Collection, NYPL. 
218 N.J. Thischby to Harry Sacher, November 22, 1927, Box 12, Folder 1, PEC Collection, NYPL. 
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The increased productivity of quarries that utilized “labor-saving machinery” 
including excavators, drills, and jackhammers, it was thought, would ameliorate the 
deficiencies of the Jewish body and the higher cost of Jewish labor. This would allow for 
the development of a strong Hebrew stone industry, permitting private and public firms to 
open new quarries. At the same time, mechanization of existing quarries would permit 
the displacement of Palestinian workers and expertise there.219  
Discussed at the industry-wide level, the economic language of “competition,” 
“cost,” and “productivity” could make quarry mechanization appear like a somewhat 
abstract proposition. However, when these discussions focused on the workings of 
specific quarries, the fundamental idea – that mechanization would allow the 
displacement of Palestinian workers and expertise – became more evident. For example, 
a laudatory article published in the September 1925 issue of the Kibbutz ‘Ein Harod’s 
journal Mi-Befnim (“From Inside”), narrated the difficult beginnings of Jewish labor in 
the local quarry several years prior, its development, and its future. The article accorded a 
prominent obstructive role to “the Arab expert” (ha-mumḥe ha-‘aravi) employed in the 
quarry, whose high salary, according to the article, had proved burdensome. The expected 
arrival of a compressor-powered drill, however, it was hoped, would both increase 
productivity and reduce costs, since “it will [then] be possible to let the Arab expert 
go.”220 
The quarry at the Nesher factory is another case in point. As mentioned in 
Chapter One, Nesher was a “mixed” workplace, with Jewish employees working in the 
 
219 N.J. Thischby to Harry Sacher, November 22, 1927, Box 12, Folder 1, PEC Collection, NYPL. 
220 “Mahtzevat ‘Ein Harod” [The ‘Ein Harod Quarry], Mi-Befnim 2, no. 16, September 1, 1925. 
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factory and Palestinian Arabs in the company quarry. It was also the site of some of the 
Mandate periods most substantial cross-communal labor organization efforts.221 
However, many among the factory’s Jewish workers and the Histadrut leadership, 
maintained throughout that labor in the quarry should be “Hebrew” as well. For over a 
decade since the factory began operations and until 1936, when the Solel Boneh 
contracting company’s leadership was able to force his hand to “integrate” the quarries, 
Nesher’s founder, Michael Pollak, withstood Histadrut and workers’ pressures by 
repeatedly promising that Nesher would transition to “full Hebrew labour” as soon as the 
quarry was mechanized to allow it.222 “When [the machines] arrive,” became a repeatedly 
deferred moment of promise. Pollak and other members of Nesher’s management 
announced time and time again that such an “arrival” was imminent, only to have it 
dissipate shortly thereafter.223 
Over time, Jewish workers at Nesher and Histadrut officials seemed to internalize 
this conditional relationship. In September 1933, rumors began spreading among the 
factory’s workers that as part of a factory expansion, management would finally 
mechanize work in the quarry. In a September 29 letter to the Histadrut’s Executive 
Committee, the Secretary of Nesher’s Workers Council described “a stir” (tesisa) among 
the Jewish workers. The workers, he reported, were urging the Council demand that 
management introduce Jews into quarry work following mechanization. A note scribbled 
 
221 See fn. 87 above. 
222 De Vries, “Ma’avakei ‘Avoda u-Samkhut”; Bernstein, “Yehudim ve-‘Aravim be-Mif‘al ‘Nesher’.” For 
Pollak’s reasoning behind the decision see also Chapter 1, 53, fn. 93 above. 
223 Y. Marminski, “Report on my Activities at Nesher,” September 17, 1929, LMA, IV-208-1-258A. 
111 
 
on the letter, likely by a member of the Executive Committee, suggested that if there was 
any chance of success, it would be worthwhile to do so.224 
The letter also revealed an accompanying assumption. Mechanization and 
“rationalization” of the quarry – the two terms were often bundled together in discussions 
of the conquest of stone – were antithetical to the continued employment of Palestinians 
there. Prior to August 1933, the letter noted, when partnership between Jewish and 
Palestinian organized labor at Nesher finally dissolved, Nesher’s Jewish workers could 
not support quarry mechanization and rationalization wholeheartedly since “[these] 
would have considerably pushed the hands of the Arab workers away from the quarry.”225 
Palestinian workers, it was assumed, had little place in a “modern” industrial workplace. 
Here too, a racialized hierarchy of skill emerged. 
Once deemed plausible, such hierarchies were to be protected. When in December 
1933 reports described additional steps towards the mechanization of Nesher’s quarry, 
including the training of Palestinian workers on the new machinery, the local Jewish 
Workers’ Council reacted furiously. In a December 5, 1933 letter to the Histadrut’s 
Executive Committee, the Council reported that workers demanded that factory 
management halt the introduction of new machinery until Michael Pollak returned from a 
trip abroad. When he did, the workers intended to press him on his promise that 
mechanized quarrying would be carried out only by Jewish workers. The Histadrut’s 
Executive Committee responded within a week. They supported the workers’ demands, 
 
224 Tzvi Grinberg to the Histadrut Executive Committee, September 29, 1933, LMA, IV-208-1-894. 
225 Tzvi Grinberg to the Histadrut Executive Committee, September 29, 1933, LMA, IV-208-1-894. 
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specifically calling on them to resist attempts to force Jewish employees to train 
Palestinian workers on the machinery.226 
Unsurprisingly, the voices of the Palestinian workers that quarry mechanization 
was intended to displace, or any other Palestinian voices for that matter, are absent from 
these intra-Zionist discussions. This does not mean, however, that similar questions of the 
costs and benefits of mechanization – extending well beyond the specific instance of 
quarry work – did not figure in Palestinian thinking about the nexus of political economy, 
labor, and development. The leading article in the November 15, 1935 issue of al-
’Iqtisadiyyat al-‘Arabiyya (translated by its editors as The Arabic Economic Journal, or 
sometimes, The Arab Economic Journal) – a journal Sherene Seikaly has identified as the 
primary organ of Palestine’s “men of capital” – provides a glimpse of a different 
approach to the relationship between mechanization, labor, and “progress.”227  
The article, titled “Labor Versus Machinery in the Near East,” warns against the 
adoption of the “common fallacy” of exaggerating the dependence of production 
efficiency on mechanization and the “corollary” argument that “economic progress is 
impossible without mechanization.” Pointing to the problem of “technological 
unemployment” elsewhere, the article’s author, Edward F. Nickoley (1873-1937), an 
American Professor of Economics and the longtime Dean of the Faculty of Arts and 
Sciences at the American University of Beirut, suggests that the emergence of this 
problem has allowed a “more balanced… attitude” to supplant the “traditional faith in the 
machine as the saviour of the race.” One important outgrowth of this “more balanced 
 
226 Tzvi Grinberg to the Histadrut Executive Committee, December 5, 1933, LMA, IV-208-1-894. 
227 Seikaly, Men of Capital, Chapter 1. 
113 
 
attitude,” Nickoley suggests, is a growing recognition of the need to make a clearer 
distinction between machinery that “cooperates with labor,” and between machinery 
which competes with labor. This distinction, according to Nickoley, reveals that the 
benefits of mechanization are not absolute, and that the specific form mechanization 
should take is always context dependent.228 
In the case of the Near East, an “indiscriminate demand” to introduce machinery 
as a condition for progress, Nickoley argues, fails to consider local conditions. Although 
the Near East’s countries may not possess abundant natural resources, and suffer from 
“unduly timid” capital, they enjoy “an excessive supply not only of unskilled labor but of 
labor with high potentialities of technical efficiency.” Introducing labor-saving or 
substituting machinery would only “accentuate a condition which is already critical… 
inadequate opportunity for the labor which exists.” “Progress” in the Near East, Nickoley 
claims, could only be brought forth by providing “effective training and intelligent 
direction of the quantitative and qualitative potentialities” of its inhabitants.229 
Al-Iqtisadiyyat first included Nickoley’s article in a special English and French 
language issue of the journal. Two months later, in the journals’ January 25, 1936 issue, 
the editors included the article again, this time translated into Arabic.230 In keeping with 
the editorial line of the journal which “conceptualiz[ed] economy… as discrete from the 
political,”231 Nickoley does not mention colonialism, Jewish settlement in Palestine, or 
 
228 Dr. E.F. Nickoley, “Labor Versus Machinery in the Near East,” al-’Iqtisadiyyat al-‘Arabiyya 1, no. 22 
(November 15, 1935): 3-4. 
229 Nickoley, “Labor Versus Machinery.” 
230 E.F. Nickoley, “al-‘Umal ’Iza’a al-Alat fi-l-Buldan al-Sharqiyya,” al-’Iqtisadiyyat al-‘Arabiyya 2, no. 4: 
5-6. 
231 Seikaly, Men of Capital, 33. 
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Zionism in his article. In accordance with al-’Iqtisadiyyat’s editorial line, he writes of the 
matter at hand from an approach that seems to aspire toward separating the economic 
from the political. Nonetheless, it is instructive to read his suggestions, which, given the 
venue, had likely struck a chord with at least some of Palestine’s capitalist class, against 
the backdrop of the Zionist embrace of quarry mechanization. Equally as rooted in the 
economic language of “efficiency,” “costs,” and “productivity” as his Zionist 
counterparts, Nickoley prescribes a different vision. He saw imminent danger in 
indiscriminate mechanization’s capacity to replace, deskill, and eventually displace 
indigenous populations in the Middle East, precisely the qualities which made machinery 
so appealing to its promoters in the Zionist conquest of stone.232 
 
Conclusion: “Soon They Will Be Firing the Arab” 
When finally, Jewish workers were introduced into Nesher’s quarry in 1936, it was due 
not to mechanization but to the 1936-1939 Palestinian Great Revolt, and the incessant 
pressures of the Histadrut and its contracting company Solel Boneh on Pollak. At first the 
quarry became a “mixed” workplace, with Jews and Arabs working alongside one 
another. Solel Boneh’s David Hacohen (1898-1984), who had previously established a 
partnership with Tahir Qaraman at Even va-Sid, and the Palestine Arab Workers 
Society’s Sami Taha, were the architects of this first stage of the quarry’s transformation. 
Then, by the late 1938, the quarry transitioned to exclusively Jewish labor.233 
 
232 It was, in fact, precisely the sort of “labor-saving machinery” Nickoley warned against, that the 
architects of Zionism’s quarry mechanization efforts had argued for. N.J. Thischby to Harry Sacher, 
November 22, 1927, Box 12, Folder 1, PEC Collection, NYPL. 
233 Hacohen, ‘Et Lesaper, 65-68; Bernstein, “Yehudim ve-‘Aravim,” 103. 
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With the transition to exclusively Jewish labor, mechanization was in fact soon to 
follow. However, it soon proved to be a fickle ally of labor. By 1942, Nesher’s now 
wholly Jewish quarrying workforce found themselves and the company’s management on 
the opposite sides of the quarry mechanization debate. Fearful of losing their jobs, the 
Nesher Workers’ Council fought against management’s plans to introduce a new 
excavator to a recently opened quarry face. This time, however, they did not receive the 
Histadrut’s backing. Rather, the Histadrut’s Executive Committee issued a letter to the 
Workers’ Council stating that 
Theoretical assumptions and experience – both prove that there is no basis for the 
workers to resist the expansion of machinery use [in the quarry]. The machine has 
been and still is one of the central means for the Jewish worker to expand and 
solidify his standing, to improve his working conditions, and to increase the work 
itself.234 
 
And what of the question with which this chapter began? The question which for 
a short while in 1931 vexed people not just in Haifa and Mandate Palestine, but also in 
Beirut, Cairo, London, and New York: machine gun or rock breaking machine? The 
histories of the construction of the Haifa Harbor and its Athlit quarry and of the Zionist 
“conquest of stone” more broadly, demonstrate that the line separating these two 
machines could be finer than we might otherwise assume. The “weaponization” of the 
quarry drill – making it into a device for Palestinian displacement – was tied to racial 
hierarchies of different bodies, their laboring capacities and needs, and their relationships 
to their environment, technology, and modernity writ large. These racialized 
 
234 Histadrut Executive Committee to Solel Boneh Directorate, Haifa and the Nesher Workers’ Council, 
June 18, 1942, LMA, IV-208-1-2363C. 
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understandings also placed mandate Palestine along the emergent global color line of the 
1920s and 30s, connecting local struggles to transnational and imperial frameworks. At 
the same time, Mandate Palestine’s construction sites and quarries were locations where 
other seemingly obvious separations could be challenged as well. There Eastern 
European Jewish settlers learned they would need to adopt Palestinian sensibilities, 
knowledge, and bodily comportment, and that the displacement of Palestinian expertise, 
and Palestinians, remained difficult because of the Zionist project’s dependence on them.  
That did not mean however, that other strategies of displacement could not be 
explored. One such strategy, already explored as early as the 1911 Yavnieli Mission, was 
to look for more suitable Jewish bodies to serve as replacements.235 In a 1945 report on 
the economic feasibility of employing Jewish labor in “primitive lime kilns” as part of the 
production process, Dr. Ludwig Grünbaum, uses the Even va-Sid lime kiln at Shfeya as a 
case in point.236 There, utilizing Yemeni Jewish workers, the prospect of “full Hebrew 
labor” seemed closer than ever. The clause in Grünbaum’s report titled “Arab Labor in 
Shfeya”, reads as follows: 
“I went over the list of workers, I visited Shfeya, and I talked with some workers. 
From the evidence, I learned that there is only one Arab in the factory, who is 
teaching the craft to the Jewish workers. Soon they will be firing the Arab.”237 
 
235 See Introduction above. 
236 The role which Grünbaum, who would later change his name to Aryeh Ga‘aton, played in the planning 
of labor in the proposed Jewish state, after the United Nation’s Special Committee on Palestine issued its 
recommendation for partition in Fall 1947, is discussed at length in the following chapter. 




CHAPTER 3: “IF WE ARE A FORCE”: CONSIDERING 
COERCION AND APPEARANCES IN THE DIVISION OF 
LABOR 
 
Of all the years and events which have cast their long shadows on the modern history of 
Palestine/Israel – 1917 and the Balfour declaration, the violence of summer 1929, 1936-
1939’s Great Revolt, and 1967’s Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip – 
none has loomed larger than 1948. In many ways a shorthand for a sequence of events 
which spanned the years 1947-1949, 1948 is etched in Palestinian history and memory as 
the year of the Palestinian catastrophe, the Nakba. In Zionist history and memory, it 
marks the year of Israeli independence. The year has also come to define one of the 
primary and longest lasting divisions among Palestinians: that between the roughly 
750,000 Palestinians forced to leave their homes in what became Israel and who became 
refugees, and the roughly 150,000 Palestinians who were able to remain in the boundaries 
of the new state, or returned in the years immediately following. To the latter, it gave an 
enduring name: “’48 Arabs” (‘arab tamaniyah wa-’arba‘in).238 
The events of 1948 are rightly recognized as a watershed. This recognition of 
their transformative nature has, however, led to substantive continuities between what 
 
238 I borrow the evocative imagery of the shadows certain years have cast on Palestine/Israel’s history from 
the concept for the 2018 New Directions in Palestinian Studies Workshop at Brown University, which was 
titled “The Shadow Years: Material Histories of Everday Life.” On the terminology “’48 Arabs,” and other 
terms which refer to Palestinians with Israeli citizenship, such as ‘Arab al-dakhil (“Arabs of the inside”), 
see: Dan Rabinowitz and Khawla Abu-Baker, Coffins on Our Shoulders: The Experience of the Palestinian 
Citizens of Israel (University of California Press, 2005), 59. 
118 
 
preceded these events and what followed frequently being overlooked in the scholarship. 
Such oversights have been perhaps most pronounced when it comes to examining how 
colonial structures, which were in place under the British Mandate, evolved in post-1948 
Israel. Several important works have examined the role of these colonial legacies. 
Scholarship by Shira Robinson, Yael Berda, and Leena Dallasheh, among others, has 
demonstrated how colonial practices and logic shaped the relationship between the 
nascent Israeli state and Palestinian citizens in it, particularly in relation to the legal, 
political, and social dimensions of citizenship and rights.239 Cultural studies of Mizrahi 
Jews, or more specifically, Arab Jews – a nomenclature some of the field’s leading 
scholars argue for on historical, cultural, and political grounds – pioneered by Ella Shohat 
and taken up by scholars like Aziza Khazzoom and Yehouda Shenhav, have emphasized 
how colonial and orientalist cultural hierarchies impacted Mizrahim’s “absorption” in 
Israeli society.240 This chapter extends the pathways paved by these inquiries to examine 
how ideas and policy suggestions the Zionist leadership considered before and during 
1948’s upheavals, laid the groundwork for the Israeli state’s division of labor. I show that 
as the Yishuv moved towards what its leaders would no doubt consider “post-colonial” 
statehood, even if only in temporal terms, these ideas and policy suggestions remained 
firmly rooted in the racialized divisions of colonialism and empire.  
 
239 Robinson, Citizen Strangers; Berda, “Colonial Legacy”; Leena Dallasheh, “Troubled Waters: 
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The chapter relies on minutes of Histadrut Executive Committee Meetings, social 
scientific studies produced during the 1940s, and the records of the Yishuv Emergency 
Committee (Va‘adat ha-Matzav, lit. “the situation committee”), established following the 
UNSCOP partition proposal in late 1947, to plan the administration of the future Jewish 
state. In this respect, the chapter is unique among this dissertation’s chapters. Because it 
focuses on Zionist perceptions and ideas about divisions of labor, race, economy, and the 
labor market, it relies almost entirely on Zionist or Hebrew sources.  
This focus on Zionist discourses allows the chapter to also address a conceptual 
matter, providing a second related axis along which I trace continuities between 
Mandatory Palestine and the history of post-1948 Palestine/Israel: the question of 
Zionism’s dependence on coercive power. In his critique of Gershon Shafir’s classic 
study, Land, Labor, and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1882-1914, 
Zachary Lockman calls attention to the overlooked role coercion played in “reali[zing] 
Zionism’s goals,” even prior to 1948. This elision occurs in part, because until 1948 the 
levers of coercive state power were unavailable to the Zionist leadership directly. As 
Lockman points out, while some coercive tools were available to the labor Zionist 
movement in its struggle for Hebrew labor during this period, until at least the mid-1940s 
the movement relied primarily on the coercive state action of the British to advance its 
objectives in Palestine.241 
 
241 Zachary Lockman, “Land, Labor and the Logic of Zionism: A Critical Engagement with Gershon 
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Since the British did relatively little to interfere in Palestine’s labor market, the 
struggle for Hebrew labor could be won in earnest only after the foundation of Israel, 
when the state apparatus was firmly in the hands of the labor Zionist leadership (and, as 
Lockman notes, also as a result of the Nakba and the “radical transformation” of the 
land’s demography).242 This did not mean, however, that when conceiving of the labor 
market, the labor Zionist leadership and its institutions did not give such coercive power 
consideration. As Lockman shows in his analysis of a 1927 text by labor Zionist leader, 
Hayyim Arlosoroff (1899-1933), regardless of whether someone like Arlosoroff 
approved of such coercive measures, he saw the necessary power to enact them as 
decisively out of reach. The minutes of the Histadrut Executive Committee meeting I 
examine in the chapter’s first section, suggest that by 1942 some in the labor Zionist 
leadership had begun to reconsider this assessment. The sources used in the second and 
third sections of the chapter then provide an opportunity to examine how Zionist leaders 
(including those beyond the labor Zionist milieu) and experts viewed the use of coercion 
 
efforts in a “country with low a wage level,” by a people “with a European standard of needs,” were 
pursued “without using coercive means,” he came up short. The only truly comparable example Arlosoroff 
could find was, in fact, the South African one, where state coercion through legislation was the primary 
means for sustaining white workers’ “European” standards. Without addressing the morality of the steps 
taken by the South African state to protect white workers, Arlosoroff conceded that the toolset of state 
coercion South Africa employed was entirely out of labor Zionist’s reach in Palestine. However, since 
starting conditions in South Africa were similar, labor Zionism had no choice but to pursue a policy akin to 
that which eventually became euphemistically called “separate development.” As this chapter 
demonstrates, when the prospect of state power became arguably more tangible, labor Zionist leaders 
continued to consider the South African model, alongside other colonial models of labor market 
organization. 
242 Lockman, “Land, Labor, and the Logic,” 28. Here Lockman relies on the work of Michael Shalev on the 
Histadrut. Shalev, Labour and the Political Economy, 34-42. 
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in organizing the labor market when explicitly tasked with “seeing like a state,” following 
UNSCOP’s partition recommendation in late 1947.243 
The chapter’s first two sections demonstrate that by the early 1940s, as some in 
the Labor Zionist leadership warned of the demise of the Hebrew construction worker, 
discussions of the dangers of a colonial division of labor, first explored in the previous 
chapter, shifted in tone. Using the minutes of a 1942 meeting of the Histadrut’s Executive 
Committee and Solel Boneh’s leadership regarding construction work undertaken for the 
British (and American) war efforts, I show that although some Labor Zionist leaders held 
onto the question of whether such a division was morally justifiable, different questions 
altogether animated much of the discussion. Rather than framing the question as 
primarily one of morality and self-perception, they asked whether it was politically 
 
243 As the third section of this chapter demonstrates, some of the experts which the subcommittee in charge 
of planning the future Jewish state’s Ministry of Labor enlisted, were in many ways products of and 
participants in some of the key moments and movements in the twentieth-century history of expertise and 
social-scientific authority. A.L. Grünbaum (Ga‘aton), was a pioneer of the “national income accounting” 
which Timothy Mitchell has identified as pivotal in what he terms the “birth of the economy,” as well as 
the author of multi-year economic plans for the Israeli state after its establishment. Alfred Bonne, in turn, 
while an economic historian by training, dedicated much of his career to researching and writing about 
development economics. Both were products of post-World War I German academia and emblematic of the 
period of “twentieth century high modernism” which James C. Scott locates at the heart of his Seeing Like 
a State. Indeed, in making the case for the necessity of his four-year plan for Israel’s economy and the 
absorption of immigration, issued in 1950, Grünbaum repeatedly refers to the example of Walter 
Rathenau’s planning work as Germany’s Head of the Office of War Raw Materials during World War I. In 
Seeing Like a State, Scott identifies – even if with some trepidation as to the utility of the exercise – 
Rathenau and his plans for German mobilization as the “particular time, place, and individual,” in which 
twentieth-century high modernism was “born.” ISA-PMO-PMO-000d1o6; J. R., “Professor A. Bonne,” ha-
Riv‘on le-Kalkala, no. 25/26 (1960): 3–4; E. Kleiman, “A.L. Ga’aton and His Doctrine: His Contribution to 
Economic Research in Israel,” ha-Riv‘on le-Kalkala, no. 124 (1985): 41–46; Timothy Mitchell, “Fixing the 
Economy,” Cultural Studies 12, no. 1 (1998): 82–101; James C. Scott, Seeing like a State: How Certain 
Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven.: Yale University Press, 1999), 97-8; 
Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2002). On Grünbaum’s pivotal role in developing national income accounting through his study of 
the Jewish economy as a separate national economy in Mandate Palestine, see: Colin Danby, The Known 
Economy: Romantics, Rationalists, and the Making of a World Scale (London: Routledge, 2017), 40-42, 
46-7, fn. 12. 
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possible for the Labor Zionist movement to adopt such a division of labor and what 
would the ramifications of instituting such a colonial division of labor in Histadrut-led 
works be? Underlying these questions were concerns about the unfolding catastrophe of 
the Holocaust – the dimensions of which were not yet widely known – but also about the 
Zionist enterprise’s coercive power and international standing, and the visibility of 
racialized colonial divisions of labor. 
The third and fourth sections then fast-forward to September 1947, when, 
following the publication of UNSCOP’s recommendation for partitioning Palestine into 
Jewish and Arab states, the Zionist leadership established an Emergency Committee 
tasked with planning the administration of the future Jewish state. Following similar 
themes as the first two sections, these sections focus on how the future state’s “Arab 
labor question” was discussed in meetings and plans which experts proposed to the 
subcommittee charged with devising the future state’s Ministry of Labor.  
 
“The Lowest Rung”  
As noted in Chapter 1, during World War II Palestine became Britain’s second-largest 
military base in the Middle East, industrializing rapidly to meet British military needs. 
The central role of Palestinian construction workers in wartime construction projects, 
including those of the Histadrut’s own contracting and construction companies, raised 
concerns among Histadrut officials that Palestinians were gaining access to skills and 
expertise intended to set Jewish workers above and apart from them. Maintaining 
exclusive claims to modern technical expertise and knowhow, was, as the previous 
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chapters have shown, one tool through which labor Zionist institutions and workers 
pursued the conquest of labor in the construction industry. In a Histadrut Executive 
Committee meeting on 15 April 1942, these developments led Berl Repetur (1902-1989) 
of the Work Center (Merkaz ha-‘Avoda), and its longtime representative in Solel Boneh’s 
management, to ask whether, “it was already possible to carry out large works without 
the skilled Jewish worker?”244 Noting the dwindling and aging of the population of 
Jewish construction workers, Repetur decried the dangers that would face the “last 
remains” of Jewish construction workers when the war ended. David Remez (1886-
1951), the Histadrut’s Secretary General, explained that Jewish construction workers had 
in practice been on the lowest rung of the project of “building the land” for some time. 
With no security, and “after… years of trouble, of unemployment and of illness,” they 
would do anything to escape construction work.245 
Repetur and Remez’s assessments of the state of Hebrew labor in the construction 
industry in the early 1940s appear to have been accurate. The industry’s heavy reliance 
 
244 Protocol of Meeting of the Histadrut Executive Committee Secretariat with the Work Center and the 
Contracting Institutions, April 15, 1942, LMA, IV-208-2363C. The Construction Workers’ Association 
publication, In Years of Emergency (The “Camps” 1937-1947), provides a similar assessment of the 
growing preponderance of skilled Palestinian construction workers in the military construction projects 
during WWII, in a piece written by one L. Kantor. As with most of the material in the volume, Kantor’s 
piece is an excerpt from an earlier publication. His was published in MAPAI’s le-Ahdut ha-‘Avoda 
anthology series in 1944. Eliyahu Biletzki, ed., Be-Shnot Herum: ha-"Kampim" 1937-1947 [In Years of 
Emergency: The “Camps” 1937-1947] (Tel Aviv: Histadrut Po’alei ha-Binyan, 1956), 110-1. The Histadrut 
established its Work Center in 1927, immediately after the first incarnation of Solel Boneh declared 
bankruptcy. The Center’s role was to step into the vacuum left by Solel Boneh and serve as a contracting 
body, primarily as a stop gap in the face of Jewish unemployment. When Solel Boneh was re-established in 
1935, the Work Center continued to operate as the representative of Histadrut members employed by Solel 
Boneh and elsewhere. Repetur was a member of the Center’s managements since its establishment. 
Yaʻaḳov Goren, Berl Repetur: Hazon be-Maʻaseh ha-Yom-Yom [Berl Repetur: Vision in Everyday Life] 
(Ramat Efʻal: Yad Tabenkin, 1995). 
245 Protocol of Meeting of the Histadrut Executive Committee Secretariat with the Work Center and the 
Contracting Institutions, April 15, 1942, LMA, IV-208-2363C. 
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on “unskilled” temporary labor had, by the late 1930s, transformed it into an immigrant 
absorbing industry in which many Jewish immigrants found their first jobs in Palestine. 
More established settlers, especially the small but growing group of second-generation 
Zionist settlers, meanwhile, tended to gravitate towards industries such as metalwork, 
printing, as well as white-collar jobs.246 Following 1935’s construction “boom,” when 
roughly 16,500 Jewish workers were employed in the industry, the number of Jewish 
construction workers plummeted, to a low of roughly 5,000 in 1938, and then between 
7,000-9,000 in the early years of World War II.247  
The industry was also becoming increasingly Mizrahi. Among the shrinking 
numbers of Jewish construction workers, the share of Mizrahi Jews grew. By 1939, 
roughly twenty percent of Mizrahim worked in construction, compared to roughly 
fourteen percent of Ashkenazi Jews.248 By World War II’s final years, the Sephardic 
Jewish newspaper Hed ha-Mizrah reported, certain trades in Jerusalem’s construction 
industry, such as tile-laying, quarrying, stone cutting, and construction materials 
production (as well as occupations like municipal sanitation workers, caretakers and 
guards), were overwhelmingly populated by Mizrahim. The article’s author, S. Malakhi, 
claimed that the fact that so many Mizrahim remained in these trades, for which there 
 
246 Bernard D. (Dov) Weinryb, ha-Dor ha-Sheni be-Erets Yisraʼel ve-Darko ha-Miktsoʻit [The Second 
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was very little demand throughout the war’s construction standstill, had effectively 
transformed them into unskilled laborers, with no, or very low, permanent income. 
“Something like a sect [kat, although perhaps the term “caste,” is a more appropriate 
translation] limited to certain professions was created,” Malakhi wrote, stating he was 
unable to determine whether someone intended this to happen. The process did explain, 
however, the worsening state of Jerusalem’s Mizrahi population in his view.249 
  
Coolies East of Tel Aviv 
The question of the future of the Hebrew construction worker which arose during the 
April 15 meeting, overlay a cleavage between the members of the Executive Committee. 
Those members who expressed concern regarding the future of Hebrew labor in the 
construction industry, also expressed alarm at the exploitative conditions of Palestinian 
workers employed by Histadrut-owned firms. The representatives of the Histadrut’s Solel 
Boneh contracting company, meanwhile, were on the defensive, claiming they felt as if 
they were seated “on the accused bench” (‘al safsal ha-ne’eshamim) for exploiting 
Palestinians and forsaking the Hebrew worker. In their defense, they first denied they 
were hurting the “Arab worker” at all: If anything, Palestinians working for Solel Boneh 
were profiting. Secondly, the most important thing at stake, they argued, was not the 
future of Hebrew labor in a specific industry, but the existence of Solel Boneh as a tool of 
 
249 Hed ha-Mizrah, October 27, 1944; Davar, April 16, 1945. 
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economic power. Hiring more Jewish labor would mean losing government tenders or 
operating at a loss. Either could bring Solel Boneh’s downfall.250 
Several of the Histadrut Secretariat members rejected the company’s claims. In 
their view, the wage gap between Jewish and Palestinian workers was egregious. Ziama 
Aharonovich (1899-1970) (who would later change his name to Zalman Aran and 
become a long serving Israeli Minister of Education and one of the architects of the 
state’s education system in its first two decades), stated that regarding Solel Boneh’s 
existence as the foremost objective at present and condoning the employment of cheap 
Palestinian labor to preserve it, threatened the Histadrut with “a moral and political 
failure.” The reliance on underpaid Palestinian labor, he suggested, would place Jewish 
workers in Palestine in a colonial relationship with Palestinian Arabs: While “[f]or 
generations, the English worker has gained what he has based on exploiting the 
colonies,” Jews in Palestine, “with our small shoulders [here, Aharonovich turned to 
Yiddish: ‘mit undzere shmole pleytses’],” were in an entirely different position. The 
exploitation of Palestinian workers by Histadrut owned companies would expose 
Zionism, already “surrounded by enemies,” to a “most grave courthouse” after World 
War II ended.251 
Aharonovich’s invocation of the English worker’s relationship to Britain’s 
colonies recalled the Executive Committee’s 1929 memorandum to the High 
 
250 Protocol of Meeting of the Histadrut Executive Committee Secretariat with the Work Center and the 
Contracting Institutions, April 15, 1942, LMA, IV-208-2363C. 
251 Protocol of Meeting of the Histadrut Executive Committee Secretariat with the Work Center and the 
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Commissioner, discussed in chapter two, which similarly regarded a colonial division of 
labor in Palestine as a moral failure.252 But, unlike the authors of the 1929 Memorandum, 
Aharonovich now also called attention to the coercive power which instituting and 
maintaining such a division of labor required and which he thought the Zionist enterprise 
still lacked. Aharonovich thus indicated the oft-overlooked role of such power in labor 
Zionist politics, which Zachary Lockman has called attention to.253 The Histadrut, 
Aharonovich implied, was no British Empire. If it adopted such exploitative practices 
now, retribution would surely come later.254  
For Hillel Dan of Solel Boneh, these arguments were irrelevant. The goal of his 
work, he stated, was to increase the Jewish population in Palestine. For this, a strong 
Solel Boneh was crucial. “Should that matter be endangered,” Dan clarified, he would 
grant it precedence over any moral question: 
if I have no other way [to guarantee a Jew’s right to exist in Palestine or 
elsewhere] – I am willing to exploit an Arab as well. This is not a question of us 
exploiting a colony to send someone money. We need to force our way in this 
land to sustain ourselves [emphasis in the original], to live.255 
 
 
252 See fn. 180 above. 
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Dan’s argument was simple, its existential tenor likely forged in light of events in 
Europe, even if the reality of Nazi death camps had not yet come into full view: If an 
exploitative division of labor was necessary to assure Jewish life in Palestine, Dan 
argued, so be it. This, to him, was altogether different from the question of the English 
working class’s gains from British colonialism. Whether others would agree was another 
matter. Dan did not fear anyone holding the Histadrut accountable, as Aharonovich did. If 
Solel Boneh’s approach was successful, he argued, that is, “if we are a force (be-mida 
she-niheye koakh)…, we will have what to respond to such accounting.” The sort of 
coercive power Aharonovich thought Zionists in Palestine lacked, Dan indicated, was 
close at hand. 
Golda Meyerson (later, Meir) (1898-1978), also of the Histadrut’s Secretariat, 
positioned herself as a mediator between the sides. She considered the question of 
Hebrew labor in construction crucial. On the other hand, she, like Hillel Dan, “was never 
concerned,” from a moral standpoint, that the Histadrut was “causing injustice to the 
Arabs,” even if this was hard to explain to socialists elsewhere. Yet, when Meyerson 
expressed what did concern her, she also shed light on what might have prevented such 
broader understanding – the institution of a racialized division of labor.256 
Undertaking a government tender with Palestinian workers as Solel Boneh’s 
leadership desired to do, Meyerson argued, was only justifiable if it ensured that future 
works would employ Hebrew labor. Moreover, there were particular projects which 
 
256 Protocol of Meeting of the Histadrut Executive Committee Secretariat with the Work Center and the 




Meyerson thought it was important to carry out solely with Hebrew labor. This was the 
case when tenders brought the Histadrut into contact with the relatively small US 
Military presence in Palestine, as in the building of the Tel Litvinsky base east of Tel 
Aviv. Works like Tel Litvinsky had “a large political role”, in Meyerson’s view. They 
should be accepted and performed with Hebrew labor out of “long term political 
calculations,” similar to those which motivated the “sending of Hebrew workers to 
Iran.”257 
In the Tel Litvisnky case, these “political calculations,” had a specifically 
American twist. They should “prove [to the Americans] that the Hebrew worker can carry 
out such work[s], not just the Hebrew contractor” [emphasis in the original, NBZ]. The 
Tel Litvinsky works provided an opportunity to impress upon US forces – and, 
presumably, political actors – the vitality of Zionism’s undertaking. Meyerson’s concerns 
about US perceptions were rooted in her assumptions about how US officials thought of 
Jews. “Immense buildings have been built by Jewish contractors in New York, but a 
Jewish worker has not been seen there,” Meyerson noted. It was crucial therefore to 
“prove to the Americans… that the Hebrew worker there is doing the whole job, from 
start to finish, [and] not ‘coolies’.”258 
Meyerson’s insistence on guaranteeing that American forces witness Jewish 
workers and not just Jewish capital in action, was rooted in labor Zionism’s commitment 
to refashioning not only the Jewish body but to performing that refashioning on the 
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international stage. Her use of the term “coolie” in reference to how American onlookers 
might perceive Palestinian Arab workers, however, is, at first blush, striking. As Madhavi 
Kale, Moon-Ho Jung, Lisa Lowe and others have shown, the meaning of the term 
“coolie” varied widely between and within the British Imperial and American contexts, 
shifting between “free” and “unfree” labor, from the nineteenth century onwards.259 
When the Milwaukee-raised Meyerson’s used the term to refer to Palestinian workers 
building a US military hospital in British-ruled Palestine, she could equally have been 
thinking of the British or American contexts for “coolie labor.” What did remain 
consistent about coolie, despite its “plasticity,” was its application to distinctly racialized 
and exploited laborers, and its association with the excesses of colonialism.260 This was 
no less true in Palestine: when politicians or authors in the contemporary Hebrew press in 
Palestine used the term “coolie,” they typically did so either to invoke its exploitative 
valances, its racial ones, or both. The implication of Meyerson’s use of the term then, was 
that to outside onlookers versed in the global color line, Palestinian workers working 
under Jewish managers could appear to be precisely such coolie labor.261  
Meyerson’s invocation of the workers sent to Iran, situates the discussions of the 
April 15, 1942 Executive Committee meeting in direct relation to the Solel Boneh works 
in Abadan, where Yehouda Shenhav locates the zero point of the encounter between 
Zionism and the Arab Jews.262 While the works at Abadan would not begin until later that 
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year, by April the contracting company had already set up an office in Baghdad.263 The 
encounter of the Zionist emissaries to Abadan with a system of coolie labor and its 
disparities, which positioned them “as white Europeans,” constituted a key component of 
what Shenhav describes as the “phenomenology of colonialism,” defining their attitude 
towards Mizrahi Jews.264  
If the colonial context of Abadan was culturally formative of the encounter 
between Zionism and Arab Jews, then the near-simultaneity, even precedence, of 
discussions about colonial divisions of labor and “coolies” in Palestine itself, coupled 
with the increase of Mizrahi Jews’ and Palestinians’ share in menial labor executed by 
the Histadrut and its organs, lent these hierarchies both a cultural basis and a structural 
foundation in the labor market. Taking the link which Meyerson draws between Abadan 
and Tel Litvinsky seriously, albeit for connections which Meyerson herself would have 
likely refused, takes us a step further towards understanding the colonial foundations of 
social hierarchies in 1950s and 1960s Israel. By drawing Shenhav’s study of the 
encounter at Abadan more closely into Palestine’s sphere, it allows us to do so through 
the sort of “integrated approach” to Mizrahi and Palestinian Arab history which Shenhav, 
building on Shohat and Shafir, espouses.  
Following Meyerson’s comments, to which their appeared to be little objection, 
the remainder of the Executive Committee’s meeting for the most part eschewed the 
explicitly colonial framework for discussing Solel Boneh’s use of Palestinian Arab labor. 
Instead, it turned to the by then familiar question of squaring the use of Hebrew labor 
 
263 Shenhav, The Arab Jews, 46 
264 Shenhav, The Arab Jews, 25-26. 
132 
 
with the supposedly “iron laws of economics.” That is, to the matter of employing Jewish 
workers at the expense of profitability. Berl Repetur and David Remez dominated the 
discussion, warning repeatedly of the dwindling ranks of Jewish construction workers, 
partially a result of the negligence of their affairs by the Histadrut in recent years.  
While the April 15, 1942 meeting concluded on a relatively positive note, the 
crisis in the construction industry it sought to address subsided only partially in the 
subsequent years of the War and after. The concerns Repetur, Remez, and others 
expressed during the April 1942 meeting, about the potential disappearance of the Jewish 
construction worker, extending beyond the conditions of the wartime economy, proved 
prescient. Between 1945-1948, the shortage in construction workers in Palestine was a 
major concern, prompting the establishment of training programs by the Histadrut and 
reaching even the British parliament.265 Compounded by a shortage in building materials 
and years of stagnant civilian construction, Palestine underwent a cross-sector housing 
crisis.266 The shortage, in both housing and workers, particularly skilled ones, continued 
beyond the 1948 war and the Nakba. As the following chapters show, the massive 
construction projects required by the Israeli state in its initial years were carried out to a 
significant extent by an underpaid, undervalued and largely “unskilled” construction 
workforce. These “lower” echelons of the construction workforce would quickly become 
the domain of Mizrahi Jews, Palestinian citizens, and after 1967, Palestinian non-citizen 
subjects from the Occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
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Peppered throughout the Executive Committee’s 1942 discussion about the 
construction industry and the future of the Hebrew construction worker are references to 
how the direction which the industry and the worker take would impact a future Jewish 
state. But these references are for the most part oblique. Talk of a state in 1942, in the 
throes of a global war, was necessarily abstract. The following sections examine how a 
different group of individuals, Zionist politicians and experts on economics and labor 
envisioned the future Jewish state’s labor market, immediately following UNSCOP’s 
recommendations for Palestine’s partition in September 1947. By then, the contours of 
the state, its boundaries, and its demography, appeared to be much more concrete. The 
experts were tasked specifically with proposing plans for how the new state should 
address its “Arab labor question.” This, in the committee’s view, was to be a pressing 
problem in a state whose population, according to the UNSCOP plan, would be roughly 
forty-five percent Arab, and whose boundaries would be open to the residents of the 
neighboring Palestinian Arab state and to the Middle East as a whole.  
 
Equivocating Equality 
In May 1947, three months after Britain announced its plans to withdraw from Palestine 
and transfer responsibility for the land’s future to the United Nations, the UN formed the 
United Nations Special Commission on Palestine (UNSCOP) to address this 
responsibility. The Committee, composed of representatives of eleven member states – 
Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, the Netherlands, Peru, 
Sweden, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia - was to serve in an investigative and 
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recommendation-making role. Committee members conducted a several weeks’ long visit 
to Palestine, toured Jewish refugee camps in Europe, met with representatives of the 
Yishuv’s various political strands in Palestine and with representatives of several Arab 
nations in Beirut. They did not, however, meet with Palestinian representatives. The Arab 
Higher Committee boycotted UNSCOP on the grounds that Britain’s transfer of authority 
to the UN was illegal. UNSCOP issued its recommendations for partitioning Palestine 
into Arab and Jewish states with a separation zone under international administration 
running from Jerusalem to Jaffa, on September 3, 1947 (Fig. 3.1).267 
Even prior to UNSCOP’s establishment, the Yishuv leadership began preparations 
for an eventual transition of power from the British to a sovereign Jewish state. Then, in 
October 1947, the Yishuv institutions launched the Emergency Committee, to begin 
planning the structures of the future state’s government, and the divisions of 
responsibility and authority within it.268 The Committee’s head was David Ben Gurion, 
and it included eight subcommittees, each responsible for a number of related topics, 
according to members’ expertise. 
 
267 The partition plan was based on the proposal of a majority of the member nations. Three nations – India, 
Iran, and Yugoslavia – proposed a federative solution, rather than partition. For an analysis of the UNSCOP 
report and its relationship to interwar discourses about partitions, population “transfer,” and “minorities” in 
the Middle East, see: Laura Robson, States of Separation: Transfer, Partition, and the Making of the 
Modern Middle East (Oakland: University of California Press, 2017), 132-134. UNSCOP’s full report and 
additional related documents can be found online at: Economic Cooperation Foundation, “UNSCOP Report 
(1947),” https://ecf.org.il/issues/issue/454 [last accessed: July 12, 2020].  
268 Jonathan David Fine’s, A State is Born: The Establishment of the Israeli System of Government, 1947-
1951, translated posthumously from the Hebrew in 2018, dedicates its first part to the work of the 
Emergency Committee, and is, as far as I am aware, the only study to do so extensively. Accordingly, I 
draw much of the descriptive narrative about the Emergency Committee and its work from Fine’s volume. 
Although Fine used the Committee’s planning for the future Labor Ministry as one of his two case studies 
alongside the Ministry of the Interior, his study is for the most part an institutional history and he does not 
mention any discussions or documents regarding the projected 45% of the population who were to be 
Palestinian according to the partition plan. Jonathan David Fine, A State is Born: The Establishment of the 




Fig. 3.1. Palestine Plan of Partition, United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, 1947. 
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Subcommittee C, headed by Yitzhak Gruenbaum ( 1970-1879 ), a former head of the 
Jewish Agency’s Departments of Immigration and Labor, who had been a member of 
Polish parliament before immigrating to Palestine in 1933, was responsible, among other 
matters, for planning the state’s Labor Ministry. Jonathan Fine rightly points out that of 
all the administrative issues the Yishuv would have to tackle as it transitioned into a state 
government, labor was one in which the Zionist institutions had robust structures and 
experience to build on. While these pre-existing institutions, primarily the Jewish 
Agency’s Department of Labor, would likely serve as a basis for the new ministry, they 
would also have to undergo significant changes in scope, responsibilities, and 
structure.269 
Alongside questions of staffing, physical structures to occupy the future 
ministry’s offices, and other matters which all subcommittees were required to address, 
Subcommittee C’s planning for the Labor Ministry also included several unique 
challenges. These were rooted in part in the need to incorporate duties previously handled 
by the Mandate Government’s Department of Labor (established in 1942), such as 
workplace safety regulation and inspection alongside the responsibilities and functions of 
the Jewish Agency’s Department of Labor.270 However, in the eyes of some 
subcommittee members and the experts enlisted to assist them, the “central question” 
which the move from the Jewish Agency’s Department of Labor to planning a 
 
269 Fine, A State is Born, 73, 85-7. 
270 Fine, A State is Born, 84-90. 
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government labor ministry presented the subcommittee with, and one which Fine does 
not address, was “the Arab labor question.”271  
As mentioned above, according to the UNSCOP’s recommended partition plan, 
which at the time of the Emergency Committee’s establishment was still the primary 
blueprint for the future states, this population would be comprised of roughly fifty-five 
percent Jews and forty-five percent Palestinian Arabs. According to this plan, the so-
called “Arab labor problem” a major external threat from the perspective of Zionist 
colonization and settlement since the late-Ottoman period, would to a significant degree, 
become an internal question for the new state to tackle.272 
As much of the critical literature on the conquest of labor has shown, some of the 
strategies adopted or considered by the Yishuv until 1947 to address this “problem” – the 
racially differentiated wages and concepts of each group’s standards of living, often 
summarized by Zionist spectators as the problem of “cheap Arab labor” – paid lip-service 
to, or even genuinely sought to address the profound inequalities between Jewish and 
Arab workers. However, such egalitarian considerations were time and again forsaken or 
deferred in favor of the immediate interests of Jewish workers and the “Hebrew 
economy.” Indeed, Mandate Palestine’s “dual economy” – even if it was largely an 
abstraction which the land’s actual economic conditions, interactions and transactions 
repeatedly refuted – nonetheless provided the Yishuv with a license to not only disregard, 
 
271 ISA-no-no-0007e6x: Dr. A. Boneh, “The Problem of Arab Labour Within the New Jewish State,” 
September 30, 1947; Dr. L. Grünbaum, “He‘arot le-Hasdarat Shuq ha-‘Avoda ba-Medina ha-Yehudit” 
[Notes for the Organization of the Labor Market in the Jewish State], January 19, 1948[?]; Lavi Schneider, 
“Hasdarat ‘Inyanei ‘Avoda ba-Medina ha-‘Ivrit” [Organizing Labor Matters in the Hebrew State], n.d. 




but constantly position its “own” economy against an Arab one. In the new state, 
however, such a separation would present a wholly different challenge. 
Subcommittee C’s planning efforts were thus faced with a set of foundational 
questions regarding the racially divided labor market: Could the new state preserve the 
Yishuv’s Mandate-era approach built on economic segregation, unequal wages and 
rights, precedence for Hebrew labor, and preference for Jewish economic interests? What 
would such a preservation entail? If continued segregation was not a viable option, what 
were the alternatives? What kind of economic responsibilities would the new state have 
towards its nearly 500,000 projected Palestinian citizens? 
Before examining the work of Subcommittee C, a discussion of the Yishuv’s 
plans for managing a population of nearly 500,000 Palestinian citizens on the eve and 
during the initial stages of the 1948 War, begs addressing one of the oldest and thorniest 
historiographical debates regarding the events of the war: to what extent did the Yishuv’s 
leadership plan the mass expulsion of Palestinians during the 1948 War? It may be 
tempting to read the evidence presented, in this section and the following one, of plans 
proposed within the Yishuv leadership for a future which did not envision a Palestinian 
Nakba, as indicative of the unplanned nature of Palestinian expulsion. I do not think 
however that such a reading would be supported by the evidence itself. There is little 
reason to assume that if there had been plans for expulsion, the members of 
Subcommittee C and the experts they enlisted would have been privy to them. 
The subcommittee’s early 1948 discussions reveal the extent to which its 
members viewed the inequality of the Mandate period’s labor market as deeply ingrained 
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in a set of economic, cultural, and social differences between Palestine’s native Arab 
population and the Jewish settler population. In a January 11, 1948 summary document, 
the subcommittee’s head, Yitzhak Gruenbaum, flagged the institution of a minimum 
wage as one step which would need to be taken immediately once the state begins 
governing. A minimum wage, Gruenbaum argued, was necessary to “establish equality in 
the labor market and terminate the competition of cheap labor.”273 During Subcommittee 
C’s meeting two weeks later, however members of the subcommittee expressed 
reservations as to the advisability of Gruenbaum’s statement regarding “establishing 
equality,” in light of the existing wage gaps between Palestinian Arab and Jewish 
labor.274 
Moshe Shapira (1902-1970) of the religious Zionist Ha-Po‘el ha-Mizrahi party, 
suggested that given the deep “difference” between the “level” of Jews and Arabs, 
Gruenbaum remove the references to “equality,” and leave only the language about 
“instituting a minimum wage.” Shapira resorted to a qualifying discourse by now familiar 
in Zionist circles, stating that, “with all our desire to bring forth equality, there is no 
doubt that some time will pass before this will be fulfilled…. At present, we should not 
commit to achieving equality, something the state will not be able to do.”275 Avraham 
Katznelson of MAPAI expressed a similar sentiment, even as he stated that he understood 
 
273 “Maskanot” [Conclusions], January 11, 1948, ISA-no-no-0007e6x. 
274 Subcommittee C Meeting Protocol for the day of 25.1.48, January 25, 1948, ISA-no-no-000s6m1. 
275 Subcommittee C Meeting Protocol for the day of 25.1.48, January 25, 1948, ISA-no-no-000s6m1. This 
argument regarding the supposedly objective “difficulty” of achieving the desired equality between Jews 
and Arabs in Palestine and the amount of time doing so required, was not a new one. It also recurred, in a 
more elaborate fashion, in some of the expert reports examined in the following section. For prior instances 
of the argument see: Rokach, “Ptiha: Toldot Kibush Miktzo‘a ha-Even ve-ha-Sid” [Introduction: Chronicles 
of the Conquest of Stone and Lime], n.d., LMA, IV-320-11. 
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that establishing a minimum wage seeks to replace the principle of Hebrew labor, a 
principle “which has no place in the state.” In that case, he argued, he agrees that the 
summary “should not particularly emphasize the matter” (ein lehavlit et ha-davar be-
meyuḥad), presumably referring to the concerns voiced by Shapira.276 
Gruenbaum’s response to the two appears, at first, to be unequivocal: “It is 
obvious that in the [Jewish] State,” he replied, “neither the conquest of labor nor the 
principle of Hebrew labor will be discussed.” He was quick to qualify this statement, 
however, by noting that there will be two problems, that of cheap labor, and the need to 
guarantee that all unskilled work does not pass into Arab hands. The only distinctions the 
state would be able to make regarding the right to certain jobs, Gruenbaum states, would 
be between citizens and between foreign nationals who enter the country illegally. The 
minimum wage, accordingly, will be the only device at the state’s disposal to address the 
problem of cheap labor.277 And yet, shortly after Gruenbaum made such assured 
statements about the necessity to forsake the principle of Hebrew labor and its conquest, 
and the impossibility of a policy discriminating between citizens within the future state, 
three expert memoranda submitted to the committee suggested various ways to sustain 
the first two and institute the latter. 
 
 
276 Subcommittee C Meeting Protocol for the day of 25.1.48, January 25, 1948, ISA-no-no-000s6m1. 
277 Subcommittee C Meeting Protocol for the day of 25.1.48, January 25, 1948, ISA-no-no-000s6m1. 
Following Gruenbaum’s clarification, one Y. Rabinowitz, attending the meeting as an “expert on labor 
affairs,” suggested that instead of removing the reference to equality altogether, a more measured statement 
that the minimum wage “will lead to equality,” could be introduced. The minimum wage, he sought to 
remind those present, would also be important in preventing the continued exploitation of Palestinian Arab 
workers by Arab employers.  
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Planning a Division of Labor 
The authors of the three memoranda found in Subcommittee C’s archival records, were 
Alfred Bonne (1899-1960), A.L. Grünbaum (Ga‘aton) (1898-1984), both leading 
economists, and Lavi-Yitzhak Schneider (Shani-Or) (b. 1871), a high-ranking 
administrator in the Mandate government’s Department of Labor.278 Despite writing the 
memoranda at different moments – one before the civil war stage of the 1947-1949 war 
and the Nakba began, and the other two in the shadow of the fighting – all three authors’ 
plans were rooted in the demographic estimates of the UNSCOP plan. That is, they were 
plans for a Jewish state in which nearly half the population would be Palestinian Arabs. 
When Alfred Bonne authored his 4-page memorandum, “The Problem of Arab 
Labour within the New Jewish State,” on September 30, 1947 – less than a month after 
UNSCOP published its partition proposal – the Yishuv had yet to establish its Emergency 
Committee.279 The document opens with Bonne’s calculations, based on UNSCOP’s 
Report, of the size of the future state’s Arab population. He estimates a total non-Jewish 
 
278 Bonne and Grünbaum would both assume important roles in economic research and policy making in 
the early decades of the state. Bonne headed the Department of Economics at the Hebrew University and 
was instrumental in founding the university’s School of Social Sciences in 1953. Grünbaum, would author 
a series of important plans and research projects at the invitation of the Prime Minister’s office, the Israeli 
Bureau of Statistics and the Bank of Israel. See: J. R., “Professor A. Bonne”; Kleiman, “A.L. Ga‘aton u-
Mishnato”; Michael Michaely, “ha-Hug le-Kalkala ba-Universita ha-‘Ivrit: Yamei be-Reshit - me-Tatspit 
Ishit [The Department of Economics of the Hebrew University Early Days — from a Personal 
Observation],” ha-Riv‘on le-Kalkala 54, no. 3/4 (December 2007): 417–38. The head of Subcommittee C, 
Yitzhak Gruenbaum, commissioned a fourth report from Eliezer Be’eri (Bauer), an Arabist and a leading 
member of the Department of Arabic Activities of the binational Marxist Ha-Shomer Ha-Tza‘ir movement, 
however I have been unable to locate the report in the subcommittee’s records. 
279 Although it was likely the earliest report written, it appears to have been the last of the three to reach the 
subcommittee, as Bonne submitted it only on March 3, 1948. If the document’s letterhead is any indication, 
Bonne likely wrote the report as part of his work at the Jewish Agency’s Jewish Research Institute. Alfred 
Bonne, “The Problem of Arab Labour within the New Jewish State,” ISA-no-no-0007e6x. 
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population, “the bulk of which are Arabs,” of between 470,000-480,000.280 Among the 
“grave [political and economic] problems,” which such a large Arab “minority” in the 
new Jewish state would create, Bonne regards that of labor as the foremost economic 
difficulty. How, he asks, would “such an enormous number of Arab… workers and 
producers,” impact the “Jewish economy”?281 
This problem, Bonne explains, was not entirely new. In fact, it was similar to that 
which the large Palestinian Arab population in areas of Jewish settlement constituted for 
the Jewish economy up until that point. In the past, Bonne continues, the Yishuv 
attempted to handle this problem by establishing “a dual economy,” intended to protect 
the “high economic and social level” of the Jewish sector against cheaper Arab labor and 
commodities. Ideally, partition would have enabled the continuation of such economic 
segregation. However, UNSCOP’s plan, “burden[ed]” the Jewish state with a significant 
Palestinian Arab population, risking “extremely oppressing effects on the Jewish capacity 
of competition.”282 Therefore, Bonne’s memorandum proposes three possible approaches 
to “tackle” the problem: 
(a) The Arab worker within the Jewish State has free access to the Jewish labour 
market, enjoying the same rights as his Jewish colleagues; 
(b) The admittance of Arab workers to the Jewish labour market is governed by a 
quota, which may be revised from time to time, its size to be determined by the 
needs and interests of the Jewish economy; 
 
280 Bonne begins with a figure of 416,000 Arab citizens, which “together with the Bedouins… would come 
to between 470,000 and 480,000 souls as against 500,000 Jews.” Bonne’s figures somewhat misrepresent 
UNSCOP’s estimates. The report estimates that the population of the proposed Jewish state would consist 
of 498,000 Jews, 407,000 “Arabs and others,” and states that “[i]n addition there will be in the Jewish State 
about 90,000 Bedouins, cultivators and stock owners who seek grazing further afield in dry seasons.” 
United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, Report to the General Assembly, Vol. 1, 54; Bonne, “The 
Problem,” ISA-no-no-0007e6x. 
281 Bonne, “The Problem,” ISA-no-no-0007e6x.  
282 Bonne, “The Problem,” ISA-no-no-0007e6x. 
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(c) The system of “dual” economy will be continued within the new Jewish State. 
In this event, the [a]uthorities of the Jewish State will carry on the policy, 
pursued by the Mandatory, of ignoring the discrimination practiced against the 
Arab worker within large sections of the Jewish economy.283 
 
In Bonne’s view, the first approach – free (and equal) access to the labor market, 
for all citizens of the new state – seriously threatened the “remarkable achievements” of 
the Jewish economy thus far. Simply abolishing the “policy of exclusive Jewish work” 
which enabled this achievement, would result in an “immediate… flooding of the Jewish 
labour market with cheap Arab workers.”284 Employers could not be expected to prefer 
more expensive Jewish workers. Jewish workers, including new immigrants, would face 
reduced job opportunities, wages would drop, and the new state would draw significant 
Arab labor migration from neighboring countries. Bonne’s conclusions in this respect are 
unequivocal: even if a policy that restricts Palestinian citizens’ access to the labor market 
causes “grave apprehensions,” granting them free and equal access, “appears impossible." 
An approach to organizing the labor market which Bonne himself might refer to as a 
“progressive” one, as will be seen below, appears to him out of the question. The 
question, then, becomes what restrictions should be implemented and how.285 
The second approach Bonne evaluates involves setting an adjustable quota for 
admitting Palestinian citizens as employees into the Jewish sector. This quota would be 
periodically evaluated and altered in accordance with the sector’s needs. “Central control 
offices” would issue labor cards for Arab workers eligible for employment, as well as 
 
283 Bonne, “The Problem,” ISA-no-no-0007e6x. 
284 Bonne, “The Problem,” ISA-no-no-0007e6x.  
285 Bonne, “The Problem,” ISA-no-no-0007e6x. 
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administer their use. Only workers who had such labor cards would be eligible for 
employment. Bonne’s description of this option is the driest and most technical of all 
three. This is likely indicative of his preference for it, although he does not state so 
explicitly. He describes the quota system’s main drawback as the “not inconsiderable” 
administrative effort it would require. And even so, he remarks, there is sufficient 
experience in instituting such systems elsewhere to allow for their adoption and 
adaptation. 
Finally, Bonne turns to describing the third option: continuing the present system 
of a “dual economy.” That is, “a voluntary separation of the Jewish and Arab economic 
sector, and the maintenance of bars to ‘foreign’ labour.” Bonne raises two “grave 
objections” to this option. The first is a moral argument, of sorts. Bonne assumes that that 
the state which will exhibit a “strong progressive trend,” is unlikely, to adopt such a 
policy. The most difficult aspect for such a state, he believes, would be to “maintain an 
attitude of indifference in… clashes [over] working places,” as the British did.286 The 
second argument against this option is considerably more involved and seems to be the 
real source of Bonne’s concern: the potentially “grave repercussions” on the international 
stage if labor organizations in the new state refuse to admit Palestinians into their 
ranks.287 
A “policy of discrimination” of this sort, Bonne writes, is not without precedent. 
The example he cites, that of South Africa, effectively extended Hayyim Arlosoroff’s 
 
286 Bonne, “The Problem,” ISA-no-no-0007e6x. What precisely Bonne means by flagging this aspect of a 
segregated economy as particularly problematic is somewhat vague. 
287 Bonne, “The Problem,” ISA-no-no-0007e6x. 
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comparison from two decades prior.288 Bonne claims that under the conditions faced by 
the new Jewish state, such a policy would be harder to pursue, if only for pragmatic 
reasons. In the South African case, Bonne states, “there are nearly no countries with a 
negro government that could retaliate [against the policy of racial discrimination of black 
South Africans].”289 The new Jewish state, however, would face a radically different 
situation. In particular, “the economic fate of numerous Jewish communities whose 
economic security is not infrequently menaced even now, will be at stake.” Although he 
does not state so explicitly, it is clear from this juxtaposition that what he has in mind is a 
sort of racial axis of fidelity and retaliation. The parallel to the relative absence of 
countries with “negro government[s],” being in this instance the abundance of countries 
with “Arab governments” in the proposed Jewish state’s immediate surroundings.290 
In contrast to Bonne’s more focused memorandum, Aryeh Ludwig Grünbaum’s 
plan, submitted to Subcommittee C on January 19, 1948 was intended to provide a 
blueprint for the entire labor market, specifically during what Grünbaum refers to as the 
state’s “development period”. Nonetheless, the “Arab labor question” is a primary focus 
of Grünbaum’s as well. His analysis of this question, meanwhile, appears at first to place 
him directly at odds with Bonne.291 
 
288 Lockman, “Land, Labor, and the Logic of Zionism” 22-27. 
289 Bonne, “The Problem,” ISA-no-no-0007e6x. 
290 Bonne, “The Problem,” ISA-no-no-0007e6x. 
291 Grünbaum, “He‘arot.” ISA-no-no-0007e6x. According to Grünbaum, during the development period the 
state’s primary objectives would be absorbing and providing housing to holocaust survivors currently in 
refugee camps in Europe, expanding the state’s economy to support the additional population, and 




Grünbaum argues that the state’s initial development period, which he estimates 
will last between 10-15 years, will generate a considerable number of new jobs, primarily 
in construction, public works, and government administration. Since existing production 
needs will persist, the new jobs generated by the development economy, will mean that 
this period will be characterized not by unemployment but “by [a need] to find working 
hands to undertake all the necessary jobs.”292 As a result, there will likely be very little 
competition over jobs between Jews and Arabs. The main concern regarding wages will 
not be their reduction due to “social swamping” by the cheap labor of the state’s Arab 
citizens, but exaggerated wages for all.293 Moreover, unless the “development period” 
will be substantially extended, the state would likely need to rely also on migrant labor 
and imports. The primary challenge of administering the labor market would thus be the 
prevention of irregular entry of “Arabs… from neighboring countries,” primarily the 
neighboring Palestinian state, and of general “chaos” in the labor market due to extensive 
Jewish immigration.294 
 
292 Grünbaum, “He‘arot.” ISA-no-no-0007e6x. Grünbaum acknowledges that this thesis and the plan he 
suggests in accordance with it, assume that necessary flows of capital, immigrants, materials, and 
technology would enter the new state during the development period. While there are numerous 
uncertainties and problems with that assumption, he states, those lay beyond the scope of the memorandum 
itself.  
293 Grünbaum, “He‘arot.” ISA-no-no-0007e6x. Grünbaum added the term “social swamping” in hand-
written English to the otherwise typed-Hebrew memorandum. The provenance of the term is not entirely 
clear, although to the extent that it has been historically used in English, it seems to have appeared 
primarily in the South African context in reference to Afrikaner fears of cheap Indian labor. University of 
Natal Department of Economics, Natal Regional Survey, Vol. 11, 2 (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 
1961); Patrick J. Furlong, “Improper Intimacy: Afrikaans Churches, the National Party and the Anti-
Miscegenation Laws,” South African Historical Journal 31, no. 1 (November 1994), 65, 71; Garth Stevens, 
“‘Racialised’ Discourses: Understanding Perceptions of Threat in Post-Apartheid South Africa,” South 
African Journal of Psychology 28, no. 4 (December 1, 1998), 209. The American author Harrison Rhodes 
also used the term in his description of changes to the demography of Chicago in the early twentieth 
century. Harrison Garfield Rhodes, American Towns and People (New York: Robert M. McBride & Co., 
1920), 90. 
294 Grünbaum, “He‘arot.” ISA-no-no-0007e6x. 
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Although Grünbaum’s analysis of the challenges is at odds with Bonne’s, his 
proposed solutions echo the administrative and bureaucratic approach of Bonne’s 
preferred suggestion. The key difference between Bonne’s proposal and Grünbaum’s, is 
that the latter insists that state involvement in the labor market should be, at least on the 
face of things, universally applied to all citizens. Grünbaum suggests creating a 
“rationalized” labor market, in which all individuals seeking employment will be 
assigned to specific trades by governmental employment bureaus. The bureaus would 
classify all workers according to their capabilities and direct them to employment 
according to the economy’s needs. Each worker will receive a labor card, detailing skills, 
level, and designated employment. Employers, meanwhile, would be prohibited from 
hiring individuals without an employment card.295 Such a system, Grünbaum argues, 
would ensure efficient use of the labor force during the crucial stages of the development 
period. It would also curtail the threat of the entry of “unwanted foreign Arabs” into the 
labor market, without breaching the UN partition decision’s guarantee of free travel 
between the new Arab and Jewish states.296 
 
295 Grünbaum, “He‘arot.” ISA-no-no-0007e6x. Aware of the totalitarian connotations of such an approach, 
Grünbaum looks to British postwar employment policies, according to which the unemployed were 
required to accept any form of “suitable employment” offered to them. Somewhat masking the extent to 
which his proposal goes beyond the British policy, Grünbaum argues that if “England, a land with a distinct 
liberal tradition,” has adopted such an approach, there was “no reason to be ashamed of taking parallel 
measures.” Grünbaum appears to base this reference on an International Labour Review article regarding 
“postwar manpower problems” in Europe, although, as noted above, the precise details of his proposal 
seem to take the various “manpower budget” policies of European countries considerably further in terms 
of the coercion they entail. “Post-War Manpower Problems in Europe,” International Labour Review 55, 
no. 6 (1947): 485–511. 
296 Grünbaum, “He‘arot.” ISA-no-no-0007e6x. Citizens of the new Arab state would be able to travel freely 
between their state and the Jewish state, but employment will normally remain restricted to labor card-
holding citizens. At the same time, the labor card system could also be extended to foreigners when 
necessary, allowing for the introduction of temporary migrant labor. 
148 
 
Grünbaum explicitly rejects instituting separate employment bureaus for Arab 
citizens of the state, a practice which he argues “gives the impression of their 
discrimination” (me‘oreret et ha-roshem shel haflayatam le-ra‘a), and manifests a 
“politics” he describes as “unwanted and even impossible, for a number of political and 
moral reasons.”297 What potential competition there still might be between the new 
state’s Arab and Jewish population, despite the abundance of employment offered during 
the development period, will in Grünbaum’s view be mitigated further by two factors: 1) 
the inability of the state’s Arab citizens to engage in all but unskilled labor during this 
initial period; and 2) the continued material support of non-governmental Zionist 
institutions for Jews in “conquest labor (‘avoda kibushit) in the village, quarries, ports, 
etc.”298 Thus, Grünbaum adopts the notion of Palestinian “backwardness,” and suitability 
primarily to unskilled labor which characterized and justified the racial division of labor 
during the Mandate period.299 He also endorses, like Bonne, the continuation of the 
conquest of labor, through the subsidization of Jewish workers – increasing their real 
income using non-governmental funds while nominally maintaining equal pay for equal 
work. It appears clear that Grünbaum’s main concern was not discrimination per se, but 
rather its “impression.” 
Although he states in the memorandum’s summary that, “on principle, it is 
prohibited to discriminate against the Arab citizens of the Jewish state,” Grünbaum’s plan 
is rife with discriminatory practices. These are couched in terms of cultural differences 
 
297 Grünbaum, “He‘arot.” ISA-no-no-0007e6x. 
298 Grünbaum, “He‘arot.” ISA-no-no-0007e6x. 
299 Grünbaum, “He‘arot.” ISA-no-no-0007e6x. 
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and differential needs. In this respect, his plan proposes no more than a slightly 
“softened” version of the racial division of labor that evolved during the Mandate period. 
It institutes a preference for an effectively segregated employment market, in which the 
employment bureaus will be instructed to “usually direct Arab workers to Arab 
workplaces and Jewish workers to Jewish workplaces.”300 And it endorses a continued 
racial wage gap, using non-governmental subsidies for Jewish workers, even in 
government funded public and development works.301 
The final proposals regarding the organization of the labor market to be discussed 
here, are those submitted to Subcommittee C by Lavi Schneider (Shani-Or). A generation 
the senior of the two economists, Bonne and Grünbaum, Schneider was an administrator 
in the Mandate government’s Department of Labor. Unlike Bonne and Grünbaum, 
Schneider was a permanent expert member of the subcommittee. He provided detailed 
proposals for the structure of the future state’s Labor Ministry, a lengthy plan for the 
 
300 The memorandum further states that, “only Arabs who have been employed in Jewish workplaces for a 
long period of time and who are citizens of the Jewish state, will be allowed to stay in their places of 
work.”   
301 Grünbaum’s discriminatory assumptions extend into the memorandum’s appendices on housing 
construction and development works. In the housing appendix, Grünbaum assumes no need for housing 
construction in the rural Arab sector, arguing that self-construction during the agricultural “dead season” is 
the norm there. In doing so, he directly contradicts the Mandate government estimates he otherwise relies 
upon, as these suggested that it was precisely in the Arab villages where the need for housing was most 
acute. The development works appendix, meanwhile, relies on an assumption of the Arab citizens’ “low 
standard of living” to allot less schools, industry, and retail per one thousand Arab citizens than per an 
equal number of Jewish ones. Grünbaum does qualify the assumptions tied to the standard of living among 
Palestinian Arab citizens of the Jewish state somewhat, stating that the gap between them and between the 
Jewish citizens of the state may shrink after several years. Nonetheless, the memorandum suggests 




organization and administration of labor in the state, and a short memorandum dedicated 
specifically to the “Administration of the Arab Labor Market.”302 
In both the lengthier plan and the short memorandum, Schneider divides the 
“Arab labor question” into three issues, which recall those discussed by Bonne and 
Grünbaum: 1) the level of wages; 2) regulating employment; and, 3) preventing entry of 
foreign workers from neighboring countries. Regulating the “Arab Labor problem”, 
Schneider writes, will require “a range of legal, economic and administrative measures.” 
Such measures should “protect the national [i.e., Jewish] character of the economy, while 
maintaining the rights of the Arab citizens and proper relations with the Arab 
population.”303 
Like Bonne and Grünbaum, Schneider bases much of his analysis and 
recommendations on assumptions about the Palestinian citizens’ lower standard of living 
and the adjustment period which raising it to a “Jewish level” would require. To do so, 
Schneider turns to a theory of wages and consumption which had appeared occasionally 
in earlier discussions of the “cheap labor problem”: the idea that raising Arab wages and 
standards of living to those of Palestine’s Jewish population, could only be done 
gradually and over an extended period of time.304  
 
302 ISA-no-no-0007e6x: Schneider, “Hasdarat ‘Inyanei ‘Avoda”; Lavi Schneider, “Hasdarat Shuq ha-
‘Avoda ha-‘Aravi” [Organizing the Arab Labor Market], n.d; “Reshimat ha-Mehabrim she-Hegishu 
Tazkirim le-Va‘adat ha-Matzav” [List of the Authors who Submitted Memoranda to the Emergency 
Committee], ISA-no-no-000zqgc. The brief report about the Arab labor market is ostensibly an excerpt 
from the lengthier proposal. However, there are some differences between the two. Since neither is dated, it 
is difficult to establish whether one or the other represents an evolution of the proposal, although the order 
in which the documents are arranged in within the archival file potentially indicates that the lengthier report 
was likely received later. 
303 Schneider, “Hasdarat ‘Inyanei ‘Avoda,” ISA-no-no-0007e6x. 
304 See: Rokach, “Ptiha,” LMA, IV-320-11. 
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According to this theory, a swift equalization of wages would be economically 
disastrous. as populations with lower standards of living were not properly versed in 
consumption to ensure the continued circulation of capital within the economy. Rather, 
they would passively squander capital. In the context of Mandatory Palestine and in 
Schneider’s plan for the future Jewish State, this theory of consumption essentially 
granted license to a continuation of the wage gap between Palestinian Arabs and Jews. 
That is, until the consumption habits and needs of the lower-income Palestinian 
population would expand appropriately. In the meantime, Palestinian workers would “of 
course,” be paid a “fair wage, according to [their] needs.”305 
The solutions Schneider proposed to tackle the wage gap were similar to those of 
his peers. To ensure that new Jewish immigrants, especially, find their place in the labor 
market, a continued, if modified, “conquest” approach to labor should be considered. 
Employers would pay equal wages to all according to the “Arab standard,” and non-
governmental Zionist institutions would supplement the wages of Jewish workers so that 
they reach a more “appropriate” level.306 
Schneider also proposed a segregationist approach to conducting public works in 
particular, echoing some of the same concerns British officials expressed during the 
construction of the Haifa harbor.307 As wage discrimination between Arab and Jewish 
 
305 Schneider, “Hasdarat ‘Inyanei ‘Avoda,” ISA-no-no-0007e6x. 
306 Schneider, “Hasdarat ‘Inyanei ‘Avoda,” ISA-no-no-0007e6x. Schneider is insistent that any such 
subsidies, as well as all funds dedicated to encouraging Jewish immigration, funding settlements, and 
continuing the conquest of labor, should be sourced from non-governmental Zionist institutions. Funding 
these activities with government funds and taxpayer money, would no doubt meet resistance among the 
state’s Arab citizens and likely also the United Nations, as it would constitute a breach of the state’s 
obligation to equal treatment of all its citizens. 
307 See Chapter 2 above. 
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workers at the same workplace is “unwanted,” work in “public works, railway[s]… and 
port[s]” should be allotted to exclusively Jewish or Arab work groups, with the exception 
of tasks that require special expertise.308  
As for preventing the entry of “foreign workers”, Schneider suggested “avoid[ing] 
policing methods as much as possible, from which arises a smell of racial discrimination 
and xenophobia and [which] are not likely to improve the relationships between the 
groups.”309 Instead, he proposed instituting employment bureaus which would assign 
workers to all public works, most government and municipal jobs, and specific economic 
branches. The bureaus would exercise control and surveillance primarily through 
statistical methods, rather than through policing, comparing the numbers of assigned 
workers in each bureau to the numbers of employees in each workplace, while keeping 
in-person inspections to a minimum.310 
All three memoranda show that when faced with the potential of incorporating 
nearly 500,000 Palestinian Arab citizens into the proposed Jewish state, their authors 
embraced liberal, progressive rhetoric while remaining bound by, if not committed to, 
colonial and racial divisions of labor and hierarchies of skill. The three essentially 
proposed a continuation of policies tied to the principles of Hebrew labor and the 
conquest of labor – even as those were supposedly disavowed by the politicians who 
composed Subcommittee C – and endorsed various degrees of segregation in the post-
statehood labor market. In keeping with their self-perceptions as part of a progressive 
 
308 Schneider, “Hasdarat ‘Inyanei ‘Avoda,” ISA-no-no-0007e6x. 
309 Schneider, “Hasdarat ‘Inyanei ‘Avoda,” ISA-no-no-0007e6x. 
310 Schneider, “Hasdarat ‘Inyanei ‘Avoda,” ISA-no-no-0007e6x. Contrary to Grünbaum, Schneider does 
suggest separate regional employment bureaus for Arab citizens. 
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political project, Bonne, Grünbaum, and Schneider portrayed these aspects of their 
proposals as necessary evils, expressing their discomfort with them. They were also 
careful to designate what strategies in their view lay beyond the pale. As in the 
discussions of the Histadrut Executive Committee in 1942, these boundaries were set not 
only by what was deemed acceptable, but also, and perhaps even primarily, by what was 
considered possible. The events of 1948 dramatically altered the conditions the 
memoranda set out to address. Even so, the value of analyzing them goes beyond merely 
capturing a moment in the development of Zionist thinking about labor, race, political 
economy, and international politics. These seemingly soon to become irrelevant plans, 
provide an apt backdrop for the approach the Israeli state eventually adopted towards 
administering and organizing the radically different demographics, geography, and 
political economy the Nakba engendered. 
 
Grave Apprehensions 
The events of 1947-1949 – the civil war, the regional war, and most crucially the 
Palestinian Nakba – altered Palestine beyond recognition. Very little of what the 
UNSCOP plan and the November 29, 1947 United Nations vote on partition had 
suggested for the land’s future remained. There was no Palestinian Arab state. The 
Jewish state, the State of Israel, the founding of which its first Prime Minister David Ben 
Gurion, declared on May 14, 1948, was considerably larger than the one proposed by 
UNSCOP, swallowing through military force and armistice agreements roughly half of 
the Arab state’s promised territory. The legal movement across the new state’s borders 
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with its neighbors was heavily restricted and limited. Over 750,000 Palestinians were 
driven from their homes, leaving only a small minority of about 150,000 who were able 
to remain in the new state’s boundaries or to return to their homes within them in the 
years following 1948.311 The refugees included most of the Palestinian urban elites and 
political leadership. “What remained of the Palestinian people inside the nascent state,” 
Shira Robinson has noted, “was a poorer, more rural, less educated, and largely leaderless 
shadow of its former self.”312  
Of course, the “Arab labor problem” which Subcommittee C of the Yishuv’s 
Emergency Committee dealt with, had been radically altered as well. The tragedy of the 
Nakba had “lifted” the “burden,” which the economist Alfred Bonne saw in the inclusion 
of nearly half a million Palestinian Arabs in the proposed Jewish state, almost entirely.313 
So much so, that in the hundreds of pages of archival records documenting responses and 
discussions of A.L. Grünbaum’s “Four Year Development Plan,” from 1950, the 
Palestinian citizens in Israel – the same “Arabs” who had occupied a primary place in his 
memorandum to the Emergency Committee less than three years prior – are barely 
mentioned.314 
 
311 This did not mean that there was no illicit movement across these borders. Some Palestinians who fled 
their homes in what later became Israel during the 1947-1949 war, were able to return in subsequent years. 
Cohen, Good Arabs, Chapter 3; Robinson, Citizen Strangers, Chapter 3. Border smuggling was not limited 
to people, either. Haggai Ram’s forthcoming monograph explores the history of drug trafficking through 
Mandatory Palestine and then through Israel. Basma Fahoum examines the porousness of the Israeli state’s 
borders in her work on the history of tobacco in Palestine/Israel from the late-Ottoman period. See: Haggai 
Ram, Intoxicating Zion: A Social History of Hashish in in Mandatory Palestine and Israel (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, forthcoming). 
312 Robinson, Citizen Strangers, 30. 
313 Bonne, “The Problem,” ISA-no-no-0007e6x. 
314 Grünbaum, “He‘arot,” ISA-no-no-0007e6x; A. Ludwig, Grünbaum, Four Years Development Plan of 
Israel, 1950–1953 (Tel Aviv: Prime Minister’s Office, Department of Economic Research, 1950); ISA-
PMO-PMO-000d1o6; ISA-PMO-PMO-000vr4k; ISA-PMO-PMO-000vr4k. 
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Even so, the approach the Israeli state adopted to organizing this much diminished 
“Arab labor market,” resembled, if anything, the harshest of the policies presented in 
1947-1948 to Subcommittee C. The state’s policies seemed to bring together the gamut of 
policies which Bonne, Grünbaum, and Schneider rejected as too extreme, too blatantly 
discriminatory. Those policies from which, in Schneider’s words, “[arose] a smell of 
racial discrimination and xenophobia.”315 
Shortly after its independence, the nascent state imposed a military administration 
upon the Palestinian citizens within it. The military administration, which remained in 
place until 1966, introduced effective military rule over all Palestinian-majority areas. It 
included not only a work permit regime and but also imposed severe restrictions on 
Palestinian citizens’ freedom of movement. As in South Africa, Bonne’s baneful 
example, the Histadrut, which only grew in power after 1948, did not accept Palestinian 
citizens as equal members until 1959, and even then allocated their affairs to a separate 
Arab department.316 
Since the Histadrut’s labor exchanges were not nationalized and there were no 
Palestinian Histadrut members until 1959, during the 1950s the Ministry of Labor 
reluctantly opened a small number of dedicated labor exchanges for Palestinians. In 
addition to their small number and limited geographical spread, the exchanges were 
essentially limited to allocating relief work. The military administration thus cooperated 
 
315 Schneider, “Hasdarat ‘Inyanei ‘Avoda,” ISA-no-no-0007e6x. 
316 Already during the Mandate period, the Histadrut had made varying efforts to organize Palestinian Arab 
workers in an affiliated union, which was nonetheless separate from the Histadrut itself, the Palestine Labor 
League (PLL). This organization continued its activities until the Histadrut’s 1959 decision to accept 
Palestinians to its ranks. See fn. 347 below. 
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with the Histadrut and with the Ministry of Labor in limiting Palestinian citizens’ access 
to employment. It was precisely this coalescence of draconian policing, segregation, and 
exclusion which, as mentioned above, allowed the labor Zionist leadership, now helming 
the state, to finally pursue a policy of Hebrew labor successfully.317 
Palestinians in Israel thus found themselves cut off from potential markets for 
their agricultural produce and their labor, and in dire need of new means for economic 
survival. By the mid-1950s, work in agriculture and then construction work, primarily in 
Jewish locales, were by far the most widespread forms of wage-labor among Palestinian 
citizens, employing mainly men. In both, they found themselves competing for low 
wages primarily with Mizrahi Jewish immigrants, discriminated against, housed in transit 
camps or settled in remote areas, and “channeled into unskilled manual labor,” but 
nonetheless given distinct precedence by authorities over Palestinian citizens.318 
The state’s first decade also brought forth the near disappearance of the “Hebrew 
construction worker,” which members of the Histadrut Executive Committee’s 
Secretariat so feared in 1942 – at least as they likely imagined such a worker. As 
mentioned in the introduction to this dissertation, the forced migration of most 
Palestinians during the 1947-1949 war and the influx of European and Mizrahi Jews in 
 
317 Khalidi, The Arab Economy in Israel: The Dynamics of a Region’s Development, 34-49, 145; Shalev, 
Labour and the Political Economy of Israel, 34-42; Zeev Rosenhek, “The Political Dynamics of a 
Segmented Labour Market: Palestinian Citizens, Palestinians from the Occupied Territories and 
Migrant Workers in Israel,” Acta Sociologica 46, no. 3 (September 2003): 234-238; Lockman, “Land, 
Labor and the Logic of Zionism,” 28. For studies which have dealt more broadly with the experiences of 
Palestinian citizens in Israel during these initial decades and with the state’s mechanisms of control through 
a variety of analytical frameworks, see: Jiryis, The Arabs in Israel; Adel Manna, Nakba and Survival: The 
Story of the Palestinians Who Remained in Haifa and Galilee, 1948-1956 [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Van Leer 
Institute Press and ha-Kibbutz ha-Meuhad Publishing House, 2017) and the works cited in fn. 44 above. 
318 Jiryis, The Arabs in Israel, 304-305. 
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the 1950s into the new Israeli state, rendered large-scale construction projects an urgent 
priority across Israel/Palestine. The Israeli government initiated the construction of 
“development towns” (‘ayarot pituaḥ), new neighborhoods, agricultural settlements, and 
supposedly-temporary “transit camps” (ma‘abarot) within its new boundaries in the 
1950s and 1960s, to house immigration waves that tripled the countries Jewish 
population.319 
During the same period, the archetypal European Jewish Zionist “pioneers,” the 
ideal subjects of the then hegemonic labor Zionist movement, continued their withdrawal 
from physical labor in construction. The pre-state era ideals of Hebrew labor and building 
the land,” which had made construction a contested and ideologically celebrated line of 
work, remained in place. However, in line with the new state’s developing division of 
labor, the task of carrying out these ideals was rapidly racialized, falling to the state’s 
most marginalized populations.  
First, construction drew in Mizrahi Jews, who by 1957 made up roughly 40% of 
the industry’s workforce. These new immigrants, which the new state’s leadership largely 
perceived as “backwards” and “primitive,” were tasked with carrying the mantle of 
“Hebrew labor,” partially in the name of their own “development” and “physical 
regeneration.”320 Then, when the Jewish sector reached full employment in the late 
 
319 As mentioned in the introduction as well, at the same time, the need to shelter hundreds of thousands of 
Palestinian refugees in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and neighboring countries, led to the construction of 
a network of refugee camps. Ostensibly temporary, like the immigrant transit camps within Israel, as 
refugeehood became increasingly the Palestinian “norm” (constituting part of what is referred to as the 
“ongoing Nakba,” al-Nakba al-Mustamirra), Palestinian refugee camps in the West Bank, Gaza, and 
beyond grew into distinct urban formations. See footnotes 15 & 16 above. 
320 Khazzoom, Shifting Ethnic Boundaries; Bernstein and Swirski, “The Rapid Economic Development of 
Israel.” For the data regarding the percentage of Mizrahi Jews (classified under the heading of “Asian & 
African born”) in different industries, see fn. 21 above. 
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1950s, the construction industry increasingly came to depend also on Palestinian citizens. 
By 1962 Palestinian citizens were roughly twice as likely as Jewish citizens to be 
employed in construction. By 1971, they were roughly three times as likely.321 Israel’s 
division of labor after 1948 thus appeared more and more like the colonial ones which 
labor Zionists had for so long outwardly disavowed. This disavowal had been throughout 
the Mandate almost always conditional, its pursual deferred. “Now,” was almost never 
the right time to decline the benefits afforded by virtue of proximity to whiteness in a 
racially ordered world, or to refuse exclusionary and exploitative policies, even if they 
raised “grave apprehensions.” 
 
321 Jiryis, The Arabs in Israel, 304-305; Rosenhek, “Political Dynamics.”  
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CHAPTER 4: “WILL YOUR GOVERNMENT BE TAKING 
THEM TOO?” POLITICAL ECOLOGIES AND 
ECONOMIES OF STONE, 1948-1964 
In the years immediately following 1948, the stone quarries to the south of the Palestinian 
villages of Bi‘na, Deir al-Assad, Majd al-Krum, and Nahf (henceforth the Shaghur Valley 
quarries, although they are often referred to separately in various sources), became a 
point of contention and contestation between locals, the nascent Israeli state, competing 
labor unions, and several commercial operations. The quarries were located primarily in 
an area which local landowners had previously leased to the Mandate government during 
the final years of British rule, for the purpose of military training, but which under the 
new Israeli state became the target of competing ownership claims.322 Evidence as to 
whether all or some of the quarries were active prior to the lease to the Mandate 
government is vague. However, as early as 1949, locals who had previously relied 
primarily on agricultural production or on wage-labor in Palestine’s urban centers, began 
independently operating or working as wage-laborers in several of the quarries. The 
quarries then became their primary source of livelihood.323 
 
322 TNA: FO 371 (Foreign Office: General Correspondence from 1906-1966)/111060, “Memorandum of 
Protest to His Excellency the President of the State of Israel regarding the Usurpation of Lands of the Two 
Israeli Arab Villages Be’ni (sic.) and Deir-el-Assad, in Western Galilee by the Government of Israel,” 
February 16, 1954. 
323 TNA: FO 371/111060 “Memorandum of Protest”; Letter from Y. Shimoni to the Registrar of 
Cooperative Assocations, February 27, 1951, ISA-moital-moital-0011qgi; Letter from residents of Nahf to 
the Advisor on Arab Affairs in the Prime Minister’s Office, August 1, 1952, ISA-PMO-
ArabAffairsAdvisor-000fq6j. Interview with Hanna Ibrahim, Bi‘na, October 22, 2018. 
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In their search for new sources of income in the aftermath of 1948, the residents 
of the Shaghur valley villages were not unlike many of their Palestinian peers elsewhere. 
The Palestinian Nakba brought with it the forced migration of roughly 750,000 
Palestinians and the near complete destruction of Palestinian urban life. In its wake, the 
nascent Israeli state imposed a military administration upon the roughly 150,000 
Palestinian citizens who were able to remain within or return to the newly established 
state in the years following 1948 and who, for the most part, eventually became Israeli 
citizens. The military administration introduced severe restrictions on Palestinian 
citizens’ movement and employment. Palestinians in Israel thus found themselves cut off 
from potential markets for their agricultural produce and their labor, and in dire need of 
new means of economic subsistence. 
Examining the history of the Shaghur quarries after 1948, alongside several other 
quarries in the newly formed Israeli state, this chapter returns once again to the material 
and site which stood at the center of Chapter 2: stone and the quarry. This chapter 
examines how a confluence of factors spanning ecology, economy, politics, and race, 
made quarries into flashpoints between the state, business interests and the country’s 
most marginalized populations. Quarries emerged as such flashpoints as a result of 
Israel/Palestine’s geography and geology, the historical patterns of Zionist colonization, 
the ability of some Palestinians to remain within the new Israeli state despite the Nakba 
and the geographical location of those that remained, the attempts of the Israeli state to 
continue Zionism’s conquest of stone with the tools and power now available to it, and 
ongoing processes of racialization of physical labor.  
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Like other forms of physical labor, quarry work, which as Chapter 2 has shown 
was already racialized under British rule, became during the 1950s and 1960s further 
identified with Palestinian citizens and Mizrahi Jews. As this chapter will demonstrate, 
the realities of work and life in and around the quarry, were often brutal – marked by 
exploitation and precarity. At the same time, the quarry and the relationships forged with 
and within it, allowed these marginalized communities to rearticulate their self-
perceptions and shore up their material circumstances in the wake of traumatic 
dislocation. The chapter concludes by investigating how quarries as Palestinian and 
Mizrahi spaces left an indelible, if underrecognized, mark on Palestinian culture and 
played a pivotal role in early representations of Mizrahi Jews.  
 
Stubborn Formations 
Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, the Israeli state carried out massive construction 
of housing and infrastructure. These building enterprises, carried out by public and 
private contractors, were intended to “absorb” incoming immigrants, and strengthen the 
state’s hold over its territory. This was particularly true in territories which UNSCOP’s 
partition plan had originally designated as part of the future Arab state, where even in the 
aftermath of the Nakba, Palestinians often still constituted a majority. The state’s 
construction frenzy proved a catalyst for the introduction of skilled Palestinian 
construction workers into the “Jewish” labor market as early as 1949. It also created a 
growing need for construction materials such as cement, stone, and quicklime.324 
 
324 TNA: FO 371/75268. 
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To obtain the latter two materials in particular, the Israeli state found itself 
uncomfortably entangled with, if not dependent upon, the Palestinians who remained 
with its boundaries and were now its citizens. This dependency was equally rooted in 
how Mandate Palestine’s stone industry took shape, and in the events and aftermath of 
1948 and the Nakba. While Zionist attempts to monopolize other crucial production 
sectors during the mandate were often successful, effectively laying the infrastructural 
and economic foundations for the Israeli state, the “conquest of stone” (kibush ha-even) 
still remained from a Zionist standpoint, perilously incomplete.325  
As I have argued in the second chapter, the reasons for this failure were varied. 
Unlike cement production or electrification, Zionist efforts to enter quarrying and stone 
production during the Mandate, encountered an already established Palestinian quarrying 
industry which was not only relatively technically advanced, but also owned much of the 
stone-rich land where quarries could be opened. Thus, even the largest Zionist stone 
enterprise at the time, the Even va-Sid company, began as a partnership with Palestinian 
capitalists. In addition, Palestinian quarry and stone workers had better knowledge, skills, 
and expertise than their Jewish counterparts. In the initial years of “the conquest of 
stone,” Jewish quarry workers had, for the most part, learned the trade by apprenticing 
under Palestinian masters. British racial thinking about the “inherent” laboring capacities 
of Arabs and Jews, which associated the former with the hard, physical labor required in 
quarrying and the latter with more “technical” work, limited Jewish work on government-
 
325 See Chapter 1 regarding the Nesher Cement Company’s monopoly over cement production during the 
Mandate and beyond. For the history of another industrial endeavor which the Zionist movement 
successfully monopolized, electrification, see: Meiton, Electrical Palestine; Shamir, Current Flow. 
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operated quarries. Finally, the Zionist turn to quarry mechanization only produced limited 
success. 
The territorial patterns of Zionist colonization also structured the post-1948 stone 
quarrying industry. The pattern of Zionist land purchase during the years prior to the 
establishment of the state, generated a by now widely recognized overlap of high-quality 
agricultural soil and the Zionist so-called “’N’ of settlement” (figs. 4.1 and 4.2). At the 
same time, it also generated a significant mismatch: the areas of Mandate Palestine where 
the Zionist Yishuv owned land privately and collectively on the eve of 1948 – at the 
height of their pre-state expansion – were almost entirely misaligned with the land’s 
limestone deposits (fig 4.3).  
As part of the Nakba, Zionist forces drove out the Palestinian residents of some 
limestone rich areas which Israel was then able to include within its boundaries, 
particularly in the so-called “Jerusalem corridor.” This made it considerably easier for 
state authorities to facilitate the exploitation of deposits there.326 However, the two areas  
 
326 Indeed, Deir Yassin, the site of what was perhaps the most notorious massacre of the Nakba, and Lifta, a 
village whose “remains” have become one of the most iconic physical symbols of the devastation wrought 
upon Palestinian society during and since the Nakba, were both important nodes in the region’s quarrying 
industry. For a sense of the extent of the depopulation of the stone-rich Jerusalem corridor as a result of the 
Nakba, compare the lithographic map below (map 3) to the map documenting depopulated Palestinian 
locales published by the Zochrot organization. “Nakba Map,” Zochrot https://zochrot.org/en/site/nakbaMap 
[last accessed: June 15, 2020]. Rana Barakat, “Lifta, the Nakba, and the Museumification of Palestine’s 




Fig. 4.1 Classification of soil map. Sami Hadawi “MAP H: Palestine: 
Classification of Soil,” Palestinian Rights and Losses in 1948: A 
Comprehensive Study (London: Saqi Books, 1988), p. 200. Copied from 
Aida Asim Essaid, Zionism and Land Tenure in Mandate Palestine 






Fig. 4.2. Map of Jewish-owned land in Palestine c. 1947. From Aida Asim Essaid, 
Zionism and Land Tenure in Mandate Palestine (London: Routledge, 2014), 7. 
























Fig. 4.3. Lithologic map of Israel and Environs with Legend. Copied from A. Sneh, M. 
Rosensaft, 2014, “Major Exposed Lithologic Units of Israel and Environs (1:500,000),” 
Geological Survey of Israel http://gsi.gov.il/?CategoryID=698&ArticleID=1768. 
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of the state in which there remained a Palestinian majority, the Galilee and the so-called 
Triangle area (Arabic: al-Muthalath, Hebrew: ha-Meshulash), an area spanning from 
Kafr Qassem in the south to Wadi ‘Arra in the north, were also home to the majority of 
limestone deposits within its boundaries. 
In the years immediately following 1948, this underlying geology was crucial not 
only because the Israeli state had to contend with the absorption of unprecedented waves 
of Jewish immigration, as mentioned above, but also with a cyclical and acute shortage of 
cement, which lasted at least until mid-1951. It soon became apparent that both the 
production of the local Nesher Cement Company, still a monopoly at the time, and 
cement imports in a time of global shortage, would not be able to satiate the construction 
boom’s needs. The emergent practice of settling Jewish immigrants in so-called 
“abandoned” Palestinian villages and neighborhoods, could only partially meet the state’s 
settlement needs and plans. Planning officials suggested three solutions, to be pursued in 
parallel: the first, was to hasten the long-delayed establishment of a second cement 
factory. The second solution was to adopt and develop new building techniques. The 
third solution was to adapt local Palestinian construction techniques. Both the new 
techniques and the adapted local ones, the committee members suggested, would shift 
construction’s dependency from cement, back to stone. Accordingly, they would also 
necessitate increased quarry production.327 
 
 
327 “Va‘ada Beinmisradit le-Hakirat Ba‘ayot ha-Bniya” [Interoffice Committee for the Investigation of 
Construction Problems], 1947-1951, ISA-PMO-PMO-000vdf9; “Mikhrot u-Masrefot Sid – Taybeh” [Mines 
and Limekilns – Taibe], 1950-1952, ISA-moch-moch-000qeye; “Emek ‘Iron (Vadi ‘Ara) - Mahtzevot” 
[‘Iron Valley (Wadi ‘Ara) – Quarries[, 1950-1951, ISA-moch-moch-000qeye. 
168 
 
Conditions of Exploitation 
This coalescence of material shortages and geological conditions had considerable effects 
on the lives of the Palestinians in the Galilee and the Triangle, on Mizrahi Jewish 
immigrants, and on the state’s extractive policies. The drastic curtailment of the 
economic horizons of Israel’s largely agricultural Palestinian citizenry, the imposition of 
a military administration, and the attendant restrictions on their movement and 
employment, had radically changed many Palestinians’ relationship to their environment. 
Where in many places agricultural lands were seized and agricultural trade became 
unviable, quarries offered a local source of livelihood, whether as independent, and 
frequently unlicensed, quarry operators, or as wage-laborers. The state, in turn, tried to 
gain dominance over stone production by turning to land expropriation, discriminatory 
license-granting for quarry operation, and a continued emphasis on pre-state policies of 
Hebrew labor – effectively granting preference to the livelihood of Jewish citizens over 
that of Palestinian ones.328 The government Custodian of Absentee Property, an office 
ostensibly set up to handle the properties of Palestinians considered legally “absent,” 
played a significant role in the state’s attempts to gain control and administer Palestinian 
owned quarries.329 Alongside the State Assets’ Department of the Treasury Ministry and 
the Jewish National Fund (JNF), the Custodian was charged with devising the conditions 
of quarry operation leases.330 The Custodian’s role was not limited to expropriating 
 
328 Shalev, Labour and the Political Economy in Israel, 46-57. 
329 For the history of the Custodian in its initial years, see: Tom Segev, 1949: The First Israelis (New York: 
Henry Holt and Company, 1998 [1986]);  Michael R. Fischbach, Records of Dispossession: Palestinian 
Refugee Property and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003). 




Palestinian lands. It also provided enterprising Jewish quarriers with the “abandoned” 
machinery of Palestinian quarries.331  
As far as the labor itself was concerned, the racial division of labor in the 
quarries, which British racial thinking undergirded during the Mandate period, by and 
large continued. Jewish employers in the new state often showed a distinct preference for 
Palestinian workers. This was not solely because of their greater experience and skill, but 
also because as mostly “unorganized” laborers, excluded from the Histadrut until 1959, 
Palestinians were made extremely vulnerable to exploitation. Contemporary reports about 
quarry operators’ employment practices detail a wide range of abuses: from low pay and 
the continued holding back of wages, to what some contemporary reports described as 
“disgraceful conditions of exploitation” (tna’ei nitzul maḥpirim) of Palestinian workers, 
including women and children, and employers’ “reign of terror” (mishṭar shel ṭeror) over 
employees who threatened to expose such practices.332  
Ministry of Labor officials occasionally attempted to bridge the need to protect 
the rights of Palestinian workers on the one hand, and the policy of increasing Jewish 
employment, on the other, but often granted precedence to the production imperatives of 
quarry operators. Some operators even successfully argued for the continued employment 
of low-paid “Arab labor” as a temporary measure intended to establish their enterprises’ 
 
331 ISA-moch-moch-000qeye: Emek-Hefer Cooperative for Cargo Transit Ltd. to the Custodian of Absentee 
Property, December 20, 1950; Custodian of Absentee Property Department of Finances to the Ministry of 
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Avraham Malul, February 27, 1950, ISA-moital-DepDirEmployment-000yza2; Sarah Osatzki-Lazar, “Mi-
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profitability. After profitability was assured, they promised, they would be able to meet 
the mandated quota of 50% “Hebrew labor.”333 Discriminatory arrangements supported 
by economic calculations were not only the province of small employers. At least until 
late 1954, Even va-Sid – by far the largest quarrying operation at the time – refused to 
provide Palestinian workers with employment conditions and wages equal to their Jewish 
peers. The company argued that since no other quarry operators had done so, they could 
not afford to “bear the costs” of pioneering such equality.334 
Even when Jewish workers were introduced to the quarries, quarry labor often 
remained racialized, albeit differently so. Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s the 
Jewish workforce in the quarries – and in physical labor in the construction industry in 
general – became increasingly Mizrahi. Quarry operators were encouraged specifically to 
employ recently arrived Mizrahi Jewish immigrants settled in transit camps (ma‘abarot), 
in “abandoned” Palestinian villages, and in other forms of settlements located near their 
quarries.335 In part, this too was a matter of geography and geology, seemingly detached 
from the labor itself: the story of state-directed Mizrahi settlement in these decades was 
intimately linked with the policy of “Judaizing” areas of the state which, prior to 1948, 
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had been and often still were, largely Palestinian.336 And it was these areas, as we have 
seen, which were richest in building stone deposits.  
However, in areas of the Palestinian-dominated Triangle and Galilee as well as in 
the corridor along the Jaffa-Jerusalem road, the Jewish agency also established 
designated “quarriers’ villages” (kfarei ḥotzvim) in particularly stone-rich areas.337 These 
quarriers’ villages were most frequently populated primarily by Mizrahi Jews. This 
decision was justified through racializing – and often self-contradictory – discourse, 
much of which can be traced back to the Mandate period and, in the case of Yemeni 
Jews, as far back as the turn of the century Yavnieli mission.338  
Thus, for example, when discussing work in the quarries, writers in the Hebrew 
press often depicted Kurdish Jews, such as those settled in Ma‘oz Tzion, a settlement 
established in 1951 on the ruins of the Palestinian village of al-Qastel en route to 
Jerusalem, who dominated the quarries of the Qastel, as the ideal hard-laborers: culturally 
primitive but strong-headed and able-bodied.339 Others, meanwhile, depicted Yemeni 
Jews almost as Kurdish Jews’ diametric opposite – as if “all spirit, and no body. Like 
fireflies,” one contemporary journalist opined, while another described an innate Yemeni 
fear of “mountains and their shadows.”340 Others still, however, depicted Yemeni Jews as 
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338 See Introduction above. 
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extremely hard-working, with little to no material needs, and so inherently acquiescent 
they were unlikely to express any material demands. As such, Yemeni Jews were in fact 
excellent candidates to be settled in the often isolated quarriers’ villages, such as 
‘Atzmon in the north, Tirat Yehuda and Hadid along the Jaffa-Jerusalem road, and others. 
There they could carry out work which would improve their physical state, and which 
few others wanted to do.341 
 
The Right to the Quarry 
In this context, the history of the Shaghur valley quarries in the Western Galilee stand out 
for multiple reasons. First, the struggle over them was prolonged and the Palestinian 
laborers, quarry owners, and activists who challenged the state over their right to the 
quarry were relatively well organized. The struggle was also widely publicized, 
reverberating, as we shall see, even internationally. Second, the struggle over the Shaghur 
valley quarries fueled some of the most incisive contemporary Palestinian critiques of 
Israeli state policy beyond those articulated by relatively well-known figures, such as 
communist Members of Knesset Tawfiq Tubi and Imil Habibi (sometimes rendered as 
Emile Habiby), or the lawyers and activists Hanna Naqara and Elias Kusa. Third, the 
Shaghur quarries quickly became well-known for the exquisite quality of their limestone 
deposits. Initially considered by Israeli authorities as an excellent and abundant source 
for much-needed gravel, by 1956 the quarries were being hailed in the Hebrew press as a 
treasure trove of marble of unrivaled quality. This meant that large contractors such as 
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the Histadrut’s Solel Boneh company, the privately-owned Company for the 
Development of Quarries in Israel (ha-Hevra le-Pituah Mahtzavot be-Yisrael), and small-
time entrepreneurs alike, all vied for a share in their exploitation.342 Finally, the struggle 
over the Shaghur quarries left an indelible, if underrecognized, mark on Palestinian 
culture and conceptions of what it means to be proudly, defiantly, and politically 
Palestinian, and of a specifically Palestinian connection to the materiality of the land of 
Palestine/Israel. 
As noted above, the Palestinians of the Shaghur valley began working the 
regional quarries as early as 1949, primarily through local initiative, but also as hired 
labor.343 Archival evidence suggests that the earliest attempt to organize among local 
workers took place in early 1951, when workers founded a cooperative quarry workers’ 
association in Bi‘na, backed by the local branch of the communist-affiliated labor union, 
the Arab Workers Congress (AWC) (Arabic: Mu’atamar al-‘Umal al-‘Arab, Hebrew: 
Congress ha-Po‘alim ha-‘Arvim). However, organization efforts among the workers 
seem to have begun in earnest even earlier, as a response to the establishment of a quarry 
by the Israeli government’s Public Works Department (PWD).  
While he provides no specific date for the events, the poet and novelist Hanna 
Ibrahim (b. 1927) recalls in his memoirs that when the PWD began operating the quarry, 
it employed “70 Jewish workers from Acre, but not a single individual from Bi‘na, aside 
from the night guard, who was coincidentally the son of the owner of the land, and whose 
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employment was one of the conditions of the lease [to the PWD].” In response to the 
exclusion of Palestinians from the quarry’s workforce, the local branch of the AWC 
decided to organize “a different kind of demonstration (muẓahara min nau‘ akhir).” 
Instead of an ordinary demonstration to demand work, they would go to “conquer the 
labor (li-iḥtilal al-‘amal)” in the quarry. Ibrahim recalls that as soon as the AWC issued 
its decision to attempt such a conquest of labor, “more than fifty workers, some of whom 
were carrying what work tools they had,” went to the PWD quarry and “simply” asked 
for work, “just like that” (hakadha bi-basaṭa). While the director of works in the quarry 
could not offer work to all the individuals who arrived that day, an arrangement was 
reached whereby twelve of those who were in greatest need began working in the quarry. 
This “partial victory,” as Ibrahim describes it, further cemented the AWC’s already 
growing role in the village.344 
In early 1951, several Bi‘na residents who had been employed in a quarry 
operated by a Jewish resident of Haifa since 1949, established the Bi‘na Cooperative 
Association for Quarry Workers. The Haifa resident operated a quarry on land in the 
Shaghur valley which he was leasing from its Palestinian owners. The organizers of the 
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Cooperative Association hoped that operating their own quarry as a cooperative would 
provide an alternative to the poor pay and harsh conditions work as hired labor in the 
Haifa resident’s operation offered.  
The Cooperative’s organizers first applied to register their association in late 
January 1951. In his recommendation to the Registrar of Cooperative Associations in the 
Ministry of Labor to approve the Cooperative’s registration, Y. Shim‘oni of the Ministry 
of Labor described the low rates which the quarry operator paid the locals for their labor. 
These rates, Shim‘oni reported, were paid on a piecework basis, and effectively 
guaranteed the quarry operator a “one-hundred percent profit.” At the same time, the 
piecework method itself, “[exploited] every movement of the laborer and [strained] him 
to produce maximal output and to use what [remained] of his strength over unlimited 
work hours.” No longer willing to accept such treatment, Shim‘oni writes, the workers 
broke away from their employer and started operating a quarry independently on land 
owned by another Bi‘na resident. Now, inspired by the AWC branch in the village, they 
wished to register as a cooperative association so as to continue the operation of their 
quarry.345 
Following Shim‘oni’s recommendation, the process of registering their 
association seemed to go relatively smoothly. By mid-March 1951 the Cooperative was 
successfully registered. Obtaining a license to operate the quarry, however, proved 
considerably more difficult. When the workers had first applied for a license in late 
January 1951, the Nahariya district governor demanded they first register as a 
 




cooperative association and provide him with a list of all association members and their 
roles, which the organizers promptly did. However, as a May 1951 letter from Yussef 
‘Abdu, Secretary of the Union of Cooperative Associations of Arabs in Israel, another 
AWC-affiliated operation, reveals, neither meeting these conditions, nor meeting any 
further stipulations presented by the governor seemed to have had much effect. 
According to ‘Abdu, in late April that year, the governor flatly refused to grant the Bi‘na 
Cooperative Association for Quarry Workers a license to operate, without further 
explanation. By 1954, the Association seems to have completely ceased operation, at 
least in any official capacity.346 
Other quarries in the Shaghur region saw different kinds of struggles during the 
early 1950s. At the Solel Boneh quarry, for example, the company’s quarry manager 
conditioned workers’ employment on their leaving the AWC and joining the competing 
labor union, the Palestine Labor League (PLL), a Histadrut-affiliated union intended to 
organize Palestinian workers.347 By early 1954, it became clear that taken together, these 
struggles constituted something broader than each single manifestation indicated. It had 
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become a struggle for the ownership of the quarries and the agricultural lands 
surrounding them.  
 
“A Chain of Racial Persecution” 
In February 1954, Shoukry al-Khazen, the headmaster of the prestigious Orthodox 
School in Haifa and a political activist, and Boulous Hanna Boulous, one of the larger 
landowners in the Shaghur region, authored a six-page English-language memorandum, 
addressed to then Israeli President, Yitzhak Ben Tzvi.348 Signed by over one-hundred and 
fifty of the landowners of Bi‘na and Deir al-Assad, the memorandum, copies of which 
Khazen and Boulous sent also to the American and British consulates, meticulously 
surveyed the historical background for local claims to ownership of the quarries. It 
described in detail what its authors described as the “four links” of the “chain of racial 
persecution” the state had unleashed upon the locals.  
Citing the 1945 Villages’ Statistical Report issued by the Mandate government, 
Khazen and Boulous argued that prior to 1948, neither the British nor the Ottoman 
government laid claim to the lands of either village, as they both recognized the villagers 
as their sole owners. Land surveys the Mandate authorities conducted in 1931-2 and as 
recently as 1946, recognized these village-owned lands and categorized them according 
to their agricultural usage. The memorandum does point out though that unlike its early 
1930s precursor, the 1946 survey did not account for land which residents were at the 
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time leasing to the British Army as a training ground. This land, as it happened, was also 
where the villages’ quarries were located. 
The British Army, the memorandum states, honored their lease and continued 
paying their dues to the land’s owners until all payments were completed on May 15, 
1952, exactly four years after the Mandate was dissolved. The relationship of the villages 
with the authorities, however, changed radically with the establishment of the State of 
Israel.  
[G]overnment officers began to exercise diverse devices of oppression and 
persecution against the owners [of the land] to prevent them from working the 
quarries preparatory to confiscating them.349  
 
It was then that the four “links” of the “chain of racial persecution,” began to unfold. If 
the purpose of this chain was the land’s eventual confiscation, what pulled it along from 
link to link was the dependency of the people of Bi‘na and Deir al-Assad on the quarries 
for their very survival. 
First, the government “adamantly and arbitrarily” refused to grant licenses to 
Palestinian operated quarries (as we have seen above in the instance of the Bi‘na 
Cooperative Association). As a result, the landowners chose to operate according to what 
the memorandum describes as the “commonplace knowledge that the… competent 
authorities under the military rule envisaged that no license should be granted to an Arab 
unless he takes a Jewish partner.”350 To get around this unwritten rule, some quarry 
owners leased their land to Jewish contractors, so that the latter could then apply for the 
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necessary licenses. This, the landowners thought, would enable both them and the 
laborers from the area to once again earn a living from the quarries, even if it meant 
sharing some of the profits with the lessees. However, the “second link” of the chain – 
which at this point the landowners began seeing for what it was – soon appeared.  
When, following their agreement with the quarries’ Palestinian landowners, the 
Jewish lessees first applied to the government for quarrying licenses, government 
officials instructed them instead to obtain altogether new, separate leases for the same 
lands. This time, the officials told the lessees, they should obtain leases for these lands 
not from the local landowners of the Shaghur valley, but from the state, and specifically 
from what the memorandum refers to as the “Director of the State Domain.” The land, 
the government officials stated, did not belong to the Palestinians who had leased it to the 
Jewish operators in the first place – it was state-owned land. Here, for the first time, the 
government introduced the claim that the state, and not the people of Bi‘na and Deir al-
Assad, was the quarries’ rightful owner.351 
The Jewish contractor-lessees, likely eager to begin working the quarries, 
complied. They sought separate leases from the state for the lands which they had 
originally leased from the Palestinian landowners. Sure enough, they soon received the 
leases, and alongside them the coveted quarrying licenses. Having done so, the 
contractor-lessees then refused to pay the previously agreed upon rent to the Palestinian 
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landowners, let alone share the profits of the quarries’ operation. The lessees argued that 
the new leases signed vis-à-vis the state rendered the previous ones null and void and 
refused all claims by the landowners otherwise.352 
Following this stage, which Khazen and Boulous define as the “third link” in the 
“abominable policy of racial oppression,” the local landowners decided to turn to the 
supreme court in order to challenge the state’s claims of ownership.353 The supreme court 
ruled in favor of the Palestinian landowners, denying the state’s claim to the land. 
However, this did not dissuade the state from further pursuing its claims. Rather, it 
unleashed the chain’s “fourth link,” as the state turned to a different legal avenue to 
obtain control of the quarries.354  
Seeing that the court would not uphold its claims, the Israeli state filed for a land 
dispute with its own land dispute arbitration authority, the Land Settlement Department. 
The Land Settlement Department’s handling of the matter, the memorandum alleges, was 
in direct contradiction to its intended role as an impartial arbitrator. Its representatives in 
both villages, made presenting any challenges to the state’s claims extremely difficult for 
the landowners. The representatives never posted a detailed plan of the lands claimed by 
the state as required by law. The Department also closed all its local offices throughout 
the period allotted for filing challenges. Since the residents of the Shaghur valley were all 
living under the movement restrictions of the military administration, this made filing 
such challenges considerably more difficult. Finally, when the Land Settlement 
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Department appointed a land surveyor to examine the competing claims, it appointed 
none other than the surveyor of the Custodian of Absentee Property. Unsurprisingly, the 
appointed surveyor’s findings aligned entirely with the state’s claims, ignoring those of 
Palestinian landowners. The “financially able” among the latter, the memorandum states, 
were forced to go to great expense and hire another surveyor independently to try and 
challenge the decision.355 
Although their understanding of the government’s actions as pre-meditated from 
the get-go may have lent too much credit to the foresight and planning of state authorities 
and agents, the efficacy of what the memorandum’s authors called the racial chain of 
oppression was undeniable. By the time of the writing of the memorandum, local 
landowners and laborers alike had suffered considerable economic damage, both by 
virtue of being unable to work the quarries regularly, and of the expenses which the legal 
proceedings caused them to incur. While the matter of ownership was still disputed at the 
time of the memorandum’s submission, an assessment of the events which led up to that 
point provided its authors and over one-hundred and fifty local signatories, with the 
grounds to present a damning critique of the Israeli state.  
This critique was not reliant solely on a systematic presentation of events, but also 
on carefully selected rhetoric. The rhetorical inventiveness of the authors began with the 
pointed imagery of the “chain of racial oppression,” given body and weight by the 
description of its different links. Each mention of the chain and its links was underlined 
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in the original text. It then culminated with the analysis the memorandum provided of the 
underlying objectives of the state, which is worth citing in full: 
We cannot but conclude from the aforementioned measures that the Government 
has formulated a policy contemplating our impoverishment by stripping us of our 
landed properties and by causing us to incur excessive expenses in litigations 
against individual trespassers and against Government departments endeavouring 
to take our lands. The picture is becoming gradually clear. It depicts a malicious 
intention to render us landless, unable to live decently, and to make us wood 
choppers and water carriers for the children of Israel. We would ultimately 
become dispersed and destitute and be forced to leave the country to join the army 
of refugees.356 
 
Khazen and Boulous had already laid out the claim that the state was following a 
racial policy of oppression throughout. Now, they compounded that accusation by 
portraying the state’s intentions as being to render the Palestinian minority a landless 
class of “wood choppers and water carriers,” and eventually to make them into refugees. 
This, of course, stood in stark contrast not only to Israel’s declared policy towards 
Palestinian citizens. It also undermined labor Zionism’s continued disavowal of what its 
proponents portrayed as a colonial division of labor, often employing the very same 
biblical reference as Khazen and Boulous did.357 Lest invocation of such a social order 
was not pointed enough, the memorandum then moved to directly invoke what Shira 
Robinson has characterized as the “colonial specter” which haunted the Israeli state in its 
initial years.358 Here too, they underlined the words to which they wanted to call their 
readers’ attention: 
We wish in particular to invite Your Excellency’s attention to the great difference 
between the spirit of justice that characterized the conduct of the settlement 
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officers of the Colonial Mandatory Administration and the oppressive attitude of 
the settlement officers of the democratic State of Israel.359 
  
Fully leaning into the contradictory resonances of the terms “colonial” and 
“democratic” in the post-World War II era, the memorandum presented its addressee, the 
Israeli president, as well as the various foreign missions who received copies of the 
memorandum, with a “clear picture” indeed. Despite its claims to being a democracy, its 
“alleged desire to live with the Arabs in peace and friendliness,” and “the many sweet 
promises… for the betterment of the lot of the Arabs of Israel,” Palestinians were finding 
themselves worse off under the democratic Israel than under its colonial predecessor.  
 
Stone Imprints 
In 1964, the fight for the Shaghur valley quarries and agricultural lands was finally lost 
and the city of Karmiel established in their place. In the ten years which had passed since 
the landowners of Bi‘na and Deir al-Assad submitted their memorandum to the President, 
contestation over the quarries took on different forms. Having found that laying legal 
claims to the lands was not sufficient to prevent the Palestinian landowners and laborers 
from working the quarries there, however haphazardly, in 1956 the state embraced a 
different approach. In January of that year, the Israeli Defense Forces’ Chief of Staff 
declared roughly 100 thousand dunums in the Galilee and additional areas, including 
most of the Shaghur quarries, a “closed military zone.” Several Jewish operated quarries, 
such as those of Solel Boneh, were not included within the closed zone and continued to 
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operate unabated. However, Palestinian Shaghur residents who sought to operate their 
own quarries, or seek work with other Palestinian quarry operators, were forced to face 
the fact that accessing the lands they still legally owned was now considered a criminal 
offense. In the eight years prior to Karmiel’s eventual establishment, the Shaghur 
residents went on strike, protested, appealed repeatedly to the Israeli courts, and, when 
possible, continued to work in the quarries despite the restrictions, risking arrest.360  
In 1961, the state officially expropriated over five thousand dunums belonging to 
the four Shaghur valley villages, previously included in the “closed military zone” and 
encompassing the quarries. Again, the resistance of the local population was furious and 
unrelenting, reaching the Israeli Knesset and Supreme Court. Sabri Jiryis described this 
latter part of the Shaghur struggle as, “quite effective in the long run, since after 
[K]armiel there were no more expropriations on such a scale.”361 Yet, the struggle could 
not save the Shaghur quarries, which in 1964 Karmiel swallowed whole.  
My attempts to trace a historical narrative of the Shaghur valley quarries led me 
on a circuitous path, one which captures the ongoing movement between the material and 
the metaphorical of Israel/Palestine’s stone. In April 2018, I attended a daylong 
conference on the Palestinian Nakba at George Washington University. I had been 
conducting research at the United States National Archives in College Park and spending 
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Mughliqa’ fi-Aradi al-Qarawiyin al-‘Arab Yusib Nahw 60 Qarya wa-Mustawtanat Yahudia Aidan” [The 
Expansion of the ‘Closed Zone’ in the Lands of the Arab Villages will Harm Around 60 Villages as well as 
Jewish Settlements], al-Ittihad, January 13, 1956. 
361 Jiryis, The Arabs in Israel, 109. 
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considerable time thinking of how to incorporate the history of stonework specifically 
into my project. Perhaps it was this mindset, the fact that I had seldom heard or read the 
poem in English before, or both, but when during one of the conferences’ panels, the 
Hebrew literary scholar Hanan Hever recited an English translation of Mahmoud 
Darwish’s “Identity Card” (see Appendix I), the words “quarry” and “rock” in the poem 
struck me like subsequent thunderbolts.362 There was my “in” into the world of stone, at 
the heart of one of the most famous Palestinian poems of the twentieth century. The 
weight of Darwish’s quintessential early expression of defiant and political Palestinian-
ness, specifically Palestinian masculinity, was carried on the shoulders of a quarry worker 
and his relationship to the quarry’s stones. “Identity Card” was so iconic, so oft cited and 
discussed, it had never occurred to me to even look. 
As I began learning more about the history of quarries in the archives, I adopted 
“Identity Card,” alongside Ehud Ben ‘Ezer’s 1963 novel, The Quarry (ha-Mahtzeva), as 
the cultural artefacts I most frequently cited in conversation, to demonstrate how quarries 
shaped the experiences of the nascent Israeli state’s most marginalized populations – 
Palestinians and Mizrahi Jews.363 Ben ‘Ezer’s The Quarry is hardly of the caliber of 
“Identity Card.” Whereas Darwish’s poem has grown in stature over time, re-inscribed, 
repeatedly, as a quintessential expression of defiant and political Palestinian-ness, Ben 
‘Ezer’s novel has been, to some extent, forgotten. Nonetheless, it was a pioneering 
 
362 Hanan Hever, “From Revenge to Empathy: Abba Kovner from Jewish Destruction to Palestinian 
Destruction,” paper presented at the George Washington University Institute of Middle East Studies 
Annual Conference: Nakba, Past and Present, April 13, 2018; Mahmoud Darwish, The Music of Human 
Flesh (selected and translated by Denys Johnson-Davies) (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1980); 
Mahmoud Darwish, Awraq al-Zaytun [Olive Leaves] (Haifa: Matba‘at al-Ittihad al-Ta‘awuniyya, 1964). 
363 Ehud Ben ‘Ezer, ha-Mahtzeva: ha-Sefer ha-Shalem [The Quarry: The Complete Book] [Hebrew] 
Second expanded edition (Tel Aviv: Astrolog, ‘Am ‘Oved, 2001 [1963]). 
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attempt in twentieth-century Hebrew literature to depict the lives and struggles of Mizrahi 
Jews in the nascent state from their point of view. As the Mizrahi author, critic, and 
political activist Sami Michael stated in a 2002 retrospective review of the novel, Ben 
‘Ezer was unique among his generation of authors in his approach to writing about 
Mizrahi subjects. He wrote of Mizrahi Jews not as an outside onlooker, regarding their 
life as whole, rather than incomplete or lacking.364 
The novel, which was also adapted into a play in 1964 and later a film in 1990, 
tells the story of power struggles and romantic entanglements in an unnamed quarry and 
its adjacent “quarrier’s village.” Although his characters’ relationship to the quarry in the 
novel – for which Ben ‘Ezer drew inspiration from his time as a teacher in Ma‘oz Tzion, 
near the Qastel Quarry on the route to Jerusalem365 – is not as intimate as that of “Identity 
Card’s” speaker, work there nonetheless shapes the bodies and lives of the novel’s 
protagonists. In keeping with the processes of quarry labor’s racialization described 
above, Ben ‘Ezer portrays spaces which, as the novel progresses, become almost entirely 
Mizrahi. At the beginning of the novel, Rabinovich, the quarry foreman and the only 
remaining Ashkenazi man working there, retires. A power struggle then ensues between 
Moshe David, the protagonist, and the newly appointed foreman, Nissim Levi, whose 
rivalry with Moshe David dates back to their previous lives in the unnamed Middle 
Eastern country from which they emigrated. After Rabinovich’s departure, the quarry 
itself, the nearby village, and even the novel’s urban scenes become effectively 
 
364 Sami Michael, “ha-Proletar ha-Yahid Notarti, Kamuvan, Ani,” Ha’aretz, May 2, 2002 
https://www.haaretz.co.il/misc/1.791304 [last accessed: July 1, 2020]. 
365 Ben ‘Ezer, ha-Mahtzeva, 267-270. 
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segregated from the Ashkenazi Jewish elites, which figure only periodically as an 
intrusive outside force. Thus, as Sami Michael has noted, the novel’s protagonists and 
antagonists are given room to compete among themselves for power and influence, and 
the community as a whole, to shake off Nissim Levi’s tyrannical rule from within.366 
The Quarry is not devoid of orientalist tropes, and sections of it have not aged 
well. However, like “Identity Card,” it nonetheless opens the door onto the forgotten role 
of quarries at the margins of the nascent Israeli state: spaces where the limits of the 
state’s sovereignty were tested, and where its discriminated-against populations could 
exercise degrees and forms of autonomy otherwise hard to obtain. 
In October 2018, I was conducting oral history interviews in Palestine/Israel. 
Most of the individuals I interviewed were former construction workers. However, I was 
also able to locate several former quarry workers who were willing to be interviewed as 
well. Among these, the poet and author Hanna Ibrahim, who had worked in the Shaghur 
valley quarries between 1952-1964, was by far the most recognizable name.367 In our 
conversation at his home in Bi‘na, Ibrahim described in detail how during that period, the 
people of Bi‘na, Deir al-Assad, Majd al-Krum, and Nahf struggled against the Israeli 
government and the military administration to maintain access to the quarries which were 
their main source of livelihood. But, as the interview revealed, this struggle’s place in 
Palestinian history likely far eclipses anything that a historical narrative about it could 
possibly capture.  
 
366 Michael, “ha-Proletar ha-Yahid,” Ha’aretz, May 2, 2002. 
367 Interview with Hanna Ibrahim, Bi‘na, October 22, 2018. 
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During our conversation, I asked Ibrahim, as I did others among the former 
workers I spoke with, for his thoughts about Darwish’s quarry worker in “Identity Card,” 
and the quarry as a Palestinian symbol. As soon as I mentioned the poem, Ibrahim said: 
“He wrote this [the poem], in my name (huwwa, hay katabha bi-ismi)… he put himself in 
my place (ḥaṭṭ ḥalo maḥalli).”368 He then began reciting lines from the poem which 
aligned with his biography: 
“I work with my comrades of toil in a quarry… (wa-a‘amalu ma‘ rifaqi al-kadḥi 
fi maḥjar) 
I have eight children (wa-abna’i thamaniyatun),”369 and actually I had eight 
children!370 
 
Approaching “Identity Card” anew yet again, its affinities to the narrative of the 
struggle over the quarries of Bi‘na, Deir al-Assad, Majd al-Krum, and Nahf are 
remarkable. The dependence of the villages on the quarries is captured in the lines: “I 
have eight children / For them I wrest the loaf of bread / The clothes and exercise books / 
From the rocks.” Nicknamed “red Bi‘na” (bi‘na al-ḥamra’), for the widespread support 
of its people for the communist party, Bi‘na appears as a likely candidate for the village 
 
368 Interview with Hanna Ibrahim, Bi‘na, October 22, 2018. 
369 Here Ibrahim replaced Darwish’s original term – aṭfali, for “my children” – with abna’i. 
370 Interview with Hanna Ibrahim, Bi‘na, October 22, 2018. Ibrahim also describes his relationship with 
Darwish, which he discussed in our interview as well, and further elaborates on the affinities between 
“Identity Card’s” protagonist and himself in several recent interviews published online. Unfortunately, I 
encountered these interviews only after my conversation with him. Muhammad ‘Ali Sa‘id, “al-Sha‘irayn: 
Mahmoud Darwish wa-Hanna Ibrahim wa-Qissat Sajjil Ana ‘Arabi” [The Two Poets: Mahmoud Darwish 






accessed: July 1, 2020]; Hatem Jou‘iyya, “Liqa’ ma‘a al-Sha‘ir <<Hanna Ibrahim>>,” [An Interview with 
the Poet Hanna Ibrahim], Diwan al-‘Arab, July 4, 2016 
http://www.diwanalarab.com/spip.php?article44366#.XKX59JhKhhE [last accessed: July 1, 2020]. 
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which Darwish describes as “…remote, forgotten / Its streets without name / And all its 
men in the quarries and fields / Love communism.”371 And although talk of the 
government’s intentions to take “these rocks” which are all that “you left us and all my 
descendants,” could, as we have seen above, apply to any point in time from the early 
1950s onwards, it would have been particularly pressing in 1963, when Darwish’s poem 
was first published.  
To the question, “Will your government take them too?” the state provided its 
final answer the following year. But while it was eventually able to sever the material 
binds between the people of the Shaghur valley and the stones for which they struggled, 
and from which they “wrested bread, clothes and exercise books” for fifteen long years, 
the government could not sever the affective bond between them. Rather, through 
Darwish’s poem, this bond has gained a significance spanning well beyond the Shaghur 
valley, across Israel/Palestine and outwards to the Palestinian diaspora and the 
international scene. Yet, at the same time, its symbolic power has arguably occluded the 
 
371 Interview with Hanna Ibrahim, Bi‘na, October 22, 2018. Ibrahim also discusses the moniker in his 
interview with Diwan al-‘Arab: Jou‘iyya, “Liqa’.” The line “Love communism” (yuḥibbun al-shuyu’iyya) 
which appeared in the original printing of the poem in the first edition of the volume, Awraq al-Zaytun 
(Olive Leaves) was omitted from later editions. In Denys Johnson-Davies’ English translation the line is 
left blank, making the verse it appears in the only one in the poem to include an empty line. In a 2013 
study, ‘Adel al-Usta explores Darwish’s changing politics and tastes as captured by a variety of such 
editorial omissions and changes in the various editions of his poems. Referring specifically to the omitted 
line from “Identity Card,” al-Usta mentions that Darwish’s break with communism drove the decision to 
alter or remove such references in subsequent editions of his poems. ‘Adel al-Usta, Jadal al-Shi‘r wa-l-
Siyasa wa-l-Dha’iqa: Dirasat fi Zahirat al-Hadhaf wa-l-Taghyir fi Ash‘ar Mahmoud Darwish [Disputes of 
Poetry, Politics and Taste: Studies in the Phenomenon of Omission and Alteration in the Poems of 
Mahmoud Darwish] (Nablus: 2013); Mahmoud Darwish, The Music of Human Flesh (selected and 
translated by Denys Johnson-Davies) (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1980); Mahmoud Darwish, 
Awraq al-Zaytun [Olive Leaves] (Haifa: Matba’at al-Ittihad al-Ta‘awuniyya, 1964). Elliot Colla has 
generously shared with an unpublished article manuscript which examines “Identity Card” as part of a 
reconsideration of the significance of Darwish’s early works, which are often derided by critics as 
poetically “simple” and “straightforward”: Elliot Colla, “The Political was the Poetic: Reading Early 
Mahmoud Darwish” (unpublished manuscript, July 16, 2019), Microsoft Word file. 
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material, lived history of attachments which inspired the poem in the first place. Perhaps 
re-narrating the history of twentieth-century Palestine/Israel, already overdetermined by 
symbols and meanings, as one in which the semiotic and the concrete are both given due 
consideration, can prevent us from losing sight of one for the other. 
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CHAPTER 5: “WE BUILT THIS LAND”: PALESTINIAN 
CITIZENS IN ISRAEL’S CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY, 
1948–1973372 
 
“And what if I told you that… workers slept between the thorns, in the field? 
Workers would dig [a hole] like a grave and put straw inside. When it rained they 
would do like this around [Ahmad mimics piling up dirt so that water cannot 
enter] and put a tin above.”  
Ahmad Yusuf Masarweh (b. 1939), 10 October 2018373 
 
 
The physical construction of the Israeli state in its initial decades depended not only on 
the dispossession of Palestinians, as in the Shaghur Valley quarries, but also on their 
labor. In the decades after Israel’s establishment and the Palestinian Nakba, Palestinian 
citizens in Israel - a newly constituted minority in their own homeland, reeling from 
catastrophe and living its aftermath – played a crucial role in the making of the state 
responsible for their ongoing dispossession. As mentioned in previous chapters, Israel’s 
initial decades were marked by massive state-directed construction, intended to house 
unprecedented numbers of Jewish immigrants. Many of these housing projects were built 
by Palestinian hands, on Palestinian-owned land, and on the ruins of Palestinian cities, 
towns, and villages. 
 
372 I would like to thank the individuals interviewed for the purpose of this chapter and their families, 
including those individuals whose narratives are not included here. The experiences of getting to know 
each of them have been life-altering and eye-opening. Their openness, thoughtfulness, and hospitality 
towards me have placed me forever in their debt. I would also like to thank the individuals without whose 
help I would never have met the narrators: Assaf Adiv, Fady Asleh, ‘Issa Boursheh, Leena Dallasheh, 
Suheil Diab, Basma Fahoum, Anis, Leila and Hanna Khoury, and Shira Robinson. 
373 Interview with Ahmad Yusuf Masarweh, ‘Ara‘ara, October 10, 2018. 
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This chapter explores the experiences of Palestinian citizens in Israel’s 
construction industry in the twenty-five years after 1948. The processes through which 
they became disproportionately represented in such racialized and frequently exploitative 
labor, both foreshadowed the exploitation of Palestinian subjects from the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip in the Israeli economy after the 1967 war, and resembled patterns of migrant 
labor exploitation in other settler-colonial contexts.374 As in those instances, these process 
were part and parcel of the broader marginalization and exclusion of Palestinian with 
Israeli citizenship: the imposition of a military administration between 1948-1966, which 
restricted their movement and employment; massive land expropriation and unequal 
resource allocation which curtailed possibilities of economic sustenance and 
development; and purposeful limitations imposed by the state on the construction and 
development of Palestinian localities. By offering Palestinian citizens “a path to 
survival,”375 Israel’s construction industry enrolled their labor in the service of the very 
structures that exploited and excluded them in the first place.  
These structural elements, recalling John Chalcraft’s analysis of hegemony in 
relation to subaltern groups in his exploration of the dynamics of Syrian labor migration 
to Lebanon, form the backdrop of this chapter. The chapter’s foreground, however, is 
dedicated primarily to exploring what Chalcraft has described as “the optimism of the 
story” of hegemony’s “invisible cage”: how powerful structures, because they require 
decision-making agency on the part of workers, always leave “a possibility – especially 
 
374 Farsakh, Palestinian Labour Migration to Israel; Juval Portugali, Implicate Relations: Society and 
Space in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1993); Wolpe, “Capitalism and 
Cheap Labour-Power.” 
375 Khalidi, The Arab Economy, 145. 
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in the context of ceaseless structural and social change, fracture, and contradiction – that 
such agency [be] put to purposes other than those that [work] to reproduce the dominant 
form of power.”376 I argue that although Palestinian citizens who found work in Israel’s 
construction industry often did so feeling as though they had little choice, workers and 
their communities used their place in the industry to circumvent and at times even 
challenge the Israeli state’s suffocating hold. Through their growing role in building the 
Jewish state, Palestinian citizens gained skills and knowledge of techniques, materials, 
and forms of spatial organization which they adapted and introduced into the 
reconstruction of their homes and towns. These capacities, marshalled in the service of 
informal arrangements and solutions, were all the more instrumental given the state’s 
purposeful stifling of Palestinian localities’ development. Still others refused to accept 
the racialization and dehumanization which marked them as out-of-place and 
undeserving, and relegated them, at best, to society’s sidelines, hidden in plain sight. 
Instead, they sought to reclaim their humanity and belonging through various means, 
including bringing their oppression into the public eye. 
To explore these experiences, the chapter relies on oral history interviews 
conducted with nineteen Palestinian men and women who are former workers, foremen, 
contractors, labor organizers, and their family members, primarily from the Triangle area 
and the Galilee.377 These interviews are used alongside archival sources, newspapers, and 
 
376 John Chalcraft, The Invisible Cage: Syrian Migrant Workers in Lebanon (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2008), 231-232. 
377 Following the mass forced migration of Palestinians as a result of the Nakba and the establishment of 
Israel, the Galilee and the Triangle (also known as the Little Triangle) were home to the vast majority of 
Palestinians who became citizens of the new state. While the Galilee was seized by Israeli armed forces 
during the 1947-1949 war, the Triangle was annexed in May 1949 in accordance with the armistice 
agreement signed with Jordan. Shira Robinson, Citizen Strangers, 38-40, 84-85. 
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film. Of the nineteen individuals interviewed, the narratives of thirteen are used here. 
Following a brief exposition about the narrators and the methodology I used in the 
interview and analysis process, the chapter first examines the various factors which 
pushed individuals into the construction industry specifically. Then it looks at the 
circumstances that surrounded work-life – commuting, dwelling, and the relationship to 
family, community, and home. At the center of my analysis of narrators’ experiences I 
place workers’ physical and emotional experiences of labor, and the multiplicity of 
homes– in the affective, discursive, and material dimensions of the word – that they 
made. These included the houses they built for others, alongside the forms of shelter and 
homemaking they engaged in for themselves and their communities: from establishing 
temporary dwellings in harsh-conditions and attempts to be at home wherever work took 
them, to utilizing the skills, expertise, and income of their labor in the service of 
remaking their own homes and those of their communities.  
I view Palestinian homemaking in the nascent Israeli state as a deeply political 
act, akin to what bell hooks has called “construction of [the] homeplace.” “In the face of 
the brutal harsh reality of racist oppression,” such “homeplaces,” hooks argues, “however 
fragile and tenuous… had a radical political dimension.” hooks urges us to reevaluate 
African-American women’s fulfilment of the gendered roles “assigned by sexism” within 
the home, in light of how they expanded these roles to make the home a shelter, a place 
of rest, and at times the starting point for revolution. Her notion of constructing the 
homeplace – focused on material, affective, and intellectual care and nurturing – defines 
some of the Palestinian (and at times, Palestinian and Jewish) homemaking practices 
195 
 
discussed below, particularly those practiced by women. However, my emphasis is 
primarily on how physical acts of construction, of making homes in the material sense, 
intertwined with the struggle of Palestinian citizens in Israel to be once again at home in 
their homeland.378 
 
Narrators and Methodology 
All individuals I interviewed were involved in the Israeli construction industry between 
1948-1973. They are, nonetheless, a diverse group, capturing some of the variety of 
Palestinian experiences shaped by the industry at the time. With the exception of one, all 
narrators resided in rural locales during the period, reflecting the overwhelmingly rural 
character of the Palestinian locales that survived the Nakba.379 Some narrators had 
lifelong careers in the construction industry, others only spent relatively short periods of 
time in it. Some aligned themselves with the Labor Zionist ruling elite of the period, 
 
378 bell hooks, Yearning: Race, Gender, and Cultural Politics, 2nd ed. (New York and London: Routledge, 
2015 [1990]), Chapter 5. For a discussion of theoretical approaches to the home and its relationship to 
racialization, see Helen Ngo, The Habits of Racism: A Phenomenology of Racism and Racialized 
Embodiment (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2017), Chapter 3. 
379 Shira Robinson, Citizen Strangers, 30-33; Ilan Pappé, The Forgotten Palestinians: A History of the 
Palestinians in Israel (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), 25-27. Muhammad Abu Ahmad, whose 
career and educational trajectory also set him apart from most other narrators, lived in Nazareth, the only 
remaining Arab town within Israel after the Nakba. It is worth noting however that narrators who were 
teens or young adults during the final years of the British Mandate also spent long periods of time in Haifa 
and even Beirut and Damascus, providing a glimpse at the draw of regional urban centers for rural 
Palestinian youth during those years. Their return to rural towns and villages during 1948 was a direct 
result of the upheaval of the Nakba. Interviews with Mikhail Haddad, Tarshiha, October 21, 2018 and 
Shawqi Khoury, Tarshiha, October 21, 2018. For more on patterns of rural migration to urban centers, 
primarily to Haifa, during the Mandate, see: Na‘ama Ben Ze’ev, “‘I came naïve from the village’: on 
Palestinian Urbanism and Ruralism in Haifa under the British Mandate,” British Journal of Middle Eastern 
Studies (2018), DOI: 10.1080/13530194.2018.1491296; Na‘ama Ben Ze’ev, ‘Sites of Assimilation into 
Urban Life: Rural Migrants’ Clubs in Haifa under the Mandate, 1939–1948’, Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History 42, no. 1 (2014): 114-133; Charles Anderson, “From Petition to Confrontation,” 
532-549; Yazbak, “From Poverty to Revolt.” 
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others were and still are ardent communists. Others still, sought to make their own 
political paths or seem to have had relatively little involvement in party politics. 
Narrators also differed in the access they had to education. As a rule, these 
differences seem to have been primarily generational. Most narrators were only able to 
complete primary education. Narrators who were able to obtain a high school education, 
did so despite prohibitive costs. These costs stemmed not only from the price of high 
school education itself, which did not become compulsory, nor nominally “free” in Israel 
until 1978, but also from the geographical dispersion of secondary education institutions 
for Palestinian citizens in Israel. As a result, obtaining a high school education did not 
mean that an individual did not work as a child, or in the construction industry as a 
teenager.380 
 
380 Majid al-Haj’s 1995 study of the Arab education system in Israel is, to the best of my knowledge, still 
the most comprehensive to date, and elucidates the limited access to education, particularly secondary 
education, which Palestinian citizens in Israel suffered from well into the 1970s. However, it offers little in 
the way of data which could demonstrate what proportion of students were able to continue onto secondary 
education (defined as beginning with the 9th grade) during the period of the military administration, or the 
years immediately following it. See: al-Haj, Education, Empowerment, and Control. 
Documents and reports included in the files of “The Committee for the Employment and Vocational 
Training Problems of Arab Youth,” a government committee appointed by the Ministry of Labor in mid-
1961, include some useful information. It appears that as of 1960, roughly 70% of Palestinian children in 
Israel were able to complete the 8th grade, and their mandatory education, with some children forced to 
leave school already during the 5th-6th grades. A letter from the Ministry of Education claims that 44% of 
Arab students who completed the 8th grade in the 1958/59 school year continued onto secondary school the 
following year. However, the committee’s eventual report places this figure at less than 30%. See, ISA-
moital-moital-0010bbt: Mahmoud Abbasi, “The State of Arab Youth in Israel,” n.d; Eliezer Shmueli to A. 
Meron, September 19, 1961; “Report of the Committee for the Employment and Vocational Training 
Problems of Arab Youth,” November 30, 1961. In her research on “Palestinian Camp Women” in Lebanon, 
Rosemary Sayigh identified a similar educational difference between women she interviewed who were 
born before 1942 and those born after, one which also reflects the role of gender in access to education. 
Sayigh writes that of the eighteen speakers she interviewed, “[n]one of the nine born before 1942 had gone 
to school, whereas all of the nine younger speakers had, with two having completed secondary school and 
three having reached university.” Rosemary Sayigh, “Palestinian Camp Women as Tellers of History,” 
Journal of Palestine Studies 27, no. 2 (1998), 43. 
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The oral histories which my conversations with narrators produced are, like other 
oral histories, by definition dialogic and collaborative endeavors, shaped by a wide range 
of factors: The malleability of narrators’ memories and subjectivities, their self-
reflexivity, the languages in which the interviews took place, my positionality vis-à-vis 
interviewees, and the settings and participants. These factors no doubt influenced not 
only the content of their narratives but also the discourses and cultural contexts they drew 
upon and embedded their narratives in. Narrators’ memories and the processes of 
remembering which the oral history interviews requires of them, are active processes of 
reconstruction. These processes are informed by communal and even national memory 
and ways of remembering. They are also impacted by events which occurred long after 
those being recalled and by the present in which the remembering took places.381 
The semi-structured interviews that inform this chapter were conducted mostly in 
Hebrew, in which all narrators are fluent, and which was the primary language in which 
 
381 For an excellent survey of the theoretical underpinnings of oral history which addresses all of these 
issues while drawing upon a broad array of practitioners and theorists in oral history and other disciplines, 
see: Lynn Abrams, Oral History Theory, second edition (London: Routledge, 2016 [2010]). Since 1948, 
Palestinian history has been shaped by repeated displacements, the destruction of communities and 
institutions, state-oppression, and ongoing statelessness. As a result, existing Palestinian archives too have 
been displaced, dispersed, and destroyed. Similarly, those seeking to create alternative Palestinian archives 
have also faced immense difficulties. Thus, whereas in many cases oral history is useful in revealing crucial 
facets of history not documented in most traditional archives – which often give little room to the 
experiences and perceptions of non-elites – in the Palestinian case, they are even more crucial still. 
Accordingly, oral history has played a central role in the creation of a Palestinian historiography and 
historical narrative, not only through scholarly studies, but also as a tool of public history. Oral narratives 
have been transmitted, elaborated, and preserved across a variety of media, ranging from qiṣṣaṣ (Arabic for 
stories) shared face-to-face, through the development of the genre of written village histories, which 
Rochelle Davis has explored in her remarkable Palestinian Village Histories. Most recently, oral histories 
have been the focus of a variety of digital and online initiatives such as the American University in Beirut’s 
Palestinian Oral History Archive, PalestineRemembered.com’s oral history collection, and others. See: 
Palestinian Oral History Archive, https://libraries.aub.edu.lb/poha/ [last accessed: 26 June 2020]; Nakba 
Oral History Project, https://www.palestineremembered.com/OralHistory/Interviews-
Listing/Story1151.html [last accessed: 26 June 2020]; Rochelle Davis, Palestinian Village Histories: 
Geographies of the Displaced (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011); Sa’di and Abu-Lughod, Nakba: 
Palestine, 1948, and the Claims of Memory; Sayigh, “Palestinian Camp Women,” Journal of Palestine. 
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most of them worked, with parts of the conversations in Arabic. However, there were 
instances in which narrators were more comfortable conducting interviews entirely in 
Arabic. Not coincidentally, those who were more comfortable with the latter option were 
also those whose working lives were conducted primarily in Arabic as well.  
At the beginning of each interview, I discussed my research agenda with the 
narrators, explaining that our conversations would inform a project that examines the 
history of construction work and the construction industry and their roles in shaping 
social hierarchies in twentieth-century Palestine/Israel. Occasionally, this also entailed 
my explaining what led me, as an Israeli Jew, to be interested in this history. 
Understandably, some individuals were initially more suspicious of my intentions than 
others, cautious not to sound too critical of their experiences with the state or with Jewish 
employers and management. Others sought to meet what they presumed were my 
expectations from them. That is, as Katherine Borland has noted, narrators “adapted their 
narratives to account for what they think their audiences already know, what they might 
care about, what they might be sensitive to.”382  
Most interviews were conducted as one-on-one affairs, usually in a single sitting. 
However, in instances in which other people were present during an interview, I have 
also incorporated their narratives. I did not originally set out to recreate or simulate a 
setting in which collective storytelling of life histories (what Rosemary Sayigh calls 
quṣṣaṣ, stories; qiṣṣaṣ in literary Arabic) usually takes place.383 Nonetheless, the 
 
382 Katherine Borland, “Co-Narration, Intersubjectivity, and the Listener in Family Storytelling,” Journal of 
American Folklore 130, no. 518 (2017), 444. 
383 Sayigh, “Palestinian Camp Women,” 42-44.  
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dynamics of these collective settings which Sayigh identifies in her work - the 
interjections and questions of other participants, even their very presence – doubtlessly 
impacted the narratives people shared. Such instances of “co-narrated” back-and-forth 
introduced questions I would not have thought to ask and personal and familial histories 
which I could not have been aware of. At the same time, these multi-participant settings 
may have also caused people to refrain from speaking of certain things or to frame things 
differently than they would have in the context of a one-on-one interview. They 
emphasized the degree to which social contexts, settings, and interactions shape the 
performance of oral narratives.384 
Occasionally, collective settings noticeably encouraged participants to share 
experiences they seemed otherwise hesitant to speak of and elicited the active narration 
of individuals aside from the intended “interviewee.” Given that I had originally set out 
to interview former workers, all of whom were men, the collective interview settings also 
granted me an invaluable opportunity to hear from workers’ families, particularly their 
wives. This unplanned introduction of women’s narratives, although severely limited in 
number, added new dimensions to my inquiry, reshaping my perspective on how both 
construction work and homemaking were gendered.  
  
Out of Necessity 
For many among the roughly 150,000 Palestinians who were able to remain within the 
new Israeli state after the 1948 war and the Nakba, or to successfully return to it in the 
 
384 Borland, “Co-Narration, Intersubjectivity, and the Listener in Family Storytelling.” 
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subsequent months and years, scarcity and want were defining features. As Adel Manna 
has recently reminded us, having survived the Nakba and being able to remain more or 
less “in place,” did not mean that survival was not still the primary concern of those who 
remained.385 The growing body of scholarship on Palestinian citizens in Israel in the 
state’s first decades - the time of the Israeli military administration between 1948-1966, 
and the years immediately following - has shown that during this period, survival meant 
many things: from struggles for the right to remain, through those over political and civil 
rights and over resources, to those over cultural and political connections to the Arab 
world.386 It has also shown, however, that survival often retained its barest meaning: 
staying alive, not going hungry, keeping a roof over your family’s head. Governmental 
land expropriation, discriminatory resource allocation, and restrictions on movement and 
thus access to markets, meant that the agricultural economy many families and 
communities relied upon was no longer able to sustain them. Employment became a 
necessity, but was hard to come by locally, and in order to work elsewhere – namely, in 
Jewish localities – individuals had to navigate the military administration’s work permit 
regime. 
In light of these difficulties, the imperative of survival drove individuals to seek 
work wherever available. “Now, I, as a child, there was no high school. We finished 
 
385 Adel Manna, Nakba and Survival. An Arabic version of Manna’s book was published in 2016 by the 
Institute of Palestine Studies, under the title Nakba wa-Baqa’: Hikayat Filastiniyin Zalamu fi Haifa wa-l-
Jalil. 
386 For recent examples dealing with this period, see: Nassar, Brothers Apart; Dallasheh, “Troubled 
Waters”; Manna, Nakba and Survival; Robinson, Citizen Strangers. An older body of scholarship deals 
primarily with the economic realities of Palestinians in Israel, including during the first decades of the state: 
Khalidi, The Palestinian Economy in Israel; Noah Lewin-Epstein and Moshe Semyonov, The Arab 




primary school. There was a military administration, we can’t leave [the village], and 
there was hunger… So, we went to work,“ Ahmad Masarweh, of ‘Ar‘ara in the Triangle, 
recalls.387 Munir Qa‘war (b. 1940), of nearby Kafr Qar‘, the eldest of four siblings when 
his father passed away in 1951, remembers that, “Israel was just established, there were 
problems everywhere, and people were hungry. People don’t have [food] to eat.” Munir’s 
father had saved enough money to sustain the family after his passing until Munir had 
finished the 8th grade, “and after that, there is no more money. I have to go to work.”388 
Among the narrators who were or came of school age after Israel’s establishment, 
Munir was hardly alone in having completed only his primary schooling. As mentioned 
above, the inaccessibility of a high school education, geographically as well as 
financially, compounded poverty in motivating children to search for work. Of the 
individuals whose narratives form the basis of this chapter, only Muhammad Abu Ahmad 
(b. 1943) of Nazareth, Anis Khoury (b. 1952) of Tarshiha, and Sadeq Dallasheh (b. 1954) 
of Bu‘eine, graduated high school. Both however, recall working in construction during 
high school as well. Sadeq stated that he would have never been able to finance his high 
school studies, for which he had to leave Bui‘ene and rent an apartment in ‘Ilabun, had he 
not saved money working in construction during the summer breaks.389 
 
387 Interview with Ahmad Yusuf Masarweh, ‘Ar‘ara, October 10, 2018. 
388 Interview with Munir Qa‘war, Kafr Qar‘, October 13, 2018. 
389 See, fn. 380 above. Interviews with Sadeq Dallasheh, Bu‘eine, October 19, 2018 and Muhammad Abu 
Ahmad, Nazareth, October 20, 2018. 
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During the first two decades of Israeli statehood, work in agriculture was the most 
readily available.390 Ahmad Yusuf Masarweh first found work in Zikhron Ya‘akov, a 
Jewish settlement roughly twenty kilometers west of ‘Ar‘ara, at the age of thirteen. Munir 
Qa’war first found work in agriculture in Giv‘at ‘Ada, several kilometers from his 
hometown of Kafr Qar‘, at a similar age. This remained true for younger narrators. Sadeq 
Dallasheh recalls, “the first daily wage I made in my life, I was eight or nine years old.” 
When the family’s finances were particularly tight, he would work alongside his mother 
in the fields below Bu‘eine.391 
While not as widespread as agricultural labor, the construction industry, which 
faced a shortage of skilled professionals and the housing needs of massive immigration 
waves, was among the first branches to absorb Palestinian workers. As early as October 
1949, a British diplomatic report noted that despite the dominant preference for Jewish 
employees – that is, the continuation of the pre-state policy of Hebrew labor, now 
undergirded by a state apparatus –  “certain Arab elements, such as skilled carpenters and 
others, whose services are necessary to the authorities, readily find employment in the 
construction of the new Jewish settlements.”392 
Solel Boneh, the Histadrut’s contracting arm first established in the early 1920s, 
and one of the most powerful corporations in the state, was an early recruiter in the 
 
390 Statistics regarding the percentage of Palestinian citizens in Israel employed in agriculture between 
1948-1973 vary. What is clear, however, is that if during the first decade of the state the percentage of 
Palestinians employed in agriculture was around or above 50%, in the second decade it decreased to around 
40%, and by the early 1970s, to just over 20%. See: Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov, The Arab Minority, 47-
51; Khalidi, The Arab Economy, 113-125; Jiryis, The Arabs in Israel, 304-305. 
391 Interviews with Ahmad Yusuf Masarweh, ‘Ara‘ara, October 10, 2018 and Sadeq Dallasheh, October 19, 
2018. 
392 TNA: FO 371/75268, 6-7, 9-10. For the Israeli authorities’ and the Histadrut’s pursual of a policy of 
Hebrew labor after 1948, see fn. 317 above. 
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country’s north. Mikhail Haddad (b. 1926) of Tarshiha, who was working in construction 
in Damascus when the war erupted, found work with Solel Boneh in Tarshiha itself just 
after Jewish forces occupied the village in 1948. He was employed in repairing homes 
whose Palestinian owners had fled or been driven out, so that they could house new 
Jewish immigrants.393 Shawqi Khoury (b. 1931) of Fassuta, had no prior experience in 
construction when he began working for Solel Boneh, building the new cooperative 
agricultural settlement (moshav) Hosen to Tarshiha’s southeast, in 1949. He remembers 
however that those with prior experience and skill were the first to be recruited. His 
recollections align both with Mikhail Haddad’s narrative and the 1949 British diplomatic 
reported cited above, as he notes that “in Tarshiha especially there were excellent 
craftsmen…. [T]here were carpenters, ironworkers…. They would be accepted straight 
away as expert craftsmen.”394  
Ibrahim Shamshoum (b. 1933), of ‘Arrabe, was following in his father’s footsteps 
when he first set out to Haifa in 1950 or 1951 hoping to find work in a concrete block 
factory at the age of seventeen or eighteen. Ibrahim’s family had fled their hometown of 
Nazareth to ‘Arrabe after the fall of Haifa in April 1948. He recalls that for roughly two 
years “there was no work” in ‘Arrabe, prompting him to leave for Haifa. When I first 
asked Ibrahim, later a contractor and a leading figure in the ‘Arrabe branch of the 
communist party, how he had started working in construction, he replied, “my father was 
 
393 Interview with Mikhail Haddad, Tarshiha, October 21,2018. Mikhail’s story, poignant as it may be, was 
not unique. Palestinians elsewhere were also employed in renovating and even demolishing the homes of 
their neighbors-turned-refugees, to make way for new Jewish immigrants. Andrew Ross presents the 
narrative of Jiryis Sakas of Kafr Yassif, whose father, an experienced builder and quarry owner, worked in 
demolition and construction for Solel Boneh in his hometown of al-Birwa, only a few years after he and his 
family were driven from it. Ross, Stone Men, 41-45. 
394 Interview with Shawqi Khoury, Tarshiha, October 21, 2018. 
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a builder” (abui kan mu‘alim ‘amar).395 Whenever he explained how he learned a certain 
skill, Ibrahim always referred back to this familial heritage.396 
Most narrators, however, had neither family legacies nor prior experience in 
construction work. By the time they came to work in construction, they usually had 
already worked in agriculture or other physical labor.397 What drew most of them to 
construction work was that when there was demand for workers, wages were 
considerably higher than those in any other occupations available to them. All narrators 
agreed that wages in construction were higher than those offered in agriculture.398 When I 
asked Ibrahim Zahalqa (b. 1944) of Kafr Qar‘, if he recalls whether many others in the 
village also worked in construction when he began working in 1964, he said,  
Yes. Many… There was no work, only this… Working at that time, say, in ’64 or 
’65, if we had to work in agriculture it would be four [Israeli] Pounds a day… 
And in construction it was double, double and then some, more than ten Pounds [a 
day].399 
 
Ibrahim’s insistence that work in the construction industry for many of his peers 
was also a product of limited choices - “there was no work, only this” - was echoed by 
other narrators, including those who, like Ibrahim, built entire careers in the industry.400 
 
395 Interview with Ibrahim Shamshoum, ‘Arrabe, October 12, 2018. 
396 Interview with Ibrahim Shamshoum, ‘Arrabe, October 12, 2018. 
397 Ahmad Yusuf Masarweh, for example, mentions working in gardening for a period. Interview with 
Ahmad Yusuf Masarweh, ‘Ar‘ara, October 10, 2018. 
398 Muhammad Abu Ahmad, who was the Secretary of the Construction Workers Association in the 
Nazareth area from 1963-1980, mentioned agriculture’s seasonality as another reason why construction was 
a preferred trade. However, as Bernstein and Swirski, and indeed some of the narrators I interviewed 
mentioned, the structure of employment in construction was hardly stable and could easily be considered 
“seasonal” as well, if for different reasons. Interview with Muhammad Abu Ahmad, Nazareth, October 20, 
2018; Bernstein and Swirski, “The Rapid Economic Development of Israel,” 72-3. 
399 Interview with Ibrahim Zahalqa, Kafr Qar‘, October 7, 2018. 
400 Interviews with Ahmad Yusuf Masarweh, ‘Ar‘ara, October 10, 2018 and Shawqi Khoury, Tarshiha, 
October 21, 2018. 
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Muhammad Abu Ahmad, who was the Secretary of the Construction Workers 
Association in the Nazareth area from 1963-1980, linked this notion of construction as 
work for those “who have no other choice,” to early safety problems in the industry and 
the widespread denigration of so called “Arab labor” (‘avoda ‘aravit) in Jewish Israeli 
culture, 
…People simply weren’t experts. Like I said, this idea of “Arab labor” didn’t 
come from nothing. A significant number of these Arab workers who came to 
construction, came because they had no other choice. You work in 
construction.401 
 
This sense of having no other choice should not be confused with self-denigration 
or denigration of their craft among the narrators themselves. Fissures appeared and 
experiences of hurt, discrimination, and frustration surfaced even in the narratives of 
individuals who at first sought to portray an idyllic picture of professional relations 
between Palestinians and Jews. Yet, narrators never expressed shame in doing work “no 
one else would.” On the contrary even, as Muhammad himself put it, 
There’s a common saying: We the Arabs built this country. What are you [the 
Jews] saying? Who built this country? Who built Haifa? The kibbutzim? The 
hotels? We the Arabs built this country…. What, doesn’t the country belong to 
us? Don’t we belong to the country?402 
 
 
401 Interview with Muhammad Abu Ahmad, Nazareth, October 20, 2018. 
402 Interview with Muhammad Abu Ahmad, Nazareth, October 20, 2018. In his 1974 novel, The Strange 
Events of the Disappearance of Sa‘id abi al-Nahs al-Mutasha’il (published in English under the title, The 
Secret Life of Saeed the Pessoptimist), widely considered one of the most important works of Palestinian 
literature in the twentieth century, Emile Habiby expresses a similar sentiment, cited also in the epigraph to 
the Introduction above: “… who erected the buildings, paved the roads, dug and planted the earth of Israel, 
other than the Arabs who remained there?” Emile Habiby, The Secret Life of Saeed: The Pessoptimist, 
trans. Salma Khadra Jayyusi and Trevor LeGassick (Brooklyn, N. Y: Interlink Pub Group, 2001), 81. 
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I mentioned this formulation again later when asking Muhammad about its 
relationship to the many difficulties workers experienced under the military 
administration. His reply made explicit the claim’s link to Zionist discourses of 
republican citizenship as a basis of rights, even as these had moved away from “building 
the land” to military service: “It was prominent. We would even say it just like that, 
openly. We argued, ‘What, what do you have more than me? What, you went to the 
army? I built the country!’”403 
Sadeq Dallasheh drew a related parallel, albeit without mentioning military 
service directly. Instead, he described construction work among Palestinian citizens in 
Israel as akin to the institution of “national service” (sherut leumi). “National service,” is 
a state-supervised system of voluntary work in pre-approved civil society organizations. 
It is offered to some citizens as an alternative to Israel’s mandatory military conscription. 
Such “service” is viewed both as a means for citizens who wish to contribute to the 
(national) community but cannot serve in the military to do so, and as a way for those 
individuals to enjoy at least some of the rights and social and material rewards military 
service grants.404 Unlike Muhammad Abu Ahmad, who sought to cast construction work 
 
403 Interview with Muhammad Abu Ahmad, Nazareth, October 20, 2018. For a discussion of the ethno-
nationalist republican citizenship model in the Zionist settlement enterprise (the Yishuv) and in Israel, as it 
operated in parallel to other models from the Ottoman period onwards, see: Gershon Shafir and Yoav 
Peled, Being Israeli: The Dynamics of Multiple Citizenship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002). For an overview of the historical cycles of “militarization” and the social and political 
“convertibility” of military service in the Yishuv and Israeli society, see: Yagil Levy, “Social Convertibility 
and Militarism: Evaluations of the Development of Military-Society Relations in Israel in the Early 2000s,” 
Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Summer 2003), 73-80. 
404 The national service system was originally introduced in 1971 to allow religious Jewish women to 
perform an alternative form of service other than Israel’s mandatory military conscription. According to the 
letter of the law, Palestinian citizens in Israel are all legally required to serve in the military. However, the 
state has refrained from conscripting the vast majority of Palestinians with Israeli citizenship (aside from 




as a form of republican participation by comparing it to military service, Sadeq’s 
comparison was aimed towards both construction work’s ubiquity among Palestinian men 
in Israel, and the material benefits it provides: 
One thing remains [constant], it [i.e., construction] is a national service. [It is a 
form of national service] for an Arab…. How do I get to this [conclusion]? It’s 
[like] a national service. I want to go and study at the university? I need some 
money to pay tuition. Now, where do I work? The simplest thing, whenever I 
want, I can find work in construction, it’s always like that.405 
 
Sadeq’s mention of university tuition is hardly coincidental. Higher-education 
tuition support is a key material benefit given to those who serve in the military or in the 
national service system. Construction, in Sadeq’s telling, is comparable to national 
service for Palestinians, not because of its contribution to a nation and nationalism which 
are not their own and have historically developed at their expense. Most Palestinian 
political parties and civil society organizations in Israel have consistently opposed the 
participation of Palestinian youth in national service programs, which they view as means 
for their cooptation and the neutralization of their civil, economic, and national demands. 
Rather, for Sadeq, construction for Palestinians serves a similar function as national 
service does for some Jewish Israelis, in that it provides income which can be used to 
 
various political parties and civil rights organizations have advocated that Palestinian citizens either be 
required or permitted to volunteer to national service as well. Both right-wing and liberal parties and 
organizations have promoted such proposals, which became, as Rhoda Kanaaneh states, “a recurring 
theme.” These parties have typically argued, according to their political orientation, that certain rights 
should be conditional upon such service, or that Palestinian citizens should not be blocked from the rights 
and material advantages it provides. See: Suhad Daher-Nashif, “Trapped Escape: Young Palestinian 
Women and the Israeli National-Civic Service,” Arab Studies Journal Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2017): 34-58. 
Rhoda Kanaaneh, Surrounded: Palestinian Soldiers in the Israeli Military (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2009), esp. chapter 1-4; Moshe Sherer, “National Service in Israel: Motivations, Volunteer 
Characteristics, and Levels of Content,” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 33, no. 1 (March 2004): 
94-95. 
405 Interview with Sadeq Dallasheh, Bu‘eine, October 19, 2018. 
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fund higher education. Greater access to higher education through tuition support has 
been a central point for those advocating that Palestinians join national service programs 
en masse. Construction work, Sadeq effectively argues, already functions similarly for 
some.406  
Sadeq himself gained most of his experience in construction between 1970-1973, 
when he worked in the southern port of Eilat and in the Dead Sea to save up for 
university and later during university breaks. Before this he had paid his way through 
high school by working in construction during the summers. Throughout our 
conversation, Sadeq repeatedly mentioned the influence his parents’ emphasis on 
education had on his siblings and him. Their mother would meticulously check her 
children’s homework daily, only to reveal to them later in life that she was in fact 
illiterate. But the link between construction work and funding education as a device for 
social mobility appears to have been broader and at least to some extent generational.407 
Anis Khoury (b. 1952) of Tarshiha, a career educator and former school principal, 
 
406 Kanaaneh, Surrounded, 32-34;  Janaan Bsoul, “’Ha-Sherut ha-Leumi Hu Kli le-’Iluf ‘Aravim Tze’irim’” 
[“The National Service is a Tool for Taming Young Arabs”] TheMarker, November 26, 2015 
https://www.themarker.com/career/1.2784783 [last accessed: July 1, 2020]. Another possible interpretation 
of the notion of construction work as “national service,” which may have also underpinned Sadeq’s 
invocation of the idea, is bleaker still. Raja Khalidi describes the high mobility demanded of Palestinians 
with Israeli citizenship who wished to participate in the workforce as a “national service” as well. While 
never stated explicitly, Khalidi’s use of the term in a section which describes Palestinian workers’ 
migration as “a path to survival” and a matter of little choice, indicates that this “service” could also be 
understood as coerced. In a recent interview in the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz, the Palestinian poet and 
playwright, Ayman Kamel Agbaria, drew a similar parallel to Sadeq’s. Explaining that after high school 
and before going to university he worked in construction, Agbaria jokingly noted, “construction work is 
like a year of public service for us.” Vered Lee, “The Palestinian Poet Who Refuses to Be the Court Jester 
of Israeli Literature,” Ha’aretz, February 6, 2020 https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-the-
palestinian-poet-who-refuses-to-be-the-court-jester-of-israeli-literature-1.8499307 [last accessed: April 1, 
2020]. I thank Orit Bashkin for calling the interview with Agbaria to my attention. 
407 Interview with Sadeq Dallasheh, Bu‘eine, October 19, 2018. 
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worked at Solel Boneh for several years to fund his academic studies.408 And although 
Munir Qa‘war himself left school for work at thirteen, he recalls that funding school and 
academic studies for his youngest brother – whose birth in 1953 was part of what drove 
Munir to seek a job in the first place – was an important motivation for him. Multiple 
narrators mentioned the ability to fund higher education for their children as the 
consideration behind their continued work in the construction industry. Motivations to 
seek work in construction then, could morph from the strict purpose of ad hoc survival to 
more elaborate considerations of possible futures and social advancement, within an 
individual’s lifetime.409 
The experiences of Palestinian citizens who worked in construction during the 
first two and a half decades of the state, shaped their attempts at homemaking (and 
remaking) in various ways. The dire financial need which drove workers constituted an 
obvious material connection between the two realms. Meanwhile, rhetoric emphasizing 
the crucial role Palestinians played in Israel’s construction industry to reinforce their 
claims of belonging to the land, and its belonging to them, constituted an ideological and 
affective connection. Through a repurposing of the state’s and Zionism’s idioms, these 
rhetorical uses challenged both Palestinians marginalization under the new state and the 
broader doubts Zionist ideology cast on their connection to the land. The following 
sections highlight how the role of Palestinian citizens working in the Israeli construction 
industry shaped other processes of homemaking which workers, their families, and their 
 
408 Conversation with Anis and Layla Khoury, Tarshiha, October 21, 2018. 
409 Interview with Munir Qa‘war, Kafr Qar‘, October 13, 2018. 
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communities engaged in - the making of homes away from home and the use of expertise 
gained in construction work to build and refashion Palestinian homes. 
 
In Search of Home, In Search of Shelter 
Throughout the economic ebbs and flows of Israel’s first decades, in construction as 
elsewhere, the unequal distribution of government resources and economic activity drew 
a relatively clear occupational map: very little work was available in the centers of 
Palestinian life within Israel.410 Employment required workers to travel, often far away. 
This was particularly true in construction, where in 1961, 81% of Palestinian employees 
commuted to work.411 The poor infrastructure and barely existing public transportation in 
many Arab locales meant that the problem of Palestinian “commuters” (mutanaqilun), 
was often a major preoccupation in the pages of the Communist Party’s al-Ittihad, the 
period’s major Arabic-language newspaper.412 
Among the difficulties that lacking infrastructure, transportation and movement 
restrictions imposed upon Palestinian workers was the need to find a place to stay near 
places of employment, which were either too far or too dangerous to travel to and from 
 
410 See Haidar, On the Margins, Chapter 5. 
411 Haidar, On the Margins, 94.  
412 See, for example: al-Ittihad, January 17, 1963, 2; al-Ittihad, March 27, 1964, 5; al-Ittihad, May 22, 
1964, 6. See also: Haidar, On the Margins, 110-112; Khalidi, The Arab Economy, 141-145. Both Khalidi 
and Haidar discuss these patterns as “mobilities” rather than migration, indicating perhaps how such 
patterns anticipated the “circular mobilities” which Naama Blatman-Thomas describes among middle-class 
Palestinian citizens in Israel who have moved to the Jewish-Israeli city of Karmiel. Naama Blatman-
Thomas, “Commuting for Rights: Circular Mobilities and Regional Identities of Palestinians in a Jewish-
Israeli Town,” Geoforum 78 (January 2017): 22–32. 
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on a daily basis. To do so, workers made and inhabited multiple kinds of shelters.413 
These ranged from housing for livestock, through the construction sites of homes-in-the-
making of which they were the first inhabitants, to grave-like pits in the open field, 
shared apartments and leased rooms in family homes. This section explores these various 
forms of shelter as recounted by interviewees, and the range of physical and emotional 
experiences they engendered: dehumanization alongside politicization, the tolls and 
wages of passing alongside the threat of exposure, fragile intimacies alongside the 
alienation of being cast as a racialized threat, isolation alongside solidarity. The section 
further explores questions of visibility and invisibility, both as conditions forced upon 
Palestinian workers and as strategies workers employed.414 
When Ahmad Yusuf Masarweh describes the sleeping arrangements in Zikhron 
Ya‘akov, where he began working in 1952 at the age of 13, he refers to “reserving a room 
in a hotel before you go.” He clarifies, “that is, you check in which cowshed your friend 
is sleeping.” Then the tone of his description shifts rapidly, 
 
413 The question of housing for migrant laborer populations, including internal migrant labor, and the 
various effects of the housing question on social, cultural, political and gender issues, is one that arose in 
multiple colonial and post-colonial contexts. The degree to which colonial or state governments intervened 
in offering solutions to the problem has varied widely. See, for example: Jane Bristol-Rhys, “Socio-Spatial 
Boundaries in Abu Dhabi,” in Migrant Labour in the Persian Gulf, edited by Mehran Kamrava and Zahra 
Babar (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 59-84; Julie Greene, The Canal Builders: Making 
America’s Empire at the Panama Canal (New York: Penguin Press, 2009); Luise White, The Comforts of 
Home: Prostitution in Colonial Nairobi (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1990), especially chapter 3. 
The widespread neglect of migrant laborer populations is also partially responsible for the emergence of 
what Mike Davis has called the “Planet of Slums.” Mike Davis, Planet of Slums (London: Verso, 2006).  
414 This specific kind of homemaking was shared also with other commuting workers, many of them young 
teenagers. For example, a report on youth between ages 12-17 in Nazareth, authored as part of the work of 
the government’s Committee for the Employment and Vocational Training Problems of Arab Youth in late 
1961, and dealing primarily with young teenagers employed in coffee shops, restaurants and retail 
locations, mentions instances of up to 15 teenagers sharing a room in Haifa during the winter months, when 




I was fourteen, thirteen, fifteen, it was the first time I had the honor of getting to 
know headlice. You get a job, you dwell in the cowshed, you wake up at five in 
the morning, water the garden, collect the eggs from the coop, hitch the mule to 
the wagon, and that’s just the yard work. Until you actually start moving to the 
fields, it doesn’t count [as work], what counts is when you first lift the hoe 
(turiye) until you put it down… 
After that, that’s when I started understanding what the French Revolution was 
about, and the exploitation, through having experienced it on your [own] body. 
You can’t understand if you haven’t been through that experience. It remains 
[only as] things that are said. But going through it, at [that] age… [When you’re] 
working and you doubt you’ll be paid. And what’s more you’re enslaved 
(meshu‘abad), you’re a tool. You have to [work] from five till six-seven at night. 
And then you go to Tel Aviv, and there it’s only construction, or gardening.415 
 
Ahmad, a lifelong political radical, narrates his politicization at a young age as 
rooted in the felt experiences of exploitative labor: from the difficulty of work itself – 
measured by employers strictly according to the particular physical activity of using the 
hoe; through the impact the sanitary conditions of the cowshed “hotel” had on his body 
(“it was the first time I had the honor of getting to know headlice”); to the insecurity of 
whether you will be paid for your labor. These physical hardships reduced Ahmad in his 
own eyes to a “tool”, enslaved, and not in control of his own body. Revolutionary 
politics, he seems to argue, can only be truly understood through experiences like these. 
Otherwise “it remains [only] things that are said.”  
After leaving Zikhron Ya‘akov – an episode he narrates as an escape - Ahmad 
lived in Yakum, a kibbutz on the Mediterranean coast, for a brief but formative period. 
He arrived in Yakum at the invitation of the short-lived “Pioneer Arab Youth” movement 
(No‘ar ‘Aravi Halutzi), an initiative for Palestinian youth established by the Shomer 
Tza‘ir (“Young Guard”), a socialist Zionist movement, at the time still committed, at 
 
415 Interview with Ahmad Yusuf Masarweh, ‘Ar‘ara, October 10, 2018. 
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least outwardly, to a bi-national vision for the fledgling state. At Yakum, Ahmad and 
three other teens who arrived with him were given Hebrew names. Ahmad became 
“Tzvi.” He and fourteen other Palestinian teens lived on the Kibbutz, studying, working, 
and eating with their Jewish peers. Yet, Ahmad noticed that while Jewish teens studied 
for five hours a day and worked for three, Palestinian teens studied for three and worked 
for five. While supposedly a result of the groups’ different funding sources, the message 
the arrangement relayed was clear to him: Palestinians were considered better served, and 
better utilized, dedicating their time to physical labor rather than to learning.416 
Although he left Yakum disillusioned with the movement, Ahmad’s experiences 
there were crucial to his ability to navigate the next episode of his life in Tel Aviv. When 
he first arrived in the city to look for work, he continued presenting himself as “Tzvi,” 
passing as Jewish. His ability to do so successfully no doubt depended on the cultural and 
linguistic skills and the manners of behavior and comportment he acquired at Yakum.417 
 
416 Interview with Ahmad Yusuf Masarweh, ‘Ar‘ara, October 10, 2018. For a journalistic article on the 
“Pioneer Arab Youth” which features interviews with Ahmad and others who participated in the 
movement, see: Ayelet Bechar, “When Arabs Were Invited to Live the Zionist Dream,” Ha’aretz, July 26, 
2019 https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium.MAGAZINE-the-experiment-that-invited-israeli-
arabs-to-live-the-zionist-dream-1.7575293 [last accessed: July 1, 2020]. 
417 While Ahmad does not mention it, both his appearance and his knowledge of Arabic would have made 
passing as a young Mizrahi Jew, perhaps a relatively recent immigrant, entirely plausible. The possibility of 
passing as Mizrahi Jews is alluded to in “I am Ahmad” as well, as described below. The practice of 
adopting a Hebrew sounding name in order to pass as Jewish, particularly in the workplace, is still extant 
among Palestinians working in Jewish locales in Israel/Palestine. See for example: Andreas Hackl, 
“Immersive Invisibility in the Settler-Colonial City: The Conditional Inclusion of Palestinians in Tel Aviv,” 
American Ethnologist 45, no. 3 (August 2018), 346. For other works which explore questions of passing in 
Israel/Palestine, see: Judit Druks, “Passing As… in Arab Labor by Sayed Kashua on Israeli TV,” Third 
Text  (March 18, 2020), DOI: 10.1080/09528822.2020.1735762; Liora Sion, “Passing as Hybrid: Arab-
Palestinian Teachers in Jewish Schools,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 37, no. 14 (December, 2014): 2636–
2652; Orna Sasson‐Levy and Avi Shoshana, “‘Passing’ as (Non)Ethnic: The Israeli Version of Acting 
White,” Sociological Inquiry 83, no. 3 (2013): 448–472; Gil Hochberg, “To Be or Not to Be an Israeli 
Arab: Sayed Kashua and the Prospect of Minority Speech-Acts,” Comparative Literature 62, no. 1 (2010): 
68–88; Carol Bardenstein, “Cross/Cast: Passing in Israeli and Palestinian Cinema,” in Palestine, Israel, and 
the Politics of Popular Culture, eds. Rebecca L. Stein and Ted Swedenburg (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2005): 99-125. 
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As “Tzvi,” Ahmad soon exchanged the cowshed “hotels” and the Kibbutz 
dormitories for a more hospitable arrangement in Ramat Gan, a city just outside Tel 
Aviv. His early experiences there were also a reminder, however, that he, like many 
Palestinians who were looking for work in Jewish towns at the time, was still very much 
a child. As he describes them, he becomes visibly emotional: 
I started going from place to place, I arrived at a house, [there] an older woman, she 
takes me on for work. I worked in the yard. She made me food, washed my clothes. 
There was a pot over a fire [in which she washed the clothes]. She looked for work 
for me, gave me tools…. [Later] I went and wrote a letter to her, [telling her] who I 
am.418 
 
That living arrangement, and the ongoing ties with the family he stayed with were 
at times more fragile, at least from Ahmad’s perspective, than he initially makes 
apparent. The woman’s daughter (who later also became a lifelong friend), was at the 
time a captain in the Israeli army: “When I was working in the garden, the daughter 
came, a captain, that’s real military. I was shaking, I couldn’t respond, you have to think 
of a situation of terror. I had no idea [what to do], I was ‘Tzvi’ then.” Ahmad’s fear of 
having his true identity exposed by an army officer was well-founded. Even though he 
was a minor, as a Palestinian from ‘Ar‘ara, without a permit, his presence and 
employment in Ramat Gan were deemed unlawful under military rule. Being caught 
would have risked his ability to financially support his family. It could also lead to costly 
 
418 Interview with Ahmad Yusuf Masarweh, ‘Ar‘ara, October 10, 2018. 
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fines and even the imprisonment of an adult family member who might be demanded to 
serve a sentence on Ahmad’s behalf.419 
After the 1967 war, the woman who took him into her home, Ms. Levin, sought 
out Ahmad (who had previously revealed his identity to her) to discuss her disillusion 
with Zionism in the war’s wake. They remained in contact until Ms. Levin passed. When 
Ahmad describes their final conversations, the impact of her attitude towards him when 
he was a young teenager is evident, 
… I was in touch with this woman until the end of her days, she has a daughter in 
Ma‘agan Mikhael [a kibbutz on the Mediterranean coast]. [I] came there [to meet 
her], and she told me, “Ahmad, what do you want? I’m done [i.e., I am about to 
die].” I tell her, “That’s your business, but my business is that I can’t forget. You 
making me a sandwich, washing my clothes, and looking for a job for me. That 
was a home (ze haya bayt). It was a refuge from the jungle.” 
Nimrod: It was an alternative to sleeping in the fields. 
Ahmad: No! No! The attitude (yaḥas) [i.e., the way she treated and related to 
Ahmad] first of all. An attitude that just wasn’t there.420 
 
Ahmad was emphatic in correcting my misunderstanding. I had suggested his 
gratitude towards Ms. Levin was perhaps largely a product of the typically harsh 
alternatives he had for staying at her home. The kinds of temporary dwellings he found in 
a Zikhron Ya‘akov cowshed, or later in the fields outside of Tel Aviv. What made Ms. 
Levin’s house a home for Ahmad, however, was first and foremost the kindness and care 
she had shown him. “The jungle” from which Ahmad sought refuge was defined not only 
by its often-inhumane physical conditions, but also by the terror and the invisibility it 
 
419 Shira Robinson discusses multiple instances of sanctions and punishment meted upon Palestinians 
citizens who authorities considered in violation of the work and employment restrictions under the military 
administration, including sanctions imposed on working children and their relatives. See Robinson, Citizen 
Strangers  ̧42-45. 
420 Interview with Ahmad Yusuf Masarweh, ‘Ar‘ara, October 10, 2018. 
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forced upon Palestinian workers. Since he had come to that “jungle,” Ms. Levin was the 
first person to see Ahmad as a full human being, deserving of her kindness, affection, and 
care. When he revealed his identity to her, Ms. Levin told him she had already realized he 
was Palestinian long before. Unlike at Yakum, where the identity of “Tzvi” was forced 
upon him, he could be Ahmad with her.421  
Other experiences of such living arrangements demonstrate the various shades of 
fragile intimacies they fostered. At thirteen, Munir Qa‘war left agricultural work in 
Giv‘at ‘Ada in 1953 and set out to find work in the Tel Aviv area. In Jaffa, he found work 
and a home of sorts: 
I went and found work there in Jaffa with some Bulgarian man. He had thirty-four 
sheep and he wanted someone to take them out to pasture…. 
He had a woman, and they told me, you’ll get fifty Pounds a month and we’ll give 
you food. And the woman would, the Bulgarians would make these red peppers 
filled with burghul…. And we weren’t familiar with this, but I grew used to it 
since [laughs]. And this woman, I mean, she loved me, loved me so much. Even 
as a child, I mean… her love entered my heart.  
…I worked there, maybe for three weeks or a month [each time], before coming 
home. And my mom, my mom is here [in Kafr Qar‘] and she’s crying and saying, 
“how do you manage son?” And I tell her, “Listen, this is what I want, to work. 
And that’s that.”422 
 
Assuming an adult role by refuting his mother’s concerns while recalling the care 
of the Jewish woman he worked for, hints at the role the latter was fulfilling for Munir 
when he was away from home. But there were also components in the relationship which 
seem to have made Munir somewhat uneasy, as he moved between the roles of child and 
adult: 
 
421 In this sense, Ms. Levin had provided Ahmad with a “homeplace” as hooks defines it – a humanizing 
place of nurture, care and rest. See fn. 378, above. 
422 Interview with Munir Qa‘war, Kafr Qar‘, October 13, 2018. 
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Munir: So, you see, back then there weren’t showers like there are now. And there 
was a warehouse by the [house], and when once a month I wanted to go back 
home, she would boil water, the woman, and bring it to me, and she would say, 
“Listen, I want to help you [bathe].” And I tell her, “No, I’m a big boy already, I 
can do it myself, even my mother doesn’t help me.” And I, I’m sorry, I mean, 
there are people who think, I mean, that this was maybe related to sex…. I didn’t 
know what sex was. But I knew, when I grew up, that the woman’s intention was 
good. Her intention wasn’t, god forbid, that she would, with a child, ummm, 
something. She wanted to help me because she loved me, I mean, as a child. She 
loved me as a child. Because her whole behavior wasn’t a behavior of, of… 
Nimrod: It was motherly behavior? 
Munir: Yes, [the behavior] of a mother. Of mother and child. That’s what I tell 
them.423 
 
Munir speaks of this episode in his relationship with this significantly older 
Jewish woman who was both his employer and functioned as a surrogate mother to him, 
as though the suggestion that there may have been a sexual component to it sullies a 
connection he remembers as “pure.” The episode itself, meanwhile, demonstrates yet 
another layer of the emotional and physical vulnerability young Palestinians experienced 
in their attempts to provide for their families. It also shows how fraught questions of 
masculinity and sexuality could become for young Palestinian men working away from 
home. 
Munir’s vulnerability contrasts with common Jewish Israeli perceptions of the 
masculinity and sexuality of Palestinian workers engaged in physical labor in Jewish 
localities, as essentially threatening.424 Shawqi Khoury recalls working as a plasterer in 
Beit Oren, a kibbutz not far from Haifa, 
 
423 Interview with Munir Qa‘war, Kafr Qar‘, October 13, 2018. 
424 A considerable body of scholarship has investigated perceptions of the racialized “other” and the 
“native” as a sexual threat in colonial and settler colonial contexts, from the attitude towards enslaved 




Shawqi: I don’t remember exactly how we got to Beit Oren, me and a relative. 
We worked as plasterers. We had a reputation as excellent plasterers. We went 
there, we started working in the kibbutz, and they gave us food, a place to sleep, 
showers, everything was fine. We worked there for some time, and they were very 
happy. One day they show up and say, “the work is done, go home.” We went 
home, but there was work [i.e., the work wasn’t done]. And I didn’t know [the] 
reason [they told us to go]…. Thirty years later I meet the construction 
coordinator of Beit Oren at the Party [Mapai]. He was a Party member. He 
recognized me right away, I didn’t so much. [He said] “Hello! Do you remember 
me? I’m Sha’ul who was the construction coordinator at Kibbutz Beit Oren. Do 
you know why we drove you out (girashnu) from Beit Oren?” 
Nimrod: He said, “drove you out?!” 
Shawqi: Yes. I said, “I don’t know, I was still only speaking Hebrew half-and-half 
[at the time].” He [Sha’ul] smiles and laughs…. I’m not saying this to [brag], just 
to say what happened [Shawqi pauses to clarify]…. He [Sha’ul] told me, “Listen 
you were such a handsome guy, all the women in the kibbutz would look.” 
[Shawqi laughs] Really! After thirty years! I came to eat bread! I came to look for 
girls?!425 
 
For Shawqi, this anecdote is an opportunity to boast a little about his good looks 
as a young man (at 88, he still exudes plenty of charisma and charm). What underlay it 
however was at once a fear of the possibility of Palestinians and Jewish Israelis forming 
romantic relationships, and a perception of the Palestinian worker as a sexual threat and 
potential predator, one that needed to be “driven out.” It also placed Shawqi’s concerns in 
stark contrast with those of his employers – he was there “to eat bread” not “to look for 
girls.” 
 
White Women’s Protection Ordinance in New Guinea. See for example: Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, Revolt 
Against Chivalry: Jessie Daniel Ames and the Women’s Campaign Against Lynching, revised edition 
(Columbia University Press, 1993); Jock McCulloch, Black Peril, White Virtue: Sexual Crime in Southern 
Rhodesia, 1902-1935 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000); Ann Laura Stoler, Carnal Knowledge 
and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule, second edition (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2010 [2002]), Chapter 3; Anna Clark, Desire: A History of European Sexuality, second 
edition (Routledge, 2019), Chapter 9. 
425 Interview with Shawqi Khoury, Tarshiha, October 21, 2018. 
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This cultural fear of the sexualized Palestinian man in the Jewish city is also 
referenced in “I Am Ahmad,” the pathbreaking short docudrama which Ahmad 
Masarweh and several partners made based on Ahmad’s experiences in Tel Aviv’s 
construction industry. As Ahmad’s character is walking on a Tel Aviv street behind a 
young Jewish couple, a man and a woman – in a scene which, as Yosefa Loshitzky points 
out itself places Ahmad as a looming threat, despite the film’s generally empathetic and 
sympathetic approach to its protagonist – we hear his internal monologue (in the voice of 
Ahmad Sabr Masarweh):  
At night in a strange city, you are alone. You know that no one [there] cares about 
you. That they absolutely don’t want you here. That they think you are 
dispensable, and that it would be best if you go somewhere [else]: to Canada, or 
to America. Just as long as you’re not here – in their streets; in their homes; in 
front of their women.426 
 
 
426 “Ani Ahmad/Ana Ahmad (I am Ahmad),” directed by Avshalom Katz, written by Ram Loevy, 
Avshalom Katz and Ahmad Yusuf Masarweh, produced by David Ernfeld and Ram Loevy (David Ernfeld, 
1966), film. The concern with such “predatory” patterns among Palestinian men in Jewish spaces, strongly 
reminiscent of colonial fears, dates to the Mandate and has ample representations in Israeli film and 
literature. Examples from the Hebrew press include discussions about one, ‘Abd el-Majid, a Jaffan 
Palestinian who was briefly a suspect during the inquiry into Hayyim Arlosoroff’s murder in 1933 after he 
was bribed to falsely confess his guilt. Right-wing Hebrew newspapers reported on ‘Abd el-Majid’s 
supposed habit of “looking for and chasing Jewish girls in Tel Aviv.” See: Hazit ha-‘Am, March 2, 1934, 1; 
Do’ar ha-Yom, March 4, 1934.  
Beginning in the late 1950s violence between Jews and Arabs within Israel was often portrayed as 
revolving around the rumored pursual of Jewish women by Arab men. Ha-‘Olam ha-Ze, cultivating its 
generally sensationalist line, marked such violence in the town of Rishon Le-Tzion in 1962 as “only the 
beginning” of a wider phenomenon awaiting to erupt. Arab workers working in Jewish cities, the 
newspaper claimed, were the unwitting “explosives” that would eventually set many more cities alight. 
Here again, the seamline between Mizrahi Jewish women and Palestinian Arab men was deemed 
particularly problematic, compounded by the problem of Arabs “passing” as Jews. See: Ha-‘Olam ha-Ze, 
“Rishon Le-Tzion ve-Hal’a,” October 24, 1962, 6-7, 10. For other examples, see: Ma‘ariv, October 27, 
1959, 4; Ora Shamir, “Pogrom,” Kol ha-‘Am, 3 September 1965, 3; Yosef Ben-Meir, “Alfei Tzeirot 
Yehudiut Ovdot be-Ohalei ‘Arav… (Thousands of Young Jewish Women are Lost in the Tents of 
Arabia…),” ha-Tzofe, 28 November 1969, 5. For discussions of cinematic and literary representations of 
the theme, including the treatment of the “desirous Arab” in “I am Ahmad,” see: Yosefa Loshitzky, Identity 
Politics on the Israeli Screen (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2001), chapter 7; Yochai Oppenheimer, 
Me‘ever la-Gader: Yitzug ha-‘Aravim ba-Siporet ha-‘Ivrit u-ha-Yisraelit (1906-2005) [Barriers: The 
Representation of the Arab in Hebrew and Israeli Fiction, 1906-2005] (Tel Aviv: ‘Am ‘Oved, 2008). 
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When work took individuals to “mixed” cities such as Acre or Haifa, or even 
areas of Tel Aviv close enough to Jaffa, workers could at times rent a room or an 
apartment, usually from Palestinian owners who had managed to hold on to their 
property. Bring enough men together and you could rent an apartment, as Shawqi Khoury 
recalls doing in Acre in 1955.427 Ibrahim Shamshoum rented a room in Jaffa with six or 
seven other people in the late 1950s: “There was no kitchen. We cooked in the room, we 
ate in the room, and we slept in the room. And early in the morning we would go to work 
in construction.”428 When Lutuf Suleiman (b. 1950) of Bu‘ineh was fourteen and a half, 
he worked in sewage construction in Haifa. He and others rented rooms in the homes of 
Palestinian families in the city’s Wadi Salib neighborhood.429 
Renting an apartment or even a room was not always an option, however. In 
Jewish cities and towns, where most construction took place, finding property owners 
who would agree to rent rooms to Arabs could be extremely difficult. Of the narrators, 
only one reported even having tried to do so - Ahmad Masarweh - who through trials and 
tribulations, eventually found some success. As will be discussed below, Ahmad 
eventually made creating spaces for himself and other Palestinians in Jewish cities, 
particularly Tel Aviv, a political cause. Before turning to his public struggle, however, it 
is important to look at what alternatives he and other workers had to endure. 
 
 
427 Interview with Shawqi Khoury, Tarshiha, October 21, 2018. 
428 Interview with Ibrahim Shamshoum, ‘Arrabe, October 12, 2018. 
429 Interview with Lutuf Suleiman, Bu‘eine, October 19, 2018. 
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Hidden in Plain Sight 
Multiple narrators reported living on-site during construction – making them effectively 
the first residents of the homes they were building for others. Despite finding a job early-
on with Solel Boneh, in the years immediately following 1948 Shawqi Khoury also took 
on work privately. In 1955 he worked in the northern cooperative settlement, ‘Avdon, 
with fifteen other men from Fassuta. Since none had a permit to work there, they risked 
the journey to ‘Avdon only once every two weeks, riding in the back of a truck covered 
in a canvas sheet, as though they were cargo. Living conditions at the ‘Avdon site 
evolved as work progressed:  
You asked where we would eat? Where we would sleep? …Eating, I organized 
my people from Fassuta. Each one would bring food. We took burghul, we took 
lentils, we took all sorts of things. And I told them, guys, instead of each one 
cooking, I’ll cook, I know how. I would cook for fifteen people. We made a 
wooden table, and they [the workers] would come like soldiers in the army: each 
one would take his portion….. We would sleep under the open sky (taḥat kipat 
ha-shamaim)…. In the field, on the same site. Until you build one house, place 
the roof tiles, and go inside…. To shower, we would stand on a rock, open the 
hose and shower like that. That’s how it was. It was like that in several places, 
and then it started to get better.430  
 
Shawqi and his peers created what he remembers as a positive living space in 
‘Avdon. The invocation of a military-style order in speaking of the eating arrangements 
also indicates the decidedly masculine models he viewed their time there through in 
retrospect. However, the relative freedom experienced in a fledgling, remote settlement 
was difficult to obtain in a Jewish urban context. There matters of class and racism could 
encroach on workers’ attempts to use the worksite as a temporary home. The sort of 
 
430 Interview with Shawqi Khoury, Tarshiha, October 21, 2018. 
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invisibility forced upon Palestinian workers in these contexts was qualitatively different 
to that which Shawqi and his peers employed on the back of the truck en route to ‘Avdon 
and back. It was no longer merely a tactic to evade the persecution of the military 
administration and its regulations. Rather it was the product of broader social pressures 
requiring that Palestinian workers, as racialized and therefore hyper-visible subjects, 
“disappear” at the end of the workday, reappearing only once the next shift began.431  
When Ibrahim Zahalqa first worked in construction at the age of twenty, he was 
employed as a plasterer in a complex of sixteen-story tall buildings in northern Tel Aviv. 
Ibrahim describes the living arrangements there: 
I would sleep on site, but the person we worked for there, he would say, “look, the 
people who live here in Neve Avivim, these are aristocratic people,” I mean, 
“these are big people (anashim gdolim) and they have a lot of money, and they 
want to live where even looking [i.e., even what they see] won’t disturb them. 
And [while] you’re sleeping here, we don’t want you to go outside so that they 
will see you. [If] you sleep here, stay in the rooms or go somewhere where they 
can’t see you.” It was really like that…. Before, there were Druze [workers] there, 
and they [the neighbors] saw them, and made sure they were driven out.432 
 
The fate of the Druze workers made it clear to Ibrahim and his colleagues that it 
was in their interest to do as their employer and the “aristocratic” neighbors demanded. 
 
431 Two theorists of the hyper-visibility of the racialized, and particularly the black body, are Franz Fanon 
and George Yancy. Helen Ngo notes that in the thinking of both Fanon and Yancy such hyper-visibility, 
particularly of black men, is “usually bound with associations of danger and violence,” as in Yancy’s 
discussion of the “elevator effect” and in Fanon’s description of his encounter with a “little white boy” 
terrified by Fanon’s blackness. In both, the result of this sense of hyper-visibility as threat is an alienation 
from one’s own body. Without drawing a facile equation between the experiences of blackness in the 
colonial metropole or the United States and that of Palestinian-ness in Israel/Palestine, it is nonetheless 
important, in my view, to acknowledge their similarities, particularly in order to draw upon the critical 
insight of the many scholars of race who focus on blackness. Ngo, The Habits of Racism, Chapter 2; 
George Yancy, Black Bodies, White Gazes: The Continuing Significance of Race (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2008), especially Chapter 1; Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (New York: Grove Press, 
2008), especially Chapter 5. 
432 Interview with Ibrahim Zahalqa, Kafr Qar‘, October 7, 2018. 
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They made themselves, as best they could, invisible. Of course, such “invisibility” could 
only have been tenuous at best. Throughout the day, their work was extremely visible, 
audible and otherwise an assault on the senses, as anyone who has lived close to a 
massive construction project will attest. The neighbors in Neve Avivim were willing to 
accept the presence of Palestinian workers only during working hours. Otherwise, they 
wanted Ibrahim and his coworkers to be hidden in plain sight.433 
Ibrahim and his coworkers at Neve Avivim were hardly the only Palestinian 
construction workers rendered hidden in plain sight. Arguably the entire phenomenon of 
construction work’s “Palestinianization” was (and remains) dependent upon the work of 
Palestinians in Israel’s construction industry being invisible in various ways: physically, 
legally, and culturally. All the while, the products and processes of their work, even their 
own physical presences in Israel’s essentially segregated landscapes, were often hyper-
visible. Accordingly, as in other structures of “invisible labor” in which work and 
workers are “hidden in plain sight,” some of those seeking to overturn this regime of 
invisibility engaged in what Timothy Pachirat has called “the politics of sight”: 
“organized, concerted attempts to make visible what is hidden and to breach, literally or 
figuratively, zones of confinement in order to bring about social and political 
transformation.”434  
 
433 I borrow the term “hidden in plain sight” from Timothy Pachirat’s 2011 political ethnography about a 
Nebraska slaughterhouse, Every Twelve Seconds. Timothy Pachirat, Every Twelve Seconds: Industrialized 
Slaughter and the Politics of Sight (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011). For a recent study of a 
qualitatively different form of invisibility, defined as “immersive invisibility,” which primarily middle-
class Palestinian citizens experience and practice in contemporary Tel Aviv, see: Hackl, “Immersive 
Invisibility.” 
434 Pachirat, Every Twelve Seconds, 23. “Invisible labor/work,” have for some time now been the object of 




In early 1960s Israel, Ahmad Masarweh enlisted such “politics of sight” to launch 
a public campaign that would make workers like himself and their work visible. He 
enlisted private individuals, the controversial Hebrew weekly ha-‘Olam ha-Ze (This 
World), and as mentioned above, even made the short docudrama, “I am Ahmad,” 
alongside several partners. The experiences Ahmad‘s campaign and the film exposed 
reveal the two final types of homes Palestinian construction workers tried to make for 
themselves in the Jewish city. The first, the encampment, was often the bleakest and most 
physically harsh, hardly deserving of the moniker “home” at all. The second, renting an 
apartment or a room in a “Jewish” environment, made the underlying racialization 
process driving Palestinian exclusion perhaps most apparent. 
During our conversation, Ahmad recalls taking journalists from ha-‘Olam ha-Ze 
to workers’ encampments in the area by Wadi al-Musrara/the Ayalon River – where 
Highway 20 runs today - which separated Tel Aviv from its easternmost 
 
unpaid work carried out primarily by women and not recognized as labor, the concept has since been 
expanded to encompass the unrecognized emotional and habitual components of labor, so-called “virtual” 
and production labor carried out remotely and hidden from consumers, the purposeful erasure of workers’ 
racial/ethnic identities in certain industries, physically sequestered forms of work, and more. Calls for 
expanding the concept’s scope have been accompanied by attempts to better define it as an analytic 
category. To do so, Erin Hatton has suggested that invisible work/labor be defined as “labor that is 
economically devalued through three intersecting sociological mechanisms… cultural, legal and spatial 
mechanisms of invisibility – which operate in different ways and to different degrees.” These mechanisms, 
Hatton is careful to point out, are “intersectional and mutually constitutive.” There can be little doubt, it 
seems to me, that the history of Palestinian citizens’ work in Israel’s construction industry during the period 
under study here and beyond, demonstrates the parallel workings of all three mechanisms Hatton identifies. 
See: Erin Hatton, “Mechanisms of Invisibility: Rethinking the Concept of Invisible Work,” Work, 
Employment and Society, Vol 31, No. 2 (2017): 336-351; Marion G. Crain, Winifred R. Poster, and Miriam 
A. Cherry, eds., Invisible Labour: Hidden Work in the Contemporary World  (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2016); Jill Esbenshade, “The ‘Crisis’ over Day Labour: The Politics of Visibility and 
Public Space,” WorkingUSA, Vol. 3, No. 6 (March/April 2000): 27-70; Arlie Russel Hochschild, The 
Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling, third edition (Berkeley: University of California 




neighborhoods.435 The newspaper, known for its penchant for the shocking and an anti-
establishment editorial line, published a story, “A Jungle in the Heart of the City,” 
accompanied by photographs of the encampments. Shalom Cohen, a leftist Iraqi Jew who 
was a fierce critic of Israel’s Labor Zionist leadership and co-editor of the newspaper, 
painted a shocking picture. The workers lived “in conditions fit for animals…. In the 
foul-smelling Wadi Musrara.” Their beds were made, by “spreading rags on the ground; 
placing a blanket over the rags; under their head they place their work clothes. In the 
winter? They place rusted tins over the blanket.”436 
In one part of the encampment, workers lived in cramped, scorching tin shacks 
they rented from their Jewish owner. Nine workers per shack. Cohen mentions also a 
disused industrial cowshed, whose owner realized that Arab tenants paid much better 
than raising cows. This arrangement was deemed illegal for fear of spreading disease – 
the article does not mention which disease in particular - and was terminated. The 
workers then relocated to the adjacent fields.  
The captions that accompanied the photographs in the article (figs. 5.1-5.3) 
mapped the geography of the encampment onto the spatial division of a contemporary 
middle-class home, complete with guest room, dining room, bedroom, kitchen, and 
hallway. They thus explicitly drew a comparison to the kinds of spaces ha-‘Olam ha-Ze‘s 
readers likely inhabited, quite possibly even as they were reading the article. Cohen’s 
 
435 Interview with Ahmad Yusuf Masarweh, ‘Ar‘ara, October 10, 2018. 
436 “Jungel be-Lev ha-‘Ir (A Jungle in the Heart of the City),” ha-‘Olam ha-Ze, July 24, 1963, 10-11. The 
article itself does not credit a writer, but Shalom Cohen revealed that he wrote it when referring back to it 
in a column three and a half years later, see: Shalom Cohen, “Kor’e Yakar (Dear Reader),” ha-‘Olam ha-
Ze, February 15, 1967, 2. 
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choice to narrate the readers’ visual tour in this sarcastic manner, was no doubt intended 
to throw the severity of the conditions the Palestinian workers lived in into stark relief.  
 
 
Fig. 5.1 “The Guestroom” 
Caption: “The guestroom is a few beds in a field of thorns. The Arab workers sit on the torn mattresses after 
work, receiving their friends who come visit them from the other end of the field. During work hours they 
leave a teenager here to guard their belongings.” 
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Fig. 5.3 “The Hallway” 
Caption: “The hallway 
between the different 
residential areas is the 
bridge of stones and 
planks across the foul-
smelling wadi.”  
Fig. 5.2 “The Dining Room”  
Caption: “The dining room of the members of the Galilean ‘Arab al-Sawa‘ed tribe is simply 
furnished: some empty sacks are used as chairs. In the center: the morning newspaper fills the role 
of the table. The workers cooked the food over a fire in the ‘kitchen’ adjacent to the dining room. 
After the meal they will move to the bedrooms – a long line of iron beds, which cover about a 
quarter of the thicket of thorns.” 
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Cohen’s article placed emphasis not only on the harsh conditions but also on 
differentiating the genesis of workers’ encampments, like the one he visited, from “tin-
neighborhoods” (shkhunot paḥim) elsewhere. Unlike elsewhere in the world, the forces 
creating Tel-Aviv’s encampments were not economic at all, argued Cohen, but rooted in 
a socially upheld racial segregation 
Tel Aviv’s jungle is unlike any other…. Those who live there are not starving 
unemployed. Rather they are workers who do not earn badly, who work more or 
less regularly, and who are in professions for which there is demand. They could 
certainly afford to rent a decent room. But they can’t…. 
No one will rent to them, because they are Arabs. Part of the force of thousands 
who work in the hard, physical jobs in Tel Aviv and its surroundings.437 
 
Cohen then relates stories of workers being rejected by property owners once their 
Arabness was revealed, or neighbors physically trying to prevent Palestinian renters from 
moving in, with “children and mothers” shouting abuse at them. Such scenarios were also 
highlighted in “I am Ahmad.” In one scene, Ahmad and a friend, Mahmud, go looking 
for a room to rent in Tel Aviv. We are told that they have been rejected in six of seven 
apartments they visited. Approaching the seventh, Mahmud suggests they present 
themselves with the Mizrahi sounding Hebrew names Avraham Mizrahi and Yosef Malul 
of Hevel Lakihsh (the Lakhish Region).438 Ahmad refuses and walks away, while 
 
437 “Jungel be-Lev ha-‘Ir,” 10-11. 
438 From the mid-1950s until the early 1960s the Israeli government undertook a mass project of settling 
primarily Mizrahi Jews in the Lakhish Region. For a recent critical study of the settlement project, which is 
also attuned to the racial dynamics that shaped it, see: Smadar Sharon, “Kakh Kovshim Moledet”. 
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Mahmud enters the apartment. A shot of Mahmud’s arm opening a window from the 
inside seems to indicate that as “Avraham,” he may even have been able to rent it.439 
Following the 1963 article in ha-‘Olam ha-Ze, Ahmad Masarweh’s public 
campaign seemed to have gained some traction. Government officials discussed the 
question of establishing a government-run company to build accommodations for 
Palestinian workers in Jewish cities and officially decided to do so in January 1965.440 
However, by February 15, 1967 when Shalom Cohen dedicated his regular column to the 
film “I am Ahmad,” the government’s initiative had dissipated. “Perhaps because the 
problem was almost completely solved,” Cohen writes, “[n]ot by building cheap 
accommodations but by the recession.” “The first to be hurt,” he clarifies, “were the 
scores of Arab workers, concentrated mostly in construction. Due to lack of work, they 
went back to their villages and stayed there.”441  
A “politics of sight” of the sort Ahmad and his partners sought to enact in their 
campaign, has, as Timothy Pachirat reminds us, both “possibilities and pitfalls.”442 In 
 
439 The practice of passing as Jewish is also highlighted elsewhere in the film, when Ahmad Sabr 
Masarweh, the voiceover narrator, relates the story of another Palestinian worker, Jamal, who after being 
beat once, when he was the sole Arab working at a factory, started presenting himself as “Yitzhak”, a 
Hebrew name, and wearing a Star of David necklace. Ahmad Yusuf Masarweh, as noted above, had 
presented himself as “Tzvi” for a prolonged period as a teenager. Ahmad’s refusal to engage in passing in 
the film, in contrast to his real-life experiences, calls attention to the sense of loss which accompanies 
passing, beyond the social, economic, and political gains it entails. This loss is the focal point of Allyson 
Hobbs cultural history of passing, A Chosen Exile. See: Allyson Hobbs, A Chosen Exile: A History of 
Racial Passing in American Life (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014). For works investigating 
passing in Palestine/Israel, see fn. 417 above. 
440 Ha-Olam ha-Ze, January 13, 1965, 26. 
441 Shalom Cohen, “Kor’e Yakar (Dear Reader),” ha-‘Olam ha-Ze, February 15, 1967, 2. What Cohen 
describes in the article, Palestinian workers being the first to be hurt by the recession, seems to have been 
part of a broader discriminatory phenomenon. Several narrators mentioned events when Palestinian 
workers were singled out as “the first to go” at times when project managers decided to fire workers due to 
financial conditions. Interviews with Muhammad Abu Ahmad, Nazareth, October 20, 2018 and with 
Shawqi Khoury, Tarshiha, October 21, 2018. 
442 Pachirat, Every Twelve Seconds, 255. 
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Pachirat’s study of a Nebraska slaughterhouse, he points out how within the 
slaughterhouse a vantage point of total visibility exists alongside internal 
compartmentalization and sequestration which hide “repulsive practices” even at the very 
site on which they take place. Moreover, “[e]ven when intended as a tactic of social and 
political transformation,” Pachirat points out, “the act of making the hidden visible may 
be equally likely to generate other, more effective ways of confining it.”443 
In the case of the Israeli construction industry’s exploitative employment of 
Palestinian workers, it was an event external to the industry, the 1967 war, which 
generated conditions even more conducive for such concealment. Shortly after the war, 
the Israeli construction industry began absorbing non-citizen Palestinian subjects from 
the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip as workers. The latter rapidly eclipsed 
Palestinians with Israeli citizenship in their share in the industry’s workforce. Their 
exploitation within the construction industry and in the Israeli labor market in general, 
took place on an even greater scale, its concealment abetted by even greater degrees of 
physical, political, and social separation and new forms of racialization.444 
West Bank and Gaza Strip Palestinians were devoid of citizenship and of the 
social rights and protections which Palestinian citizens had gradually won over the 
previous decades. In one of the tragedies of Palestinian twentieth-century history, just as 
the latter were gradually relieved of the restrictions of Israel’s internal military 
administration – which, as noted above, were a key component in pushing Palestinian 
citizens in Israel to seek exploitative “informal” employment in the construction industry 
 
443 Pachirat, 253. 
444 Leila Farsakh, Palestinian Labour Migration to Israel; Portugali, Implicate Relations. 
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– the former were placed under a new form of military rule. The encounter of West Bank 
and Gaza Strip Palestinians with the Israeli labor market was shaped, with even greater 
intensity, by much of what shaped the participation of Palestinians with Israeli citizenship 
in the Israeli labor market in the period covered here – land expropriation, de-
development, restrictions on movement and employment.445 From the standpoint of 
Jewish Israeli public opinion, Palestinians from the occupied territories were several 
degrees further removed than Palestinian citizens of the state. “Israeli Arabs” (or “the 
Arabs of Israel”), as the official terminology of the state came to refer to Palestinian with 
Israeli citizenship, remained a suspect population and remained discriminated against, to 
be sure, but the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip were more foreign and 
more suspicious still.446 
Ahmad’s campaign was as personal as it was political. Like several of the other 
narrators, he spent a considerable part of his life as a political and public figure. Unlike 
most of them, however, Ahmad’s political and social circles were often centered in Tel 
Aviv and around figures on the Jewish radical left.447 The list of names he mentioned in 
our conversations could serve as a veritable who’s who of radical Jewish politics and 
 
445 Yael Berda, Living Emergency: Israel’s Permit Regime in the Occupied West Bank, (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2017); Sara M. Roy, The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of de-Development, third 
edition (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2016 [1986]); Farsakh, Palestinian Labour 
Migration to Israel; Portugali, Implicate Relations. 
446 On the significance of the term “Israeli Arabs,” see: Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker, Coffins on Our 
Shoulders, 43-44. 
447 Early on Ahmad was involved with Uri Avneri and Shalom Cohen’s ha-‘Olam ha-Ze - Koah Hadash 
(This World – A New Force) party, a radical party (although Avneri’s “radical” credentials have often 
come under scrutiny) which ran for the Israeli Knesset in 1965 and 1969, and with the Socialist 
Organization in Israel, an organization founded in 1962 by ex-Communist Party members pushed out of the 
party due to their criticism of the Soviet Union. The Socialist Organization of Israel is more commonly 
known by the name of its monthly publication, Matzpen (Compass). Interview with Ahmad Yusuf 
Masarweh, ‘Ar‘ara, October 10, 2018. 
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culture in 1960s Tel Aviv. I understand his attempts to fight not only for the visibility of 
Palestinian workers and their rights, but specifically for spaces for them in the Jewish 
city, as tied to his own sense of belonging to Tel Aviv. At one point during our first 
conversation, he stated, “I’m a Tel Avivian (ani Tel Avivi).”448 
Of the rich textual and audio-visual archive his activism generated, one 
apparently inconsequential item embodies this personal-political nexus of Ahmad’s 
homemaking efforts best. On the bottom of page four of the December 20, 1967 issue of 
ha-‘Olam ha-Ze, a small nondescript ad (fig. 5.4) reads in Hebrew: “Arab youth. Works 
and studies in Tel Aviv. Looking for a room. Call during work hours for Ahmad 
Masarweh, Tel. No. 33264, Tel Aviv.” I asked Ahmad about the ad, which he had not 
mentioned in our conversations, during a phone call. He explained: “I was tired of being 
rejected by apartment owners. I thought that being explicit might be the best option, just 
saying it – “Arab youth” - and seeing what happens.”449 
 
448 Ahmad’s refusal today to consider a politics of separation in Israel/Palestine is also rooted in this 
experience. He uses a Yiddish expression to express this refusal, driving the point further still: ‘I don’t 
believe in, in a matter of Arabs and Jews, and not in two states, it’s all, you don’t know Yiddish do you? 
It’s all katle kanyes [Yiddish: someone with no skill or knowledge]. Because you can’t separate. If you ask 
me, my whole being, used to be the friends in Tel Aviv. [When people] ask my wife how I look so well, 
she says, “it’s because of his friends.”’ Interview with Ahmad Yusuf Masarweh, ‘Ar‘ara, October 10, 2018. 
449 Ha-‘Olam ha-Ze, December 20, 1967, 4; personal communication with Ahmad Yusuf Masarweh, 
February 6, 2019. 
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Fig. 5.4 “Arab youth working and studying in Tel Aviv looking for room.” 
 
 
Remaking the Home 
Palestinian citizens in Israel incorporated in the first decades of the state into the 
construction industry were forced to make multiple forms of homes away from home. 
They transformed construction sites and fields into temporary dwellings, wrestled with 
the tensions and contradictions of making themselves at home in effectively segregated 
Jewish cities and towns, sometimes even found surrogate families. The fragility of 
Palestinian existence within Israel during those decades, meanwhile, meant that all these 
homes away from home could were hanging on a thread. At the same time, uncertainty 
and grief in the wake of catastrophe and the host of restrictive policies limiting 
Palestinian citizens’ ability to build, work, and move, meant that they also needed to 
make their own homes and communities anew. This remaking was in part a matter of 
building better lives and better opportunities for themselves and their families, often 
through funding education with construction work’s wages, as discussed above. It was 
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also, however, a material process of physical building and rebuilding in the face of 
poverty and state restrictions. 
As part of a broader strategy of “Judaization,”450 Israeli state policy, which both 
the military administration and the planning organs of the Ministry of the Interior 
enacted, actively sought to limit Palestinian construction which could expand villages’ 
built areas onto lands expropriated by the state. An effective ban on such expansion, 
which annulled previous British planning legislation, was instituted in 1955 by the 
Regional Planning Committee for the Northern District and then expanded in January 
1957. Later that year, the Regional Planning Committee partnered with the military 
administration to author new local plans for Palestinian localities. These plans defined 
areas for high-density and low-density construction of dwellings, all within the scope of 
the existing built areas. The plans were intended to further – and it was hoped, more 
effectively - curtail villages’ territorial “expansion,” and to encourage internal migration 
to urban centers as village centers became oversaturated. Moreover, until the late 1960s, 
most Palestinian localities had no state-recognized local council (Hebrew: mo‘atza 
mekomit), and accordingly, no locally devised construction town-planning, nor the ability 
to grant permits for construction.451 
 
450 For the concept of Judaization, “the spatial, political, and discursive forces associated with Jewish 
expansion and control over Israel/Palestine,” see: Yiftachel, Ethnocracy; Falah, “Israeli ‘Judaization’ 
Policy in the Galilee.” 
451 Yair Bäuml, “Israel’s Military Rule over its Palestinian Citizens (1948-1968): Shaping the Israeli 
Segregation System,” in Israel and its Palestinian Citizens: Ethnic Privileges in the Jewish State, eds. 
Nadim N. Rouhana and Sahar S. Huneidi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 118; Yosef 
Jabareen and Hakam Dbiat, Adrikhalut ve-Orientalizm ba-Aretz [Architecture and Orientalism in the 
Country] (Haifa: ha-Merkaz le-Heker ha-‘Ir ve-ha-Ezor, 2014), 261; Bäuml, Tzel Kahol Lavan, 142-145; 
Rassem Khamaisi, Mi-Tikhnun Magbil le-Tikhnun Mefateah ba-Yishuvim ha-‘Aravi’im be-Israel [From 
Restrictive Planning to Developmental Planning in Arab Localities in Israel] (Jerusalem: The Floersheimer 
Institute for Policy Studies, 1993), 8-12.  
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These policies did in fact achieve the intended overcrowding of Palestinian towns 
and villages. However, they were unsuccessful in preventing Palestinian citizens from 
building both within the localities’ built-areas and beyond them. To the extent that 
construction permits were granted in Palestinian localities, they intentionally did not meet 
the population’s needs. The result, rather than being the hoped-for migration of younger 
Palestinians to urban centers, however, was the emergence of self-constructed, permit-
less homes both within and beyond the village centers, as well as a distinct architecture.  
Workers, their families and their communities pooled their resources and the 
experience, skills, and knowledge workers had gained largely through construction work 
in the Jewish sector, to craft their own homes. Unable to pay for hired labor, work was 
done voluntarily by members of the community, thus bridging the technical and material 
gaps between “traditional” practices of communal building - of the sort captured in a by 
now famous photograph from the Matson Collection (fig. 5.5) - and the housing 
emergency in which the Palestinian citizens in Israel found themselves.452 
 
452 For studies of “traditional” Palestinian construction methods and house types, see: Tawfiq Canaan, The 
Palestinian Arab House; Ron Fuchs, “The Palestinian Arab House and the Islamic ‘Primitive Hut,” 
Muqarnas, Vol. 15 (1998): 157-177. Recent works move from the “traditional” to newer methods and call 
particular attention to the reliance on self-construction among Palestinian citizens in Israel in the decades 
following the Nakba. See: Jabareen and Dbiat, Adrikhalut u-Orientalizm ba-Aretz, especially Chapter 6; 
Allweil, Homeland: Zionism as Housing Regime, 1860-2011 (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 
Chapter 7; Abed Badran, Space Design, Making and Tectonics in Palestinian architecture in Israel: 
Impacts of the Israeli Project (PhD diss., Cardiff University, 2017). 
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Fig. 5.5 “Building Stone House in Village in Hill Country.” 
Stenograph of communal building practices in early 20th century Palestine. Photographer Unknown, 
Matson Collection, Library of Congress. 
 
  
Perhaps the epitome of such communal construction efforts was the moment of 
casting the concrete for a new home’s roof. Even narrators who did not invoke communal 
construction methods otherwise, almost invariably referred to such practices when I 
presented them with a copy of the chapter discussing construction workers’ songs from 
‘Ali al-Khalili’s Aghani al-‘Amal wa-l-‘Umal fi-Filastin (Songs of Work and Workers in 
Palestine). No one recalled the sort of elaborately crafted songs that al-Khalili discusses 
from the construction sites they worked on (“No one had the time to sing!” Lutuf 
Suleiman remarked). However, all narrators paused when they read the first line of the 
limekiln song “Wali‘ al-Latun (Fire up the Kiln).” “We say wali ‘al-baṭon [fire up/pour 
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the concrete],” Ibrahim Zahalqa said, “so that people don’t tire, everyone starts saying: 
‘wali‘ al-baṭon wali‘, wali‘ al-baṭon wali‘’ [Ibrahim chants].”’453 
As with the communal building practices of the past, many described such 
communal construction, particularly the casting of concrete towards a structure’s 
completion, as cross-generational and cross-gender. Shawqi Khoury also immediately 
recalled the chant: “This one I know!” He exclaimed and began singing. He then 
remembered how both men and women would carry buckets of concrete up ladders to 
pour it (although when he built his house in Fassuta in 1955, he points out, “there were 
enough men, so we didn’t have women”). Ahmad Masarweh too began singing, ‘the 
workers [here] wouldn’t take wages… the neighbors, the workers would come and when 
we would cast the roof, they would say “wali‘ al-baṭon, wali‘.”’454  
While such practices invoked a connection to traditional building practices, narrators 
also described workers utilizing their expertise in newly acquired professions – 
formwork, ironwork, electrical work, plumbing, and more. In describing the process, 
Muhammad Abu Ahmad of Nazareth once again shows his penchant, perhaps cultivated 
through years of fulfilling roles in the Histadrut, for subverting and laying claim to 
Zionist tropes. He recalls a representative of the Histadrut’s Culture Department, who 
 
453 ‘Ali al-Khalili, Aghani al-‘Amal wa-l-‘Umal fi-Filastin [Songs of Labour and Labourers in Palestine], 
second edition (Beirut: Dar Ibn Khaldun, 1980 [1979]), 88-89; Interviews with Ibrahim Zahalqa, Kafr Qar‘, 
October 7, 2018 and Lutuf Suleiman, Bu‘eine, October 19, 2018. Basma Fahoum has called my attention to 
another variation of this song, wali‘ al-babour. This iteration refers to al-babour, an Arabicization of the 
Turkish “vapur”, which itself was adopted from the French or English, “vapour” or “vapor”. In this 
instance, al-babour extends beyond meaning a steam engine, and refers to any kind of engine or gas 
stove/burner. The song was sung by children in anticipation of the starting of an engine or gas stove. 
“Wali‘…,” is thus revealed to be at a sung juncture between carbon-hungry systems - limekilns, motor 
engines, stoves and concrete. 
454 Interviews with Ahmad Yusuf Masarweh, ‘Ar‘ara, October 10, 2018, Shawqi Khoury, Tarshiha, 
October 21, 2018 and Sadeq Dallasheh, Bu‘eine, October 19, 2018. 
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invoked mutual assistance (‘ezra hadadit) as a uniquely Zionist organizational principle. 
Muhammad responded: 
I told him, listen, for us [Palestinians] this mutual assistance was natural. With 
you it’s planned. You used your brains [to figure out] what is good for the society 
in Israel…. But for us it’s natural. He said, “How do you mean?” I said that when 
someone wants to build a house in our neighborhood, the people from the 
neighborhood who do excavations come and do the excavation for the 
foundations for free. When they’re done, everyone who is a form worker 
comes…. Then the ironworker comes…. Casting [concrete], everyone comes, 
everyone gathers “there’s a concrete pouring at Nimrod’s, yalla, everyone come!” 
Everyone comes and helps during the concrete casting. When the concrete’s done, 
who’s a plasterer in the neighborhood? The plasterer and two others come, in two-
three days they finish the plastering, volunteers. Same thing for an electrician, 
plumbing, carpentry. He asked me, “Is it really like that?” I said, “What do you 
think, that the Israeli state built our houses? You the Jews had your houses built 
for you; we built our own. That’s mutual assistance (‘ezra hadadit).”455 
 
This communal pooling of skills served to introduce new construction techniques 
and materials, as well as new spatial arrangements and architectural forms to Palestinian 
homes within Israel. Studies of post-1948 Palestinian architecture have examined these 
changes and given the new forms various names: Yosef Jabareen and Hakam Dbiat’s, 
“post-traumatic architecture,” Yael Allweil’s “ṣumud (steadfastness) architecture,” and 
Abed Badran’s “crush and transform.” They document the same material and spatial 
shifts workers and their families described in my conversations with them: a move away 
from stone construction to reinforced concrete, and the increased division of the home 
into spaces defined according to function, in place of the “traditional” single-space 
home.456 
 
455 Interview with Muhammad Abu Ahmad, Nazareth, October 20, 2018. 
456 For the single-space village house, see: Jabareen and Dbiat, Architecture and Orientalism, 246-253; 




Where workers’ testimonies diverge from architectural scholarship is in their 
ability to animate and claim the agency that drove these adaptations, which otherwise 
appear to be driven primarily by abstract concepts and forces, or forever awaiting their 
absent planners and architects.457 Ibrahim Shamshoum holds great pride in his record of 
construction in ‘Arrabe and in the architectural and technical innovations he introduced to 
the city’s (then still a village) built environment, starting with his own home: 
When we travelled to the city we became aware of the developments in 
construction, and we wanted to implement them in our town. For example, if I 
was building a house, building a beautiful house in Haifa, or in Tel Aviv, or in 
Jerusalem, I wanted to have a beautiful house here as well. I mean, I, when I built 
my house, [then] for the first time, I thought that the boy should have a room, the 
girl should have a room, [there should be] a parlor, a bedroom, a kitchen, a 
bathroom. Before there wasn’t that [kind of construction in ‘Arrabe], very little.458 
 
Ibrahim repeatedly referred to the expertise he and others gained while working in 
Tel Aviv and elsewhere as khibra, knowledge learned through experience. When he 
brought this expertise with him back to ‘Arrabe, its application was not limited just to 
introducing internal divisions to a home which was until then frequently constructed 
 
“types” of architecture which emerged in Palestinian villages in Israel in the wake of 1948, see: Jabareen 
and Dbiat, Architecture and Orientalism, 288-300; Allweil, Homeland, 208-213; Badran, Space Design, 
Making and Tectonics, 389-419. Of the three works, only Jabareen and Dbiat’s makes mention of the 
preponderance of “skilled local manpower in the construction industry,” which they list among the 
“advantages” of what they have termed the “post-traumatic model” of Palestinian housing. 
457 In this sense, these narratives allow us to follow Farha Ghannam’s suggestion that we examine the 
construction of modern built environments as the product not only of “planners and political figures,” but 
also of what she calls, following Michel de Certau, “the ordinary practitioners of the city.” Although 
Ghannam’s research focuses on the Cairene metropolis and on forced migrations driven by development 
economics, there are notable similarities in the practices and perceptions of what constitutes “modern” 
housing among the residents of the northeastern Cairo neighborhood of al-Zawiya al-Hamra and the 
individuals I interviewed. Farha Ghannam, Remaking the Modern: Space, Relocation, and the Politics of 
Identity in a Global Cairo (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), esp. Chapters 2 and 6. 
458 Interview with Ibrahim Shamshoum, ‘Arrabe, October 12, 2018. 
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around one shared space, but also to technical aspects of the work. “We learned to make 
concrete bands, how to make columns, how to cast a roof,” he explains,  
I was one of the first to have such a house and I transmitted the knowledge which 
I learned to our town. I mean, I’m not an engineer, but I have more experience 
than an engineer in building houses, in homes. I’ve seen many very beautiful 
things [i.e., buildings] when I was working in construction and I carried many 
things in my head (naqalt be-rasi ktir shaghlat) which we [then] used in 
‘Arrabe.459 
 
Ibrahim’s approach to his role in changing ‘Arrabe’s built landscape, portrays him 
and others like him as the active and purposeful transmitters of innovations they “carried” 
with them as they moved between segregated locations. Still, it is important to note that 
although Ibrahim emphasizes the ideas he “carried in his head,” which could be 
understood as emphasizing an abstract intellectual contribution, these could not be 
separated from the embodied skills and capacities he and others acquired and transmitted.  
And yet, precisely because the process of building a home relied upon communal 
support and the skills, knowledge, and workforce collectively at their disposal, 
construction required another resource which poverty and the military administration 
rendered invaluable: time. Construction workers with relatively stable jobs which 
allowed them to be home every day, found themselves working a “second shift” on a 
regular basis. “When we started working for Solel Boneh,” Shawqi Khoury says, “you 
would work a regular eight hours. After eight hours I would go back [home] and help 
people build for another five or six.”460 For these workers, the first shift of the day was as 
a salaried worker, often working on one of the massive housing projects the Israeli state 
 
459 Interview with Ibrahim Shamshoum, ‘Arrabe, October 12, 2018. 
460 Interview with Shawqi Khoury, Tarshiha, October 21, 2018. 
241 
 
carried out to house Jewish immigrants during the decades after 1948. The second began 
once you arrived back home. It was dedicated to building your home and community 
anew in the wake of the Nakba and in the shadow of ongoing dispossession and 
marginalization.  
Moreover, unlike the first shift, which saw Palestinian men working in an almost 
entirely masculinized construction industry, the second shift also fostered the defiance of 
these increasingly rigid gendered boundaries. Palestinian women were integral to the 
(re)construction work carried during on the second shift. And although many women at 
the time were not employed in salaried work, they were engaged in multiple forms of 
unpaid labor both in and outside the home. It was their second shift too.461 
William Andraos (b. 1943), from Tarshiha, began working for Solel Boneh in 
1960. Our conversation was conducted in the presence of his wife, their daughter in law, 
and Anis and Leila Khoury, who introduced me to William. This format, between an 
interview and a family gathering, seemed less than ideal, but the dynamic between the 
Andraos couple, who go by Abu Jamil and Umm Jamil, ended up producing some of the 
most fascinating narratives I was able to take part in.462 After Abu Jamil described how 
 
461 With the “second shift,” as with “invisible work/labor,” I am making use of a term originally coined 
within feminist sociology. Arlie Hochschild originally developed the concept of the second shift to describe 
how American women remained responsible for most labor at home (the work of child-rearing, care, and 
other forms of “housework”) despite their dramatic incorporation into the US workforce. Examining 
primarily middle-class working women, Hochschild observed that rather than this change fostering a more 
egalitarian household within which labor was shared, many women found themselves working two “shifts” 
on a daily basis – one as salaried employees, the second at home. Hochschild’s work is focused on what she 
refers to as the “stalled revolution” in the late twentieth century American home and the development of 
American capitalism. The Palestinian case clarifies, however, that similarly institutionalized second shifts 
which were driven by discrimination, have arisen in drastically different historical circumstances and in 
different forms. Arlie Hochschild and Anne Machung, The Second Shift: Working Families and the 
Revolution at Home, third edition, (New York: Penguin Books, 2012 [1989]). 
462 See “The Narrators” section above. 
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difficult work was and decried the waning of his physical strength, Umm Jamil 
interjected: 
Umm Jamil: Listen, after work, after four, he would come back home, when we 
were building the house here…. [A]fter he would come back, at four thirty I 
would cook, he would eat, drink a cup of coffee and then start working [again], 
everything by hand, I helped him. 
Abu Jamil: We built this building, me and my wife. 
Umm Jamil: This whole building, this house, he built.463 
 
While Abu Jamil clearly sought to share the credit for building their home, Umm 
Jamil seemed hesitant to emphasize her role. Our conversation then moved onto the 
specifics of the construction of the Andraos home, from details regarding the flooring, to 
the time certain tasks took. Anis and Leila also interjected occasionally, explaining that 
“this was how things were done” that is, cooperatively and voluntarily, in contrast to how 
they perceived commercial construction in Tarshiha took place now. Then Anis, who had 
worked under Abu Jamil at Solel Boneh in the late 1960s, brought the conversation back 
to the Andraos couple’s joint work. This time, with both Anis and Abu Jamil gently 
insisting on discussing the construction process as one which the Andraos couple shared 
in, Umm Jamil was more forthcoming about her experience as well. As she spoke, she 
increasingly underscored how her role in their home’s construction defied the otherwise 
distinct gendering of construction work: 
Anis Khoury: He and his wife [built the house]. 
Abu Jamil: Me and my wife. 
Umm Jamil: I’m his assistant [Umm Jamil uses the term ‘ozer, the Hebrew word 
for a male assistant]. 
Nimrod: That’s really interesting. Tell me what you did, when you were building 
the house together? 
Umm Jamil: I did every task… In our roof we have this beam… 
 
463 Interview with Abu Jamil and Umm Jamil Andraos, Tarshiha, October 22, 2018. 
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Abu Jamil: A hanging beam… 
Umm Jamil: Over on that side it used to be very high, so I would dress up like 
that [i.e., like a male worker], with pants and everything, and I would go like this 
with my stomach [Umm Jamil mimics dragging herself on her stomach] and grab 
it [the beam] from above, and after that he would do the formwork. 
Nimrod: So, you did everything? You were assistant form maker, assistant 
ironworker [I continued using the male gendered term for assistant]? 
Umm Jamil: I did more than a young man! [Umm Jamil laughs] I had to! 
Abu Jamil: I would tell her, make this for me… She would make the sand, the 
gravel, sand and cement. I would mix it, she starts handing it to me, and I would 
cast the pillars. Me and her. Me and her… 
Umm Jamil: the kids were [about] ten years old, the little one was still little, the 
other was older. I would give them a small bucket and tell them, “help me, do like 
this [Umm Jamil mimics pouring sand]. Once you’ve done ten each, I’ll give you 
a popsicle.”464 
 
Umm Jamil’s initial use of the masculine-gendered Hebrew term for assistant, 
‘ozer, could be understood as a slip of the tongue, or as reflective of the perceived 
improbability of gendering the role female. However, understanding her use of the term 
as a “mistake” itself seems improbable once her description turns to her physical 
experience of the work – wearing a male worker’s clothing, crawling on her stomach to 
grab the ceiling beam – and culminates in the claim that “[she] did more than a young 
man!” Rather, Umm Jamil’s gender reversal in the narration reflects her keen and playful 
awareness of how she and Abu Jamil had defied the gendered division of labor.  
Her description of how the couple’s children participated in the construction as 
well, allows her to segue into clarifying that for her too building the house was a second 
shift job. Already a mother of three when they began construction, she recalls doing 
housework during the day (“all by hand… hard tasks”), making dinner and “then after 
four… ‘ozer binyan [Umm Jamil laughs, having invoked the reversal again].” Thus, it 
 
464 Interview with Abu Jamil and Umm Jamil Andraos, Tarshiha, October 22, 2018. 
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was not only the skills Abu Jamil learned at Solel Boneh, or the help of other community 
members that allowed the Andraos family to build their home despite meagre means. 
Umm Jamil and Abu Jamil’s temporary suspension of the gendering of construction as 
masculine labor, and Umm Jamil’s willingness to take on physical tasks she herself saw 
as masculine, was crucial.  
Narrators frequently described the emergence of these homemaking practices 
primarily in terms of financial necessity. However, in its defiance of state policies which 
sought to curtail Palestinian construction, building homes in the second shift was already 
a political act. This was made amply clear when the state stepped in via its military 
administration, and actively targeted Palestinian construction for demolition. In such 
instances, construction workers’ skills could place them opposite the state, at the 
frontline. Ibrahim Shamshoum, recalls one such event in ‘Arrabe which almost cost him 
his life: 
One day, in 1957, they [the military administration] destroyed a house here in 
‘Arrabe, saying that it was built without a permit. And we wanted to build it, my 
friends and me. The entire Party [i.e., the Communist Party members in ‘Arrabe] 
and I were able to gather the whole village and we decided to help them build it 
[the house]. That same day we started building it again, we built it that same day 
and when we started casting the concrete, the police, the Military Police came, 
and they beat me nearly to death. To the point, that my mother was told that day, 
“Ibrahim is dead” (Ibrahim mat).465 
 
465 Interview with Ibrahim Shamshoum, ‘Arrabe, October 12, 2018. The intense violence of the military’s 
reaction that day meant that the episode received considerable coverage from the Arabic and Hebrew 
communist press in particular. This has also allowed me to find its exact date –July 1, 1957. On July 2, 
1957, a day after the events, both al-Ittihad and the party’s Hebrew language publication, Kol ha-‘Am 
(Voice of the People) reported what had taken place in ‘Arrabe on their front pages. Both newspapers also 
placed the military’s violence in the context of the oppression of the military administration in general and 
of specific events. Al-Ittihad’s subtitle for the article stated that the police behaved with “intense brutality 
that evoked the dreadful memory of Kafr Qasim (bi-waḥshia baligha ba‘athat dhikrat kafr qasim al-
rahība).” Al-Ittihad, July 2, 1957, 1; Kol ha-‘Am, July 2, 1957, 1. The Hebrew daily Ma‘ariv meanwhile, 
reported on the police force’s arrival to ‘Arrabe, following “several warnings,” without mention of the 
police’s violence, nor of any arrests. Ma‘ariv, July 2, 1957, 3. 
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Fig. 5.6 Ibrahim Shamshoum and friends gathering around a cement mixer during the construction 
of Ibrahim’s house, 1965. Photo courtesy of the Shamshoum family. 
While this was the worst violent beating Ibrahim suffered during his many years 
of activism, it was hardly his first time being arrested for defying or challenging policies 
he viewed as unjust.466 Nor was it the last time the military administration tried to curtail 
his building activities in ‘Arrabe. In 1964, the administration prevented him from 
completing the construction of his own house, he says, for a period of “a whole year, 
twelve months (sineh tameh, tnashar shahr).” Finally, after a year had passed, Ibrahim 
called forty or so his “groups of comrades” (jama‘at rifaqi). “We cast the roof in four 
hours,” he laughs.467 
 
 
466 Ibrahim and several other Communist Party members in ‘Arrabe were arrested multiple times for 
organizing a protest against the “education tax” which the Israeli state levied solely on Palestinian citizens. 
Interview with Ibrahim Shamshoum, ‘Arrabe, October 12, 2018; Kol ha-‘Am, October 11, 1955, 2. For 
more on the “education tax”, see: al-Haj, Education, 62-64. 




The incorporation of many Palestinian men into a nascent Israel’s construction industry 
was overdetermined by an array of historical events and processes stemming from the 
Nakba and the subsequent policies of the Israeli state. Economic distress, land 
expropriation, restrictions on employment and movement, and curtailment of educational 
and professional prospects, all meant that Palestinians were left with little choice as to 
where to seek employment. The construction industry’s absorption of so many 
Palestinian men desperate to find work was part of the industry’s racialization, whereby 
physical labor gradually became dominated first by Mizrahi Jews and then by Palestinian 
Arabs, as Jews of European origins moved into managerial positions and professionalized 
occupations. 
Unsurprisingly then, the history of this incorporation from the perspective of 
Palestinian construction workers is one of dangerous and difficult work, harsh living 
conditions, and child and teenage labor. It is also a history of their encounter with their 
own racialization - of being cast as a threat, sexually and otherwise; being forced to hide 
in plain sight; and experiencing the dangers and humiliations of segregation. At the same 
time, however, through the narratives of workers and their families, other facets of this 
history emerge. A history of personal and communal ingenuity, of relationships built and 
of remarkable capacities to adapt – materially, culturally, and socially – not merely in 
order to survive harsh conditions borne of oppression, but also to find ways to challenge, 
change, and overcome them. Not only by refusing to let go of your home and your 




This dissertation’s inquiry ends in 1973 not because the phenomena it explores – the ties 
between the history of construction and the formation of a racialized social hierarchy in 
twentieth-century Palestine/Israel – suddenly unraveled. If anything, following the Israeli 
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a result of the 1967 war, those ties were 
drawn tighter still. Palestinians from the occupied territories, devoid of citizenship and 
subject to military rule, were swiftly incorporated into Israel’s workforce in the following 
years. If roughly 6 percent of the Palestinian workforce in the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
worked in Israel by 1968, by 1974 nearly a third of the workforce did so. By 1975, 
Palestinians from the occupied territories constituted nearly 30 percent of the entire 
workforce of the Israeli construction industry.468 Stripped of the gains which Palestinian 
with Israeli citizenship had made as workers in the decades prior to 1967 and of even the 
most basic protections of citizenship, non-citizen Palestinian subjects were, and remain, 
an extremely vulnerable population. Precarity and racialized devaluation remained bound 
together with construction work, and, as Leila Farsakh has shown, inextricably linked to 
Israeli state policies of expropriating Palestinian lands and limiting Palestinian economic 
development, this time beyond the so-called “Green Line,” which demarcates Israel’s 
internationally recognized borders.469  
 
468 Yael Berda, Living Emergency, 20; Farsakh, Palestinian Labour Migration, 125, 209. 
469 Farsakh, Palestinian Labour Migration, Chapter 5. As Farsakh notes, in her study of the Gaza Strip’s 
“de-development” under Israeli rule, Sara Roy has also called attention to this relationship between Israeli 
government aims to gain control of Palestinian lands and dispossess Palestinians, and the latter’s 
incorporation into Israel’s labor force as exploited migrant laborers. Roy, The Gaza Strip. Several scholarly 
and cinematic works examine the experiences of Palestinian laborers working across the “Green Line.” 




Nor has this outsourcing of exploitative practices been restricted to the non-
citizen Palestinian labor force. If, before 1967, Israel excavated much of its building 
stone from under the feet of the Palestinian citizens who remained in the state, in the 
decades since it has come to rely on the stone reserves of the occupied West Bank. 
Unburdened by environmental and health and safety regulations which exist within 
Israel’s de jure boundaries and aided by the state, Israeli quarrying in the West Bank has 
caused environmental devastation. The growing international demand for Palestinian 
stone, paired with often limited access to their own agricultural lands, the dire economic 
straits in the West Bank, and the neoliberal economic policies of the Palestinian 
Authority, have led some Palestinians to “carve their own land,” as architect and critic 
Yara Sharif has put it, to support themselves and their families.470  
 Indeed, an attempt to trace all the ways in which construction work, the ability to 
build (and increasingly, to demolish), and even the business entities populating the 
construction industry, remain part and parcel of the colonial, exploitative structure the 
erection of which this dissertation has narrated, would likely furnish an infuriating and 
tragic laundry list. From the Israeli Right’s notion that construction in illegal settlements 
 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003); Malon 9 Kokhavim [Nine Star Hotel], directed by Ido Haar (2006; 
Israel/Palestine; Eden Productions), DVD; Suad Amiry, Nothing to Lose but Your Life: My 18-Hour 
Journey with Murad (Doha: Bloomsbury Qatar Foundation, 2010); Mutasalilun [Infiltrators], directed by 
Khaled Jarrar (2012; Palestine/Lebanon/United Arab Emirates; Dubai Media and Entertainment 
Organization), DVD; Ross, Stone Men, Chapter 5. Nowhere have Palestinian construction workers been 
more crucial in recent decades than in the building of illegal Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. 
See: Matthew Vickery, Employing the Enemy: The Story of Palestinian Labourers on Israeli Settlements 
(London: Zed Books, 2017).  
470 Yara Sharif, Architecture of Resistance: Cultivating Moments of Possibility within the 
Palestinian/Israeli Conflict (London: Routledge, 2017), 124 & Chapter 4; Idan Landau, “Hotzvim et 
Falastin, Bonim et Israel” [Excavating Palestine, Building Israel], Lo Lamut Tipesh, June 30, 2016 




was the “proper Zionist response” (tguva tziyonit holemet) to all manners of perceived 
Palestinian and international encroachments on Israel, held and acted upon since the late 
1970s; to the disastrous equations of demolition endorsed by current Israeli leadership, 
whereby the homes of Palestinians within Israel built without a permit are demolished to 
appease popular rightwing anger at government demolitions of structures in illegal 
settlements in the West Bank, under the guise of “equitable enforcement.” Looming over 
these trajectories, the ongoing preponderance of injury and unsafe work in Israel’s 
construction industry – particularly in “wet work” jobs in which Palestinians constitute 
the overwhelming  majority – raises the question of how certain lives and bodies become 
less valuable than others.471 A question which I hope this dissertation has done some 
work to address, even as the topic of work accidents proper has remained outside its 
scope. 
 But perhaps, in the spirit of this dissertation’s final chapter and the relationship 
between construction in the material sense and as metaphor, it would be better to 
conclude with an example of how the history this dissertation has examined is shaping a 
Palestinian politics presently seeking to build a fundamentally different future in 
Palestine/Israel. Since the 2015 Israeli elections, the Joint List – a coalition of Palestinian 
and Palestinian-led parties – has reintroduced the promise of foundational change into 
Israel/Palestine’s increasingly stagnant and bleak political landscape. Bringing together 
the socialist Hadash party, the liberal-national Balad, and other smaller Islamic and 
 
471 “Work Accidents in the Construction Sector,” n.d., Kav la-‘Oved  
https://www.kavlaoved.org.il/en/areasofactivity/work-accidents-in-the-construction-sector/ [accessed: 17 
March 2020]; Jasbir K. Puar, The Right to Maim: Debility, Capacity, Disability (Durham: Duke University 
Press Books, 2017). 
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secular parties, the Joint List presented, for the first time since 1948, a united Palestinian 
political front within Israel.472 
Formed partially in response to a law which sought to effectively disenfranchise 
most Palestinian citizens in Israel by raising the percentage of votes required to win a 
place in the Israeli Knesset, the state’s parliament, the party won thirteen seats in its first 
elections in 2015, making it the country’s third largest party. After internal differences 
between its constituent parties and the List’s dismantling led to disappointing results in 
the April 2019 elections, the List was reformed in July of that year.473 In the subsequent 
parliamentary elections, in September 2019 and March 2020, the Joint List won thirteen 
and fifteen seats, respectively. Viewed alongside the steady shrinking of the Zionist Left 
into political insignificance, the explicitly non-Zionist Palestinian List’s ability to 
repeatedly receive the third highest number of votes, an unprecedented achievement, has 
the potential to radically transform parliamentary politics within Israel.474 
 
472 As’ad Ghanem, “Israel’s Second-Class Citizens: Arabs in Israel and the Struggle for Equal Rights,” 
Foreign Affairs 95, no. 4 (July-August 2016): 37-42. 
473 Jack (Jacky) Khoury, “Le’ahar Krisat ha-Reshima ha-Meshutefet, be-Hevra ha-‘Aravit Notru be-‘ikar 
‘im Da’agot” [Following the Collapse of the Joint List, Arab Society is Left Mostly with Concerns], 
Ha’aretz, February 23, 2019 https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/elections/.premium-1.6960747 [last accessed: 
July 1, 2020]; Samah Salaimeh, “Hakamata me-Hadash shel ha-Reshima ha-Meshutefet Mahzira et ha-
Mahrimim ha-Baita” [The Re-establishment of the Joint List Brings the Boycotters Back Home], Siha 
Mekomit, August 13, 2019. 
474 Mahmoud Majadleh, “al-Qa’ima al-Mushtarika Tuqaddim Qai’mat Murassahiha li-l-Knesset al-23” 







[last accessed: July 1, 2020]. On the radical potential of the Joint List’s successes, see: Omri Boehm, “After 
Liberal Zionism, the One Hope for a Democratic Israel,” The New York Review of Books, June 9, 2020, 
https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2020/06/09/after-liberal-zionism-the-one-hope-for-a-democratic-israel/ 
[last accessed: July 1, 2020]. 
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The rise of the Joint List in Israel’s politics has placed the history of construction 
work and the construction industry in the political limelight in two important ways – 
through policy demands and biography. In recent years, parties on the Israeli Right have 
made a motto of the “enforcement” of building regulations – a euphemism for increased 
house demolitions in Palestinian towns within Israel, and controls and restrictions on 
Palestinian locales’ and citizens’ economic and social development. In response, the Joint 
List’s leadership has repeatedly raised the banner of regularization of so-called “illegal 
construction,” the freezing of all demolition orders in Palestinian localities and the 
annulment of legislation intended to intensify “enforcement.” In doing so, the List has 
insisted on the explicitly political and racist nature of an issue which Jewish Israeli 
politicians and public discourse have tended to associate with Arab “lawlessness” (even if 
this association is often accompanied by a wink).475  
Two of the Joint List’s leaders, Ayman Odeh and Aida Touma-Sliman, both of 
the communist wing of the socialist Hadash party, have publicly emphasized the role 
construction work has had in their own personal biographies. In interviews, on the 
podium of the Israeli Parliament, even in a profile of Odeh’s in the New Yorker, Odeh 
 
475 Jack Khoury and Yonatan Liss, “Ha-Reshima ha-Meshutefet Tatziv le-Kahol Lavan Drishot ke-Tnai le-
Hamlatza Bifney ha-Nasi” [The Joint List will Present Blue and White with Demands as Conditions for a 
Recommendation before the President], Ha’aretz, September 21, 2019 
https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/elections/.premium-1.7870600 [last accessed: July 1, 2020]. The List has 
also been at the forefront of drawing attention to the critical state of work safety in Israel’s construction 
industry. “Va‘adat ha-‘Avoda Ishra le-Kri’a Rishona: Atar Bniya she-’Ir‘a bo Teunat ‘Avoda Kasha – 
Yisager” [The Labor Committee Approved for a First Reading: Construction Sites Where a Severe 
Accident Occurred will be Closed], Knesset News, June 21, 2016 
https://main.knesset.gov.il/News/PressReleases/pages/press21616c.aspx [last accessed: July 1, 2020]; Lee 
Yaron, “Be-Shel Ribui Te’unot ha-‘Bniya: ha-Knesset Hekima Va‘ada le-Betihut ba-‘Avoda” [Due to the 
Multiplicity of Construction Accidents: the Knesset has Established a Work Safety Committee], Ha’aretz 
July 3, 2017 https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/education/.premium-1.3906876 [last accessed: July 1, 2020]. 
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and Touma-Sliman, both the children of construction workers, have claimed this aspect 
of their respective biographies as formative. Odeh’s meteoric rise onto the national and 
international stage, in particular, has marked him as a unique, potentially generational 
leader. A self-stylized follower of Dr. Martin Luther King, his and Touma-Sliman’s 
political visions stands in stark contrast to the increasingly explicit nationalist and racist 
tenor of mainstream Israeli Zionist politics.476 They are the children of the structure of 
racialized inequality and domination, the building of which this dissertation sought to 
cast light on. The structure itself still stands, taller and more imposing by the day. It has 
never been more urgent to bring it down. Tomorrow is today. 
 
476 Roy Chicky Arad, "My Romance with Ayman Odeh,” Ha’aretz, March 13, 2015 
https://www.haaretz.co.il/magazine/.premium-1.2587355 [last accessed: July 1, 2020]; “H”K Aida Touma 
Sliman be-Ne’um ha-Bekhora: ‘ha-Ratzon Leshanot et ha-Metzi’ut ha-Me‘uvetet Haya Tamid ha-Meni‘a 
la-Pe‘ilut Sheli’” [Member of Knesset Aida Touma Sliman in Her Inaugural Speech: The Desire to Change 
the Convoluted Reality Has Always Been the Motivation of My Work], Knesset News, May 4, 2015 
https://main.knesset.gov.il/News/PressReleases/pages/press4515q.aspx [last accessed: July 1, 2020]; David 
Remnick, “A Palestinian Israeli Leader for Peace,” The New Yorker, January 18, 2016 




Identity Card/Mahmoud Darwish, trans. Denys Johnson-Davies477 (1964) 
Write it down. 
I am an Arab 
And the number of my card is fifty thousand 
I have eight children 
And the ninth is due after summer. 
Does that anger you? 
 
Write it down. 
I am an Arab  
Working with comrades of toil in a quarry. 
I have eight children 
For them I wrest the loaf of bread, 
The clothes and exercise books 
From the rocks 
And beg for no alms at your door, 
Lower not myself at your doorstep. 
Does that anger you? 
 
 
Write it down. 
I am an Arab. 
I am a name without a title, 
Patient in a country where everything 
Lives in a whirlpool of anger. 
My roots 
Took hold before the birth of time 
Before the burgeoning of the ages, 
Before cypress and olive trees, 
Before the proliferation of weeds. 
My father is from the family of the plough 
Not from highborn nobles. 
And my grandfather was a peasant 
Without line or genealogy. 
My house is a watchman's hut 
Made of sticks and reeds. 
 
477 I have made some small alterations to Denys Johnson-Davies’ original translation. I replaced the 
recurring word “record” for sajjil, with the phrase, “write it down”; the recurring question “What’s there to 
be angry about?” for “fa-hal ṭughḍib?”, with “Does that make you angry?”; and I have inserted, in brackets, 
the omitted line “Love communism” in the fourth verse. 
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Does my status satisfy you? 
I am a name without a surname. 
 
Write it down. 
I am an Arab. 
Color of hair: jet black. 
Color of eyes: brown. 
My distinguishing features: 
On my head the 'iqal cords over a keffiyeh 
Scratching him who touches it. 
My address: 
I'm from a village, remote, forgotten, 
Its streets without name 
And all its men in the fields and quarry. 
 [Love communism] 
Does that anger you? 
 
Write it down. 
I am an Arab. 
You stole my forefathers' vineyards 
And land I used to till, 
I and all my children, 
And you left us and all my grandchildren 
Nothing but these rocks. 
Will your government be taking them too 
As is being said? 
 
So! 
Write it down at the top of page one: 
I don't hate people, 
I trespass on no one's property. 
And yet, if I were to become hungry 
I shall eat the flesh of my usurper. 
Beware, beware of my hunger 
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